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PREFACE 
All authors naturally hope that their winged words will in the 
end interest many readers, perhaps for quite unanticipated reasons. 
At various points during the writing process, however, an author 
often finds himself thinking about particular groups of people with 
whom he has been in contact. In writing this book, I have had three 
groups of potential readers particularly in mind. 
To begin with, I hope that my analysis of recent economic pro-
blems in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and of the scope for 
accelerating material progress through more effective development 
planning, will be relevant to the practical concerns of government 
officials and private leaders in East Africa who are already engaged 
in development activities. An academic economist's attempt to 
consider the development process as a comprehensive whole, using 
statistical information wherever possible and trying to deal con-
cretely with policy issues, may offer at least a fresh vantage point 
for practical decision-makers. 
I have also had very much in mind the possible interests of students 
at the three university colleges in Kampala, Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam (and perhaps in other underdeveloped countries), who are 
preparing for future positions of responsibility affecting economic 
development. I hope that in presenting general techniques of 
development planning, working through a detailed statistical 
projection model for the East African economies, and applying 
economic tools to analysing the actual development plans of the 
three governments, this book may prove to be helpful to them. 
Thirdly, professional economists throughout the world concerned 
with economic development are aware that the published literature 
includes very few studies of operational experience with development 
planning. I hope that my analysis may be a small contribution 
to this large and inadequately treated subject. In this connection, 
I would suggest that the Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania economies 
are (in a meaningful sense) at a comparatively early stage of deve-
lopment, and that both similarities and differences between develop-
ment planning in East Africa and in other underdeveloped countries 
may be of considerable theoretical interest. 
This book was written during the two years (mid-1963 to mid-
1965) which I spent as Director of Economic Research at the East 
African Institute of Social Research, Makerere University College, 
Uganda. These two years were for me personally an extremely 
stimulating and gratifying experience, and I am indebted to many 
people who directly or indirectly contributed to what I have written. 
First and foremost, there are the members of our economic develop-
ment research group, whose individual research studies gradually 
built up a degree of shared appreciation of development problems 
i 
in East Africa, and whose discussions at our regular seminars 
helped all of us to clarify what we were doing: Azarias Baryaruha, 
Charles Frank, Dharam Ghai, Richard Jolly, Yoeri Kyesimira, 
George Lomoro, Priyatosh Maitra, Philip Ndegwa, Ernil Rado, 
and Brian Van Arkadie. There are also many other members of 
the Makerere faculty to whom I would like to express gratitude 
for both intellectual stimulus and organizational support. Here 
let me mention only those who during part or all of the two-year 
period played a major role in guiding the Institute's general research 
functions in the social sciences: Raymond Apthorpe, Philip Bell, 
Deryke Belshaw, Josef Gugler, Colin Leys, Merrick Posnansky, 
Aidan Southall, Derrick Stenning, and Ralph Tanner. Finally, 
I am deeply appreciative of the friendly cooperation extended so 
consistently by government officials in the three countries. I feel 
compelled to thank particularly John Kakonge, James Ilett, 
Anna Martens, and Colin Bruce in Uganda; Gary Karmiloff, 
John Kinyunyu, and John Scott in Tanzania; and Edgar Edwards, 
Oliver Knowles, and (after he moved from Makerere to the 
government) Philip Ndegwa in Kenya. But beyond this short list, 
I wish to express my appreciation to many others whose accessibility 
and candour helped make East Africa such a rewarding place in 
which to undertake applied economic research. 
Paul G. Clark 
Williams College 
Williamstown, Mass. 
September, 1965 
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CHAPTER I T H E ELEMENTS OF C O M P R E H E N S I V E 
PLANNING 
Development efforts in East Africa are in transition from a 
phase of public project planning to a phase of comprehensive 
planning for the economy as a whole. The governments of Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania share the widespread conviction in under-
developed countries that through comprehensive planning they 
can markedly accelerate past rates of material progress in their 
economies. They also have other motives for planning—to increase 
rapidly participation by Africans in modern economic activities 
previously conducted largely by Europeans and Asians; to attain 
greater scope for autonomy in national economic policies, which is 
often interpreted as increasing the share of domestic manufacturing 
and decreasing the share of export agriculture in the national pro-
duct; and to implement a philosophy of African socialism, empha-
sising social welfare uses of both public and private enterprise. 
The three governments are undertaking this transition with different 
national styles, yet a common movement toward comprehensive 
planning seems clearly under way. 
Naturally the transition is not accomplished overnight. In 
the subsequent chapters I shall discuss various aspects of the status 
of development planning in East Africa as of mid-1965. It may 
help to place the present situation in context by examining first the 
essential elements of comprehensive planning. These elements are 
defined fundamentally by the nature of the problems to be solved 
in guiding an economy as a whole on a path of accelerated growth. 
They are also indicated by the experience of other underdeveloped 
countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa which initiated 
development planning earlier. 
Public Project Planning and Comprehensive Planning1 
Let me begin by suggesting the main ways in which comprehen-
sive planning will diverge f rom the methodology of "the old plans" 
in East Africa. By the old plans I refer to the Uganda five-year 
plan for fiscal years 1961/62-1965/66, the Tanganyika three-year 
plan for 1961/62-1963/64 and the Kenya three-year plan with a one-
year extension for 1960/61-1963/64.2 Correspondingly " the new 
plans" are the Tanzania five-year plan for 1964/65-1968/69, the 
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Kenya six-year plan for 1964/65-1969/70 (which is being revised for 
the remaining five years), and the Uganda second five-year plan 
for 1966/67-1970/71 (which is not yet completed)^ All the new 
plans attempt a major advance towards comprehensive planning, 
though unevenly as we shall see, and illustrate the transition which is 
taking place. 
First, a comprehensive plan would be based on explicit quan-
titative analysis of desired objectives for the economy as a whole, 
from which the development activities of the immediate plan-period 
are derived. By contrast, the method of constructing the old 
plans was essentially that of selecting and adding together the public 
projects which appeared most promising within a rough estimate 
of the total amount which might possibly be financed. It is true 
that both the Tanganyika and Uganda plans took advantage of 
broad economic surveys undertaken by visiting IBRD missions, 
but the roughly projected rates of growth of gross domestic product 
in the plans were essentially independent of the sets of public pro-
jects finally included. 
Second, a comprehensive plan would embrace private invest-
ment as well as public expenditures, and would set targets for 
private economic activity needed to accomplish the plan objectives. 
By contrast, the old plans covered expenditures by only the central 
government and some public agencies, plus limited private partici-
pation in certain public projects. There is a chapter in the Uganda 
plan about private investment intentions, but it is based on an 
experimental survey and is related only tangentially to the plan 
proper. None of the plans provides a set of targets for all the 
main branches of private economic activity. 
Third, a comprehensive plan would place greater emphasis on 
implementation procedures, and particularly on policy instru-
ments designed to induce private actions in accordance with the 
plan. By contrast, the old plans presume that public expenditures 
will be implemented through normal budgetary procedures of the 
Ministries of Finance, and that economic policy instruments will be 
adjusted separately if and when the need becomes apparent. 
In the circumstances of East Africa, a special implementation 
problem arises from the fact that some of the most important policy 
instruments which might guide the path of economic development 
in the three countries are kept essentially uniform because of the 
common market. I refer in particular to rates of customs duty, 
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by which protection policies are implemented; to monetary and 
credit policies, which have been operated through the common 
currency board (but are now to be governed by separate central 
banks); to the level and structure of business taxation, which might 
be a key instrument of industrialisation policy; and to investment 
in railways and communications, now operated as common services. 
The gap between separate national development plans and essentially 
uniform policies for these key instruments is at present a source 
of tension among the three countries, as discussed in Chapter VII. 
The trend toward comprehensive planning seems bound to bridge 
this gap, either by completely disrupting the present degree of 
economic integration, so that these instruments can be used to 
carry out the national development plans, or by coordinating the 
separate development plans, in particular areas, so as to employ 
some common instruments more energetically and effectively. 
These three points of contrast between public project planning 
and comprehensive planning should not be interpreted as sharply 
critical of either the old plans or the imperfections of the new ones. 
There are obviously many practical difficulties to be surmounted 
in introducing a more ambitious methodology, and the process 
takes time. But what seems definite is that the East African 
governments wish to carry forward the transition already under way. 
Designing a Comprehensive Plan 
Designing a plan consists fundamentally in making decisions 
—decisions about the entire range of development activities which 
the government wishes to commit itself to undertake in the current 
plan-period. The programme of activities is then commonly pre-
sented in a plan document. These decisions are predominantly 
quantitative, and accordingly a well-worked-out comprehensive 
plan will depend upon a wide variety of quantitative economic 
calculations. I find it convenient to distinguish three main functions 
of a comprehensive plan, and correspondingly three main kinds 
of quantitative calculations to be used in its design. 
The first function is to determine how large a total programme 
of development activities the economy can support in the current 
plan-period, what main lines of activity are to be undertaken 
and how much progress seems realistically attainable in the economy 
as a whole. In short, the first function is to make the strategic 
decisions around which the specifics of the plan are built. 
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The quantitative economic calculations most closely associated 
with this first function are aggregative analyses of past trends 
in the economy and aggregative projections of future prospects 
under the development plan. These calculations provide a set of 
aggregative targets which are judged to be the maximum attainable 
during the current plan-period, and towards which all development 
activities are directed. By the word "aggregative" here, let me 
make it clear that I do not refer only to national income and product, 
but further to such major aggregates as total exports, total imports, 
total government tax revenues, total government capital formation, 
total borrowing and assistance from abroad, total private capital 
formation, total non-agricultural labour force, total production 
of selected major agricultural crops, and total supply of people 
with secondary and higher education. Techniques of making 
aggregative projections, employing such empirical relationships as 
marginal capital-output ratios, income-elasticities of demand for 
major categories of consumer goods, marginal tax rates, and 
trained manpower requirements, have been described elsewhere.4 
They are part of the common tool-kit of development planners today. 
The size of the development programme which is supportable 
and the amount of progress which is attainable will be limited by 
one or more of four potential constraints—total domestic saving 
plus foreign capital, total foreign exchange receipts, total govern-
ment revenue, and total supply of educated manpower. Ideally 
the development strategy should be adjusted until the plan is at 
the limit simultaneously of all four constraints. That is, expected 
voluntary saving and foreign capital plus acceptable compulsory 
saving should balance the necessary public and private investment; 
planned export promotion and import substitution should be 
consistent with rising import needs; acceptable government taxes 
and domestic borrowing plus the financial counterpart of foreign 
aid should cover both the recurrent and development budgets; and 
graduates from the educational system plus hired foreigners should 
balance the additional needs for educated manpower in all fields of 
employment. 
In East Africa the new plans have advanced furthest in 
handling this first (strategic) function. All the plans focus on the 
desired growth of the economy as a whole, not simply on a set of 
public projects, and establish growth targets notably above those 
achieved in the past. Serious attempts have been made to check 
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the compatibility of the plan with the savings-investment balance, 
the balance of payments, the government budget, and the educated 
manpower balance. The underlying aggregative projections still 
leave scope for technical improvement, and some of the expectations 
of the future are doubtless over-optimistic. But the new plans are 
recognisably comprehensive plans. 
The second main function of a comprehensive plan is to make 
sure that the development activities to be undertaken in all the 
sectors of the economy are consistent with each other and feasible 
within the resources available. This function of sector coordination 
is one of the main advantages to be sought by introducing planning 
to supplement unguided development of the economy. If major 
expenditures are to be made in improving the transportation system, 
requiring imported transportation equipment and fuels, then 
expanded export earnings must be planned to finance them; if 
exports are to be expanded, then broader agricultural extension 
services may have to be provided; if extension services are to be 
extended, then larger expenditures are needed for training agricul-
tural technicians in secondary schools and the university; and 
so on At the same time, the development activities in all sectors 
must obviously fit the resources at the country's disposal, so that 
the plan can be implemented without costly disruption and without 
leaving some sectors partly idle because of bottlenecks. As already 
suggested, the most critical resources are investible capital, foreign 
exchange, government revenue and educated manpower. 
The most refined techniques for carrying out quantitative 
calculations aimed at this second function are the inter-mdustry 
and linear programming tables which are being experimented with 
in such countries as India, the U.A.R. and Colombia. These 
tables pull together into a single consistent statistical framework 
detailed data on the inputs and outputs of 30-100 sectors of the 
economy, showing how output in each sector depends on inputs 
from the others and on the critical resources employed. Thus it is 
possible to calculate, for a given set of output targets in those 
sectors producing finished goods and services, the necessary outputs, 
inputs, and resources employed in all sectors of the economy. 
A single solution is automatically consistent; it can be readily 
checked for feasibility and alternative solutions can be compared.^ 
In East Africa the function of sector coordination has been 
approached more simply and partially. Consistency among sector 
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programmes, commonly formulated by separate working parties 
or individual ministries, has only been checked on an ad hoc basis 
for those inter-dependencies which the planners recognise. At the 
present stage of development, such a simple and partial approach 
in the new plans is doubtless sufficient. Sectors are much less 
interdependent than in more industrialised economies, as most 
produce predominantly for final demands like consumption rather 
than for intermediate demands from other sectors; an inter-industry 
table would have a great many zeros in it. Large export and import 
trade with the rest of the world economy permits a great deal of 
flexibility in the pattern of sector expansion. Looking to future 
plans, however, particularly in Kenya, which is already more indus-
trially advanced, it seems likely that the more refined and systematic 
inter-industry approach to sector coordination will become in-
creasingly necessary. Its use will be a further step in comprehensive 
planning. 
The third main function of a comprehensive plan is to select 
the individual development activities, or projects, which contribute 
most to attainment of the aggregative and sector targets. In part 
this function consists in comparing alternative possible projects 
for producing essentially the same output. If a hydroelectric 
plant is being designed, a choice may have to be made between 
alternative heights of the dam, or between present and future 
installation of generating units not immediately needed to meet 
present demands. In part this function may consist in comparing 
rather different alternative projects within the same broadly-
defined sector. If additional transportation capacity between an 
inland producing area and a country's major port is being considered, 
it may be necessary to choose between expanding the rolling stock 
of the existing railroad and upgrading the traffic capacity of the 
existing road system. And in part this function may even include 
comparison between alternative projects in different sectors of 
the economy. If obtaining more foreign exchange for imported 
capital equipment is accepted as a target, it may be relevant to 
choose between a project for expanding production of an agricul-
tural export crop and a project for manufacturing more textile 
products domestically. 
The quantitative calculations helpful in performing this third 
function fall under the general heading of project analysis. A 
project analysis can take various forms; the benefit-cost ratio 
6 
Development Planning in East Africa 
commonly employed in multi-purpose water resource projects 
may look rather different from the rate of return on investment 
commonly employed in industrial project decisions. But whatever 
the form, in essence project analysis calculates the net increase 
in national product for the economy as a whole from a particular 
project, taking into account both the value of its outputs or services 
and the cost of all its inputs including capital, in terms of their 
potential contribution to national product in other uses. It does 
so in a systematic way which permits comparison with alternative 
projects.6 
The new plans in East Africa have made less progress in dealing 
with this third function of systematic project selection than in 
establishing the aggregative plan strategy. The plans are some-
what uneven, with development activities in some sectors com-
paratively well worked out, using information adequate for evaluat-
ing them, but in other sectors simply sketched. The unevenness 
stems largely from differences in the quality of previous work in 
the various ministries; amid the pressures of drafting the new plans 
the central planning organisations have simply lacked the time and 
experience to establish uniform and systematic procedures for pro-
ject screening. I would suggest that the most significant technical 
advance in comprehensive planning which is attainable in the next 
few years is to do so. Fortunately it seems likely that improvement 
in project selection procedures will be a natural concomitant of 
energetic implementation of the new plans. 
An important theoretical problem in comparing projects is 
that of taking account of the true scarcity values of factor and 
material inputs which they absorb—that is, the values which these 
inputs could produce in other alternative uses. Economists often 
suggest that in countries which have embarked on energetic develop-
ment programmes and which have imperfectly functioning market 
systems, the scarcity values (or shadow prices) of such critical re-
sources as foreign exchange or educated manpower may be above 
their market prices, while the scarcity values of such abundant 
resources as untrained manpower may be below market prices. 
If this is so, then the ranking of alternative projects absorbing 
different combinations of inputs, in terms of the net increases in 
national product which they promise, can be much affected by 
evaluating them with scarcity values rather than market prices. 
Making quantitative estimates of such scarcity values is clearly 
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not easy. The most practicable approach is likely to be a series of 
ad hoc estimates of prices which might balance supply and demand 
for the various resources as rapid development proceeded.7 
Until recently in East Africa it appears that scarcity values 
(except perhaps for untrained manpower, with value actually 
below price) probably did not diverge substantially from their 
market prices. For example, export earnings adequately covered 
import demands, and the supply of (expatriate) educated manpower 
seemed adequate prior to Africanisation. Fundamentally, the 
rate of growth was not being pressed to the limit of the four con-
straints noted above. In the years ahead, however, if more com-
prehensive planning does succeed in accelerating the rate of growth 
until the East African economies run up against these constraints, 
the scarcity values of capital, foreign exchange, government revenue, 
and educated manpower will be above their market prices. Thus 
while systematic project screening procedures would be an impor-
tant improvement even using market prices, by introducing greater 
uniformity of criteria within and between sectors, it would also 
be helpful to go further by making quantitative estimates of key 
scarcity values for use in project analysis. 
Implementing the Plan 
As more and more nations have accumulated experience with 
development efforts, it has become almost a platitude that effective 
implementation is even more challenging than wise design of a 
comprehensive plan. Within government, implementation involves 
continuing day-to-day action, year after year, by thousands of 
officials in hundreds of offices. Civil servants will recognise that 
even with the best will in the world it is extremely difficult for all 
parts of the governmental structure to carry forward the actions 
for which they are responsible promptly and in ways which mesh 
with rather than interfere with actions by other offices. 
Outside government, the private actions needed for successful 
economic development are of course even more decentralised and 
diverse. Nations such as those in East Africa, which maintain a 
mixed economy of private and public enterprises, to preserve the 
advantages of cost-conscious decentralised initiative and simplified 
central administration, must employ fiscal, monetary and regulatory 
policies to induce desired private actions. The question continually 
arises: are private agricultural producers, traders, industrial 
8 
Development Planning in East Africa 
managers, or bankers responding in the ways required for the 
development plan? 
Quantitative economic calculations can make some contribution 
to effective implementation, in both government and private spheres, 
by providing a battery of measures of results as the plan unfolds. 
For example, in implementing a transportation programme in a 
region it would be revealing to keep track simultaneously of how 
many miles of realigned roads the Ministry of Works is completing, 
how many train-miles are being scheduled by the Railways and 
Harbours Administration, how many acres agricultural producers 
are shifting from subsistence crops, and how many lorries private 
trucking firms are being induced to invest in. One can also suggest 
certain general points about the kinds of quantitative measures of 
results to devise. First, the measures should whenever possible be 
measures of outputs rather than inputs. Particularly within 
government, there is a tendency to measure development progress 
in terms of budgetary expenditures. Yet how much more relevant 
it is to measure results of the activities of the Ministry of Education 
in terms of numbers of graduates with different levels of training, 
rather than in terms of expenditures on buildings or teachers' 
salaries. Output measures also provide an invitation to calculate 
costs per unit of output, which can be very suggestive in choosing 
among alternative activities, such as alternative ways of organising 
secondary education. Second, measures of results will be most 
useful for plan implementation if their scope is sufficiently narrow 
to be related to activities of particular government agencies or 
particular groups of private producers. Lagging activities need to 
be identified before they can be corrected. 
The most important actions involved in effective implementa-
tion of a comprehensive plan, however, are (a) centralised organisa-
tion and procedures for supervising planned development activities 
throughout the government, and (b) energetic and coherent use 
of economic policy instruments to guide decentralised private 
development activities. In East Africa under the new plans cen-
tralised supervision of plan implementation is still in a somewhat 
formative state. All three governments have established develop-
ment planning in new ministries separate from Finance, the tradi-
tional locus of such central supervision as existed; Tanzania at 
first went furthest by establishing a Directorate of Development 
Planning in the President's office, with three ministers and implicitly 
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some authority in development matters over regular ministries. 
But the scope in practice for centralised plan supervision temains 
to be evolved during the course of the three governments' new plans. 
In addition to the public administration problems of fitting new forms 
of central surveillance into regular ministry operations while 
expediting rather than inhibiting action, and of course endemic 
rivalries among ministries, a basic political issue is the priority to be 
given in the immediate future to economic development relative 
to other government goals, such as improved public welfare services 
and greater international prestige. 
The new plans in East Africa are perhaps least advanced in 
their use of economic policy instruments to guide plan implementa-
tion. Greater attention still tends to be given to the government's 
own development expenditures than to changes in general tax rates 
needed to finance an appropriate share of development budgets, 
monetary policies needed to promote bank lending to both public 
and private borrowers, business regulations needed to stimulate a 
greater flow of private saving into investment, or adjustments in 
the tariff structure needed to induce the projected degree of import 
substitution in manufacturing. This general underemphasis on 
economic policy instruments may stem in part from the fact that 
certain policies involve negotiations with common market partners, 
and in part from the governments' reluctance to spell out in the plan 
document future implementing actions such as tax changes. But 
during the course of the new plans it seems likely that the need for 
more energetic use of economic policy instruments, as a vital element 
of the comprehensive planning process, will be increasingly recog-
nised. 
Footnotes 
1. Portions of this chapter have been published previously in my article, 
"Towards More Comprehensive Planning in East Africa", East African 
Economic Review, December, 1963. The article places greater emphasis 
on the uses of quantitative techniques. 
2. See Uganda Government, The First Five- Year Development Plan, 1961/62-
1965/66; Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 
1961/62-1963/64; Kenya Government, The Development Programme 1960/63, 
and Development Estimates for the Year 1963/64. There were earlier 
plans going back to post-World War II years. 
3. See Tanzania Government, Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development, 1964; Kenya Government, Development Plan 1964-1970, 
1964. The new Uganda plan is expected to be published early in 1966. 
Note that I shall refer throughout to Tanzania even though the new plan 
and the economic data refer only to the former Tanganyika, without 
Zanzibar. 
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4. Various U.N. publications do an excellent job of exposition. See UN 
(ECAFE), Programming Techniques for Economic Development, 1960; 
UN (ECAFE), Formulating Industrial Development Programs, 1961; UN 
(ECLA), An Introduction to the Technique of Programming, 1955; and UN 
(ECLA), The Economic Development of Colombia, 1957 (a detailed illustra-
tion). 
5. A standard exposition of these techniques is H.B. Chenery and P. G. Clark, 
Interindustry Economics, Wiley, 1959. See also the U.N. sources cited in 
footnote 4. 
6. Project analysis techniques are described in various U.N. publications. 
See UN (ECAFE), Formulating Industrial Development Programmes, 1961; 
and UN (ECLA), Manual on Economic Development Projects, 1958. 
7. Jan Tinbergen, The Design of Development, Johns Hopkins, 1958, has a 
good discussion of scarcity values, called accounting prices in his termi-
nology, especially in chapter III. See also the U.N. sources cited in footnote 6. 
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CHAPTER II. TRENDS IN T H E UGANDA, TANZANIA AND 
KENYA ECONOMIES . 
The new and more ambitious development plans of the East 
African governments are designed to alter significantly the pre-
viously proceeding trends in the three economies: The funda-
mental desired change is of course to accelerate markedly the overall 
rates of growth, but as part of this process the new plans also 
visualise significant structural changes. These desired effects of 
the new plans are examined in subsequent chapters. The old plans, 
by contrast, appear to have had very little effect either on the rates 
of growth or on the structures of the economies. 
What have been the previously proceeding trends in the three 
East African economies? To examine this question, about fifty 
standardised statistical series for the years 1954 to 1964 are assembled 
in Tables II-A (Uganda), II-B (Tanzania), and II-C (Kenya) at the 
end of this chapter. These constitute the basic economic data 
which we shall use here for interpreting recent economic trends, 
and also later for construction of statistical projection models. 
From these basic data, certain key indicators of economic trends 
are summarised in text Tables II-1 (Uganda), II-2 (Tanzania), 
and II-3 (Kenya), immediately following. Table II-4 also presents 
a summary of the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves 
for East Africa as a whole since 1956. 
Before examining the trends over time, however, let us note 
a few general points of comparison among the three economies, 
as reflected in the tables.1 Measured in terms of monetary gross 
domestic product, the Kenya economy is in the order of one and a 
half times as large as Uganda and one and a third times as large as 
Tanzania. We neglect subsistence product here because the statis-
tical estimates are not sufficiently reliable to warrant distinctions 
among the three countries, and because the development process is 
presumably reflected almost entirely in monetised activities. The 
three countries' populations are roughly 1 \ million for Uganda, 
9 million for Kenya, and 10 million for Tanzania. This implies 
that average monetary product per capita is highest in Kenya, 
next in Uganda, and lowest in Tanzania; actually the high Kenya 
average derives largely from the European and Asian communities, 
so that the average monetary income of Kenya Africans is apparently 
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about the same as Tanzania, and well below Uganda.2 Kenya's eco-
nomy, moreover, is more industrialised, with an urban product (i.e., 
in mining and manufacturing, transport and power, commerce and 
services, and government) in the order of twice that in the other two 
countries, and with urban employment about times as great. 
The trade patterns of the three countries (which include inter-
territorial trade) are distinctive. Kenya is highly dependent 011 
imports, which amount to over 40 per cent of monetary GDP, 
has a comparatively large share of non-agricultural exports (espe-
cially in interterritorial trade) in her total, and tends to have a 
substantial negative balance of trade. Tanzania is similarly de-
pendent on imports, but has predominantly agricultural exports, 
and tends to have a modest positive balance of trade. Uganda is 
distinctly less dependent on imports than the other two (though 
still over 30 per cent), like Tanzania has predominantly agricultural 
exports, but tends to have a substantial positive balance of trade 
(though it would be smaller if valued at her border rather than 
Mombasa). Rates of gross investment in the three countries have 
fluctuated markedly in different years, as we shall examine further 
below; the only comparative point to note here is that the role of 
public investment (including parastatal organisations) has been 
significantly larger in Uganda than in the other two countries. 
Finally, the shares of government current expenditures and tax 
revenues are broadly similar in the three countries, with Kenya's 
a little higher, reflecting a little more extensive government services. 
Table II- l . Uganda: Indicators of Economic Trends^ 
(£ million, unless otherwise indicated) 
Rate of Rate of Rate of 
1954 1958 1962 1964' Growth Growth Growth 
54-58 58-62 62-64 
(%) (%) (%) 
GDP,monetary . . . . 93.0 106.3 107.9 148.9 +3°.4 + 0 . 4 + 1 7 . 5 
GDP volume . . . . 79.1 95.1 107.2 131.7 + 4 . 7 + 3 . 0 e +10.8 e 
Ag. product . . . . 56.6 57.2 50.0 75.0 + 0 . 0 —3.3 + 2 2 . 5 
Urbanproduct . . . . 32.5 44.9 54.0 70.5 + 8 . 4 + 4 . 7 + 1 4 2 
Gross investment 18.5 20.2 16.4 24.3 + 2 . 2 —5.1 + 2 1 . 7 
Public investment 14.4 12.1 9.1 —4.3 —6.9 
Investment: ratio to GDP 
volume 23 %c 21% 15% 18% 
Capital-output ratio*1 3.6 3.8 
Urban employment (th) 123.1 134.8 131.2 h + 2 . 3 —0.7 h 
Construction empl. (th) 45.4 36.6 28.6 h —5.0 —6.0 h 
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Exports . 48.6 52.6 48.0 76.1 + 2 . 0 —2.3 + 2 5 . 9 
Ag. exp. volume . 34.0 37.4 37.7 46.5 + 2 . 4 + 0 . 2 e + 11.le 
Imports . 28.4 34.3 33.9 46.4 + 4 . 8 —0.5 + 17.0 
Imports: ratio to GDP • 30% 32% 31% 31% 
Balance of trade . 20.2 18.3 14.1 29.7 
Bal. on curr. acct. 7.8 —2.2 5.7f 
Gov. current expend. . 13.3 19.1 23.2 29.7 + 9 . 5 + 5.0 + 13.1 
Gov. tax revenue . 19.8 21.8 24.3 33.9 + 2.4 + 2.8 + 18.1 
Taxes: ratio to GDP • 21% 20% 23% 23% 
Gov. financial bal. . . 6 .4 2 .4 2 .2 3.9 
Gov. capital expend. . 6 .6 6.0 4 .7 12.4 
Retail prices (index) . 100d 96 85 94 —1.3 —2.8 + 5 . 1 
Cost of living (index) . 100 116 126 134 + 3 . 6 + 2 . 1 + 3.0 
(a) For detailed series and definitional notes see Table II-A. 
(b) Capital-output ratio 54-58 is cumulative gross investment 54-57, less 
estimated retirement at 7 per cent of GDP volume, divided by increase 
in GDP volume between 54 and 58; similarly for other time-periods. 
(c) 28 percent in 1955. 
(d) 1955. 
(e) If 1962 is adjusted upward £5 million for normal cotton crop, 1958-62 
rates of growth of G D P volume and ag. export volume become 4.2% 
and 3.4%, 1962-64 become 8.2% and 4.4%. 
( / ) 1963. 
(Ii) Total employment decreased in 1963, increased in 1964, but remained 
below 1962. 
(0 National accounts, investment and budget figures preliminary. 
Table II-2. Tanzania: Indicators of Economic Trends^ 
(£ million, unless otherwise indicated) 
Rate of Rate of Rate of 
1954 1958 1962^ J964e Growth Growth Growth 
54-58 58-62 62-64 
(%) (%) (%) 
GDP monetary . . . . 79.1 97.9 123.3 171.7 + 5 . 5 + 5 ° 9 + 1 3 . 1 
(134.0) 
GDP volume . 74.8 101.8 124.7 159.3 + 8.0 + 5.2 + 8.5 
(135.4) 
Ag. product . 35.1 39.2 48.5 68.0 + 2 . 8 + 5.5 + 1.70 
(49.7) 
Urban product . 37.8 52.6 66.8 96.2 + 8.6 + 6.2 + 10.9 
(78.3) 
Gross investment . 21.8 22.7 24.4 30.6 + 1.0 + 4 . 2 + 11.9 
Public investment . 10.2 8.5 9.5 11.4 —4.5 + 2.8 + 9 .5 
Investment: ratio to GDP 
volume . 29% 22% 20% 19% 
(18%) 
Capital-output ratiob 2 .6 2 .8 
Non-ag. employment (th) . . 191.0 177.5 172.0 197.8 —1.8 —0.8 —1.6 
(204.1) 
Exports . 38.8 46.4 56.0. 76.5 + 4 . 6 + 4 . 8 + 16.9 
Ag. exp. volume . 28.6 42.4 46.8 51.5 +10.3 + 2.5 + 4 . 9 
Imports . 37.8 42.6 51.5 59.7 + 3.0 + 4 . 8 + 7 . 7 
Imports: ratio to GDP . 48% 44% 42% 35% 
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Balance of trade 
Bal. on curr. acct. 
1.0 3.8 4 .5 16.9 
—5.4 —7.0 + 6 . 4 d 
Gov. curr. expend. . . 
Gov. tax revenue 
Taxes: ratio to GDP 
Gov. financial balance 
Gov. capital expend. 
14.3 
17.7 
22% 
2.7 
3.3 
17.3 20.1 
20.5 25.1 
21% 20% 
(19%) 
1.0 1.5 
5 .2 5.7 
27.8 + 4 . 9 + 3 . 8 + 1 7 . 6 
34.6 + 3 . 7 + 5 . 2 + 1 7 . 4 
20% 
1.6 
10.0 
Retail prices (index) 
Cost of living (index) 
100 
100 
104 103 
112 — 
105 + 1 . 0 —0.2 + 1 . 0 
1-2.9 — — 
(o) For detailed series and definitional notes see Table II-B. 
(b) For definition see Table II-l , note b. 
(c) Revised figures in parentheses are comparable to 1964. 
Cd) 1963. 
(e) National accounts, investment, and budget figures preliminary. Budget 
figures are partly estimated from statements in budget speech. 
Table II-3. Kenya: Indicators of Economic Trends'1 
(£ million, unless otherwise indicated) 
Rate of Rate of Rate of 
1954 1958 1962 1964 Growth Growth Growth 
54-58 58-62 62-64 
G D P monetary 
(%) (%) (%) 
112.4 155.5 180.9 209.2 + 8.4 + 3.9 + 7 . 5 
G D P volume 110.7 156.2 179.3 204.3 + 9 . 0 + 3.5 + 6.8 
Ag. product 28.4 34.6 39.9 48.4 + 5.1 + 3.6 + 10.1 
Urban product 77.8 112.5 134.3 156.5 + 9 . 7 + 4 . 5 + 7 . 9 
Gross investment 35.3 40.0 33.3 32.8 + 3.2 —1.4 —0.7 
Public investment 16.7 13.3 12.8 9 .8 —5.5 —1.0 —12.5 
Investment: ratio to 
GDP volume 32% 26% 19% 16% 
Capital-output ratio') 2 .9 4 .6 
Urban empl. (th) 298.7 322.8 323.2 330.8 + 2 . 0 + 0 . 0 + 1.2 
Constr. empl. (th) . . 22.6 20.9 12.6 8.2 —1.9 —11.9 —19.4 
Exports 28.6 46.2 62.5 79.4 + 12.7 + 7 . 8 + 12.7 
Ag. exp. volume 19.1 35.3 40.0 44.5 + 16.6 + 3.2 + 5.5 
Imports 65.6 66.3 76.8 88.0 + 0 . 3 + 3 . 8 + 7 . 0 
Imports: ratio to GDP 58% 43% 42% 42% 
Balance of trade —37.1 —20.1 —14.4 —8.5 
Bal. on curr. acct. —18.6 —4.8 + 1.4° 
Gov. curr. expend. . . 34.0 41.0 47.1 + 4 . 8 + 7 . 2 
Gov. tax revenue 37.7 45.0 50.3 + 4 . 5 + 5.7 
Taxes: ratio to GDP 24% 25% 24% 
Gov. financial bal. . . + 1.2 —0.6 —2.0 
Gov. capital expend. 8.0 9 .4 8 .8 d 
Retail prices (index) . . 100 108 108 + 1 . 9 + 0 . 0 
Cost of living (index) 100 111 122 124 + 2 . 6 + 2 . 4 + 0 . 8 
(a) For detailed series and definitional notes see Table II-C. 
(b) For definition see Table II- l , note b. 
(c) 1963. 
(d) Excluding Settlement. 
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Economic Trends in Three Time-Periods 
It seems meaningful to distinguish three time-periods in the 
recent economic history of the East African economies, (a) In the 
mid-fifties, as reflected in the indicators for the years 1954-58, the 
economies were growing relatively rapidly, with expanding volumes 
of agricultural exports, with relatively high rates of investment 
(though already declining), and with relatively satisfactory trends 
in most aspects of the economies. (b) In the late-fifties and early-
sixties, as reflected in the indicators for 1958-62, the economies 
suffered serious retardation in their rates of growth, with agricultural 
exports sluggish, with rates of investment depressed to much lower 
levels, and with trends in most aspects of the economies adversely 
affected, (c) In the mid-sixties, as reflected in the indicators for 
1962-64, the economies have again been growing quite rapidly, but 
almost entirely under the impact of an abrupt rise in export earnings, 
due to both price and volume increases, and with little change in 
investment rates. Of course, there are differences among the three 
countries, as we shall note, and there is always some arbitrariness 
in defining time-periods in economic series, but I think this is a 
meaningful framework for analysing the economic setting of the 
old and new development plans. It should also be kept in mind 
that since populations have been growing two to three per cent 
per year, rates of growth in per capita output have been about 
that much less than the figures examined below. 
In Uganda the rates of growth in GDP volume (i.e. monetary 
GDP corrected for agricultural export prices3) were 4.7 per cent, 
3.0 per cent, and 10.8 per cent in the three periods. Uganda, 
however, suffered the greatest impact of the adverse trends in world 
prices up until 1962, so that her monetary GDP at actual prices 
rose even more slowly, and was virtually stagnant from 1958 to 
1962. On the other hand, the abrupt rise from 1962 to 1964 
included in her case a substantial rise in volume of agricultural 
exports (though part probably consisted of coffee smuggled from 
Congo and Tanzania) as well as in their prices. Tanzania grew 
consistently more rapidly than Uganda up until the last two years, 
with rates of growth in GDP volume of 8.0 per cent, 5.2 per cent 
and 8.5 per cent in the three periods. She also experienced less 
adverse trends and a different time pattern in export prices, so that 
her monetary G D P at actual prices consistently expanded in the 
5-6 per cent range, even before the recent export boom. Kenya 
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also grew at higher rates than Uganda, with a pattern broadly similar 
to Tanzania's, though with greater retardation in the years 1958 
to 1962, and with much less of a boom in the last two years. Her 
rates of growth in GDP volume were 9.0 per cent, 3.5 per cent and 
6.8 per cent in the three periods. She also had the most stable 
export prices, so that her monetary G D P in actual prices generally 
moved similarly to GDP volume. 
The most disturbing trend, in all three countries and over 
all three periods, has been a continued decline in rates of investment, 
with only a slight pick-up during the most recent boom. In Uganda 
it fell from 28 per cent of GDP volume in 1955 to 21 per cent in 
1958 to 15 per cent in 1962 to 18 per cent in 1964. Tanzania has 
done somewhat better, but her corresponding percentage rates were 
29 per cent, 22 per cent, 18 per cent and 19 per cent. Kenya started 
higher, in part due to the Emergency, but has fallen lower—from 
32 per cent to 26 per cent to 19 per cent to 16 per cent. Despite 
her lower rates of investment, Uganda still had generally a higher 
capital-output ratio than the other two countries, though Kenya's 
jumped higher in the retardation period. In all three, public 
investment has taken the lead (negatively!) in the contraction 
process. The decline in rates of investment up to 1962 was partly 
the effect of slowing real growth due to unfavourable export trends, 
and partly a separate cause of the slowdown; obviously the two 
forces interact. The failure of rates of investment to rise much 
during the export boom of 1963-64 is particularly worrisome. 
In future, as recognised in the new plans, raising rates of investment 
is essential in order to accelerate real growth in the economies, 
and public investment will probably have to take the lead in improv-
ing past trends. 
Through both the period of reasonably rapid overall growth, 
1954-58, and the period of retardation, 1958-62, urban product in 
all three countries has tended to expand more rapidly than agri-
cultural product (the latter at actual prices, though the generalisation 
still holds at constant prices). The extent of this structural change 
has varied with the overall rate of growth, being greater when the 
economies grew more rapidly. Moreover, only during the earlier 
period of reasonably rapid overall growth has the expansion of 
urban product been sufficient to require any increase at all in urban 
employment (i.e. employment in mining and manufacturing, trans-
port and power, commerce and services, and government—the 
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same sectors as for urban product). The general employment 
problem has been further intensified by steady declines in construc-
tion employment, due to falling rates of investment. Though 
the data are rough and incomplete, simply as an order of magnitude 
I might suggest that urban product per man employed has apparently 
been rising at 5-7 per cent per year in the three East African 
countries, and only when economic conditions have expanded 
urban product more rapidly than 5-7 per cent has there been any 
job creation at all. During the export boom of 1963-64, athough 
the growth of urban product accelerated substantially, employment 
has not followed. Urban product per man employed has apparently 
shot up at 12-14 per cent per year in Uganda and Tanzania, and 
in Kenya only a government-sponsored agreement to expand 
employment has kept the rise in product per man in the former 
5-7 per cent range. This phenomenon is presumably due to more 
efficient utilisation of labour force and plant capacity as output 
rises, and to employment adjustments in response to recent un-
usually rapid wage increases. As to the future, it seems clear that 
both structural changes in the relations between urban product and 
agricultural product, and future expansion of urban employment, 
depend very much on accelerating overall rates of growth in the 
East African economies. Beyond that, employment prospects 
may also demand modifications in recent output-employment-wage 
patterns. 
Turning to trade patterns, we have already noted that varying 
short-term trends in export volume and in export prices have been 
major elements of the variations in overall growth rates among 
the three time-periods. Over the decade there has been a remark-
ably limited degree of overall import substitution, as indicated by 
the ratio of imports to GDP—particularly since the import content 
of gross investment is much higher than of other uses of GDP, 
so that the falling rate of investment, particularly of equipment, 
would itself tend to pull down the overall import ratio.4 Uganda's 
import ratio remained in the 30-32 per cent range from 1954 to 1962, 
despite a falling share of construction materials and equipment, 
and continued unchanged during the export boom of the last two 
years. Tanzania's overall import ratio fell from 48 per cent to 
44 per cent to 42 per cent to 35 per cent, but much of the decline 
can be attributed to the lagging rate of investment. Kenya's 
overall import ratio was unusually high in the Emergency year 1954, 
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and then dropped and remained around 42 per cent from 1958 
to 1962 and then to 1964. If in the future rates of investment are 
pushed up, as indicated by the new plans, this would tend to raise 
overall import ratios in all three countries, unless offset by a greater 
degree of import substitution than in the past. On the other hand, 
during the export boom of 1963-64 the balances of trade of all 
three countries became much more positive, presumably temporarily. 
Government current expenditure tended to expand more 
rapidly than monetary GDP in Uganda during 1954-58 and 1958-62, 
whereas in Tanzania and Kenya it tended to rise less rapidly or at 
the same pace. Correspondingly, the ratio of total taxes to GDP 
had to be raised a little in Uganda, even though the government 
financial balance was permitted to fall, whereas in the other two 
countries it tended to decline or remain steady. In all three 
countries, however, the income elasticity of the tax structure was 
such that tax rates had to be continually raised, particularly in 
the form of higher customs duties.5 During the export boom of 
1963-64 Uganda's tax revenue rose dramatically, about 40 per cent 
over two fiscal years, followed closely by Tanzania's, while Kenya's 
tax revenue expanded less than a third as fast. In the easier revenue 
situation, both Uganda and Tanzania also raised government 
current expenditure dramatically; Uganda's rise of about 30 per cent 
over two fiscal years still permitted some increase in the government 
financial balance (including transfers and non-tax revenues), but 
this was not the case in Tanzania. Kenya held the rise in govern-
ment current expenditure to less than half Uganda's, but the 
government financial balance still moved into a larger deficit. 
With the export boom ending in 1965, all three of the countries 
would clearly face grave difficulties in retaining a significant surplus 
of tax revenue over current expenditure to use for development. 
Information on general price trends is quite incomplete for 
the East African countries. Retail price indexes, for a limited 
number of commodities consumed by low-income workers in the 
capital cities, appear to have been remarkably stable. Cost of 
living indexes, for the range of goods consumed by European civil 
servants, which include wages for services and duties on imported 
goods, have been creeping up in the range of 2-3 per cent per year. 
The balance of payments for East Africa as a whole is sum-
marised in Table II-4, and brings out several notable phenomena 
of recent years, which are not reflected in the trade data discussed 
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above (and which are also not synchronised with the time-periods 
referred to there). The most dramatic is the shift in average net 
outflow of short-term private capital plus errors and omissions 
(which at least when large is presumably mainly unrecorded capital 
and investment income transactions) from around—£8 million 
1956-59 to around—£34 million 1960-63. This shift was initially 
associated with political uncertainties surrounding Kenya's passage 
to independence, but it is notable that the outflow has risen again 
in 1963 and 1964, during the export boom. At the same time the 
average recorded inflow of long-term private capital fell off from 
around + £ 1 4 million to around + £ 2 million (considering only 
1961-63), while the average inflow of grants and public capital rose 
from around + £ 1 5 million to around + £ 3 1 million. Thus even 
though East Africa's balance on current account has shown a 
notable trend to becoming less negative, these shifts on the capital 
account have tended to pull down total foreign exchange reserves. 
The cumulative decline in reserves has fallen entirely on the sterling 
assets of the commercial banks, rather than on those of the E.A. 
Currency Board. These trends of capital flows in the balance of 
payments of course interact with the trends in gross domestic 
investment examined above. 
Constraints on Development in the Recent Past.6 
I have suggested in the previous chapter that there are four 
potential constraints on the size of a development programme, and 
hence on the rate of growth which can be generated in the economy. 
(a) Total voluntary and compulsory domestic saving plus foreign 
capital must balance the necessary public and private investment 
for the target rate of growth. (b) Total foreign exchange receipts 
must balance the rising import needs of a rapidly growing, high-
investment economy, (c) Total government revenue from taxes, 
domestic borrowing and the financial counterpart of foreign aid 
must balance expenditures on both recurrent and development 
budgets. (d) Total supply of educated manpower, national and 
expatriate, must balance the specialised employment needs of a 
rapidly growing, modernising economy. If a country's economy 
were completely flexible, or if its development plan were nicely 
adjusted to generate the maximum rate of growth attainable, then 
all four of these potential constraints would be applying simul-
taneously. Since the East African economies, like other under-
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developed countries, are far from completely flexible, however, 
and since the old plans were limited, it is quite possible that only 
one (or possibly two) of these four constraints is the critical constraint 
during a particular time-period. If this critical constraint could 
be eased all by itself, the other three would already permit a more 
ambitious development programme. 
Can one make a reasonable judgment as to which of these four 
possible constraints has been the tightest in the periods of retar-
dation (1958-62) and export boom (1963-64), i.e., in the years before 
the new plans? Of course the situation is complex. Fundamen-
tally, comparing present living standards with levels of material 
well-being which are desirable to attain, domestic and foreign 
capital, foreign exchange, government finance, and educated man-
power are all terribly scarce. Even recognising that the East African 
economies have many internal rigidities and adjustment problems, 
it might just happen that several constraints were simultaneously 
operative. Or the available empirical evidence simply may not 
permit a reliable distinction among the four possible constraints. 
Nonetheless I think a reasonable conclusion is that government 
finance has been the tightest constraint in East Africa up to the 
start of the new plans. If additional governmental finance could 
have been obtained from domestic sources or foreign aid, it seems 
likely that development programmes could have been enlarged 
without being promptly checked by lack of domestic saving plus 
capital inflow, foreign exchange, or educated manpower. 
To begin with, the evidence seems very strong that domestic 
saving plus foreign capital inflow has not been the critical constraint. 
The trends during the retardation period—slower rates of growth, 
falling shares of investment, declining urban and construction em-
ployment—suggest that the economies were operating significantly 
below capacity. This is clearly the case in industries like cement, 
where capacity and output are well-defined. The export boom 
of 1963-64 has so far had remarkably little effect on these symptoms, 
though it has surely brought into use part of the previous excess 
capacity. I think we can be reasonably confident that most non-
agricultural enterprises in manufacturing, transport, commerce, 
and construction would still be quite prepared to expand output 
at least ten or twenty per cent if demand for their products increased. 
To put the point another way, the risk of general excess— 
demand inflation in East Africa has been negligible. Trends in 
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prices may be generally characterised as stable retail prices of 
basic goods and services (especially domestic foodstuffs) consumed 
by the mass of the urban population, and slowly rising prices of the 
particular goods and services (including indirect taxes) consumed 
by high-income groups. This is not at all the picture of economies 
on the verge of general excess-demand inflation, but rather of 
economies with more stable prices than most countries in the world, 
changing the pattern of their relative wages and prices. Wages 
have risen unusually rapidly, but this is surely not due to excess 
demand in the job markets. 
Thus if additional finance could have been found to enlarge 
development programmes, it seems very likely that rising public 
investment would have led to more rapidly rising GDP without in-
flation. Domestic saving would then rise along with GDP, 
appearing either in the form of tax revenues or of voluntary saving. 
Thus rising public investment would generate the momentum in 
the economy needed to call forth additional private saving and 
private investment. 
It is true that there is an important piece of evidence which 
casts doubt on this suggestion—the recent net outflow of private 
capital from East Africa. But a more rapid rate of growth of 
G D P would itself have provided an important counterforce to this 
capital flight. If in the end the outflow had to be checked by 
exchange controls on residents' capital transactions (which the 
three governments actually did impose in mid-1965), some of this 
unused private saving would also seek profitable domestic uses. 
The evidence about the foreign exchange constraint is, at 
first sight, somewhat ambiguous. If it had been the critical barrier 
to enlarging development programmes, we would expect to observe 
several related symptoms: (a) imports rising substantially faster 
than export earnings, (b) pressure on domestic production capacity 
and prices, (c) declining foreign exchange reserves, (d) capital flight 
due to fear of inflation and devaluation, and (e) deliberate govern-
ment cutbacks in development expenditures as part of a campaign 
to protect foreign exchange reserves. 
Symptoms (a), (b), and (e) have not been features of the recent 
past. Balances of trade and balances on current account have 
tended to improve in the retardation period (except for Uganda), 
and of course shifted markedly in a positive direction during the 
export boom of the last two years. There has been general slack 
24 
Development Planning in East Africa 
in the economies, as just noted, and governments have been trying 
to speed up their development expenditures, as noted in the next 
chapter. On the other hand, symptoms (c) and (d) have been in 
evidence. However, it is generally recognised that the motivation 
for recent capital flight has not been fear of inflation and devalua-
tion, but concern about political problems. In turn capital rather 
than current transactions have been the entire cause of the declining 
foreign exchange reserves. If this unusual capital flight were 
reduced either by the pull of more rapidly growing GDP or by 
exchange controls, East Africa's fundamentally healthy foreign 
exchange situation would be obvious. Thus I feel it is clear that 
foreign exchange has not been the tightest constraint in the past. 
The evidence about government finance seems both clearer and 
more iestrictive. If it were the critical barrier, we would expect to 
observe a different pattern of symptoms: (a) small and declining sur-
pluses of tax revenues over current expenditures, (b) general slack 
in the economy, (c) ease in the current account of the balance of pay-
ments, (d) shortfalls in public investment and (e) postponement of 
development projects due to delays in arranging foreign finance. 
All of these symptoms were apparent in the period of retarda-
tion (1958-62). In 1963 and 1964 the abrupt increases in tax 
revenues in Uganda, and to a lesser extent, Tanzania, have permitted 
modest tax contributions to development, but rising demands for 
current expenditures have quickly eaten into these temporary 
windfalls. The other symptoms have continued during the export 
boom. 
My conclusion that government finance, whether from domestic 
or foreign sources, has been the critical constraint on development 
efforts in East Africa is not usual in economists' discussions. Our 
tradition is to stress "real" factors, such as the availability of 
domestic saving plus foreign capital, and largely to take it for 
granted that "purely financial" factors can be adjusted if there is 
will and understanding. 
But in underdeveloped economies highly resistant institutional 
and political obstacles to raising government finance often do 
exist. Thus in East Africa the currency board monetary system, 
even after the liberalisation of recent years, and the under-developed 
state of financial markets make it quite difficult for the governments 
to, say, double annual rates of domestic borrowing. Moreover, the 
existing structure of the East African tax systems clearly is not 
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adequate to provide suitably elastic revenues for the development 
process, yet every major adjustment is hedged in with serious 
administrative and political difficulties which can only be sur-
mounted gradually.7 Finally, the availability of foreign finance is 
largely an externally given factor, and customary administrative 
practices in foreign aid programmes may make domestic finance for 
local costs of development projects a more restrictive problem 
than foreign finance for import costs. 
One can criticise the existing situation, arguing that slow 
progress in overcoming such institutional and political obstacles, 
at least to raising domestic finance, does reflect lack of will and 
understanding among the national leadership. But one must 
recognise the seriousness of these obstacles. The point remains 
that lack of government finance, whether from domestic or foreign 
sources, can be the operative constraint directly on public invest-
ment and indirectly on the development programme as a whole. 
Turning to the fourth possible constraint, it seems quite doubt-
ful that educated manpower could have been the critical barrier to 
enlarged development programmes during the period of retardation 
(1958-62). In those mainly pre-independence years, of course, 
such manpower was predominantly expatriate. The last two years 
of export boom have roughly corresponded with the first years of 
independence, in which there has been a major turnover of 
expatriates, and Africanisation at least in the civil service has pro-
ceeded reasonably rapidly. As the proportion of new holders of 
specialist positions has risen abruptly, this has led to a temporary 
tightening of the manpower constraint, in terms of experience. 
There has now been superimposed on this transitional manpower 
problem the expanding and innovating demands of much more 
ambitious development plans. On balance I would suggest, though 
tentatively, that if in 1963 and 1964 additional finance had been 
promptly available, the stock of educated manpower would still 
have permitted some expansion of development programmes. 
But in future the situation seems likely to be quite different. 
This analysis has an interesting implication for the role of 
foreign aid in supporting accelerated development. Foreign aid 
typically eases in some degree all four of these constraints. It 
supplements domestic saving in releasing resources for gross 
investment, it provides these resources in the form of foreign ex-
change, it transfers these resources to the government supplementing 
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domestic finance and it typically includes specialised manpower 
via technical assistance. The implication of this analysis is that, 
during the years preceding the new plans, the key contribution of 
foreign aid to East Africa has been to ease the government finance 
constraint. It is a paradox that as resources from abroad have 
come to be thought of as "foreign aid" rather than "grants from 
the colonial government", recognition of their financial significance 
has tended to be somewhat obscured. 
Constraints in the Future 
The new, more ambitious development plans of the East 
African governments are bound to press more severely on all four 
potential constraints. As noted in the previous chapter, effective 
comprehensive planning ought to adjust the development programme 
until it is at the limit simultaneously of all four constraints. Judg-
ments about how tight the various constraints may be in the future 
therefore necessarily depend on analysing the new plans, which we 
shall undertake in future chapters. Here let me make only a few 
preliminary comments. 
First, since in the recent past the critical constraint appears to 
have been government finance, the task of initiating accelerated 
development under the new plans depends very much on raising 
additional finance for the development budgets. If this is accom-
plished, it will begin to increase the rate of growth and alter the 
economic trends discussed above, and thus to push up against the 
other constraints. But the first step is to finance enlarged develop-
ment budgets. 
Second, there is ground for optimism that if the foreign ex-
change, government finance and educated manpower constraints 
are satisfied, domestic saving and foreign capital inflow can rise 
fairly steadily to support the required gross investment, and G D P 
can grow at much higher rates than in the recent past without 
risking excess-demand inflation. After all, as noted above, in the 
mid-fifties Kenya and Tanzania were successfully expanding G D P 
volume in the order of 8-9 per cent per year without inflation, while 
Uganda was growing at about 5 per cent; during the recent favour-
able export boom, all three countries have been growing in the 
7-9 per cent range. A fundamental question is whether supplies of 
domestic foodstuffs would expand sufficiently rapidly to meet the 
rising demands of the urban population. But though no one can 
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be confident about the elasticity of supply of foodstuffs from peasant 
cultivators, the problem was apparently surmounted in the past. 
Even if a modest rise in the relative price of foodstuffs nonetheless 
occurred, it would doubtless help to call forth supply as well as to 
distribute part of rising urban incomes to the rural population. 
Rising urban and rural incomes could reasonably be expected to 
generate additional domestic savings, as in the mid-fifties, and in 
an environment of general economic expansion foreign capital 
could reasonably be expected to flow in again in larger amounts. 
Third, educated manpower may well prove to be the critical 
constraint in the future, as the governments attempt to implement 
the much more ambitious new plans. Two points of clarification 
should be made, however. To begin with, if a shortage of specialised 
manpower held back expanded development activities for which 
foreign exchange and government finance were readily available, 
the underlying cause would be administrative and political resis-
tance to using some of the (now surplus) foreign exchange and 
finance to import the necessary manpower. East Africa's demand 
for specialised manpower is only a tiny fraction of the world supply. 
After everything has been done to expand the training of nationals 
both inside and outside the schools, it would be quite possible 
to meet any remaining shortage during the plan period by multi-
plying, if necessary, the number of expatriates employed on contract, 
whether by direct hire or by foreign aid. Of course, hiring terms 
which depart from normal civil service practices, and campaigns 
to find more expatriates when, at the same time, Africanisation is 
a major goal, would be awkward to introduce. But it should be 
clear that reluctance to employ awkward measures, however 
understandable, is the underlying difficulty, given foreign exchange 
and finance. 
We may also note that if educated manpower becomes the 
most critical constraint, its effects are perhaps more likely to take the 
form of delays and mistakes by harassed and inexperienced govern-
ment officials administering development activities than the form 
of a general lack of suitable people to fill operating positions 
throughout the economy. Difficulties of the latter type would lower 
the efficiency of development activities undertaken, but difficulties 
of the former type may prevent development activities going forward 
at all, not least at the stage of arranging for their financing. Thus 
here a shortage of educated manpower merges with the problems of 
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energe t ic a n d decis ive o r g a n i s a t i o n , a n d c o m m i t m e n t t o deve lop -
m e n t goals , in t he g o v e r n m e n t as a who le . A l l ev i a t i on o f these 
p r o b l e m s u n f o r t u n a t e l y involves m o r e t h a n s imply finding su i t ab l e 
peop le f o r g o v e r n m e n t pos t s , w h e t h e r n a t i o n a l s e m e r g i n g f r o m t h e 
e d u c a t i o n a l sys t em o r expa t r i a t e s i m p o r t e d t e m p o r a r i l y f r o m a b r o a d . 
Bu t t o r epea t , wh ich of the f o u r po t en t i a l c o n s t r a i n t s m a y b e 
expec ted t o be t igh tes t in the f u t u r e d e p e n d s o n the n a t u r e of t he 
new p lans , as e x a m i n e d in la ter c h a p t e r s . Ideal ly , t h e p l ans s h o u l d 
be des igned to p u s h s imilar ly o n all f o u r . A n t i c i p a t i n g t he la te r 
d i scuss ion , it seems likely t h a t in ac tua l i ty t he sav ing - inves tmen t 
b a l a n c e a n d the b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s will be m a n a g e a b l e , a n d t h a t 
g o v e r n m e n t finance a n d e d u c a t e d m a n p o w e r will b e the t w o cr i t ical 
cons t r a in t s . 
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Table II-B. Tanzania: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964. (£ thousand, unless otherwise indicated) 
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64" 
>P, monetary . . 93,022 96,412 101,778 109,375 106,347 107,746 110,536 111,749 107,928 128.5 148.9 
>ort price adjust.^ - 1 3 , 9 4 0 - 1 4 , 9 3 6 - 1 0 , 3 1 6 - 1 3 , 5 1 5 - 1 1 , 2 1 9 - 4,643 0 +416 - 7 5 8 - 2,997 - 1 7 , 1 8 8 
>P volume a 79,082 81,476 91,462 95,860 95,128 103,103 110,536 112,165 107,170 125.5 131.7 
. product*1 56,584 53,626 56,397 61,443 47,228 56,974 55,628 55,694 50,026 65.4 75.0 
. prod, volume^ 42,644 38,690 46,081 47,928 46,009 52,331 55,628 56,114 49,268 62.4 57.8 
ban product^ . . 32,512 38,443 40,025 44,020 44,928 46,939 51,073 52,505 53,994 59.9 70.5 
inufacturing0 6,164 7,848 8,203 7,594 7,565 7,871 7,960 8,372 8,816 9 . 6 13.2 
insport & power 4,670 5,527 5,245 5,934 6,808 7,327 8,087 7,916 8,278 9 .0 9 . 3 
mm. & services 18,412 20,808 21,629 24,978 24,984 25,698 28,497 29,583 29,642 34.3 39.1 
vernmentd 3,266 4,260 4,948 5,514 5,571 6,043 6,529 6,634 7,258 7 .0 8 .9 
nstruction prod.b 3,926 4,343 5,356 3,912 4,191 3,833 3,835 3,550 3,908 3 .5 3 .5 
oss invest. (£mil) 18.5 23 .2 21.7 20.8 20 .2 17.4 19.0 17.2 16.4 20.1 24.3 
nstruction (£mil) 12.1 13.4 11.7 12.6 12.1 10.6 10.3 8 .9 8 .5 10.3 11.2 
uipment (£mil) 6 . 4 9 . 9 10.0 8 . 2 8 .1 6 .8 8 .7 8 .3 7 .9 9 .8 13.1 
blic invest, t (£mil) 14.4 16.2 13.3 12.5 12.1 11.1 10.6 9 . 7 9 .1 9 . 6 
portse 48,565 50,185 45,963 52,157 52,614 48,455 49,620 48,113 48,005 62,739 76,092 
:. exports f 47,923 49,653 44,685 49,050 58,581 43,291 42,977 40,971 38,481 52,946 63,643 
:. exp. volume a 33,983 34,717 34,369 35,535 37,362 38,648 42,977 41,387 37,723 49,949 46,455 
"d. exports f 191 128 189 2,135 3,054 4,030 5,307 5,080 6,208 6,770 10,434 
-exports 453 403 1,090 975 980 1,137 1,338 2,062 3,317 3,023 2,015 
portss 28,415 37,941 33,245 35,425 34,323 32,045 32,643 33,983 33,946 40,855 46,409 
odh 3,751 4,110 4,623 6,240 6,779 5,498 5,304 5,472 5,225 5,478 6,838 
'd. cons, goods'1 12,069 12,885 11,784 13,353 12,260 11,595 12,296 13,700 13,260 16,139 17,395 
hides'1 3,007 3,739 2,669 2,554 2,276 2,697 3,053 2,450 2,794 3,739 3,625 
;ermed. goods'1 1,513 2,331 2,166 2,294 2,451 2,550 2,726 3,065 3,835 3,987 4,739 
elsh 1,660 1,944 1,992 2,229 2,293 2,143 2,135 2,114 2,492 2,404 2,478 
mstr. materials'1 2,674 5,362 3.077 2,969 2,582 2,541 2,192 2,092 1,646 2,391 2,590 
[uipmenf1 3,741 7,336 6,904 5,786 5,684 5,021 4.937 5,090 4,892 6,719 8,742 
il. of trade 20,150 12,244 12,718 16,732 18,291 16,410 16,977 14,130 14,059 21,884 29,683 
il. on curr. acct. > (£mil) — — 6.56 7 .82 3.95 5.04 2 .06 - 2 . 2 0 5.71 — 
TABLE II-A. Uganda: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964—(£ thousand unless otherwise indicated) (Continued) 
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 
Gov. current expend.i 
Gov. current transfers! 
Govt, capital expend.k 
Govt, tax revenue™ 
Direct taxes 
Export taxes 
Customs duties 
Excise & other rev. 
Gov. non-tax rev . m 
Gov. econ. balance" 
Gov. finan. balance11 
13,347 
523 
6,616 
15,089 
627 
6,799 
15,701 
670 
6,973 
17,492 
800 
6,574 
19,067 
855 
6,010 
19,052 
900 
5,466 
19,165 
1,807 
5,140 
20,540 
4,129 
4,834 
23,247 
4,764 
4,668 
24,952 
4,577 
5,979 
19,817 
2,917 
6,390 
4,140 
6,370 
502 
21,003 
3,729 
5,226 
4,379 
7,669 
135 
22,900 
3,772 
7,106 
5,064 
7,958 
151 
21,612 
3,668 
5,406 
4,191 
8,347 
412 
21,849 
3,757 
5,917 
5,400 
6,775 
487 
20,352 
4,222 
4,054 
5,586 
6,490 
256 
19,170 
4,156 
2,550 
6,241 
6,223 
1,002 
18,848 
4,177 
1,800 
6,373 
6,498 
3,497 
24,302 
3,906 
3,285 
9,038 
8,073 
5,914 
29,845 
3,775 
7,866 
8,955 
7,137 
5,381 
6,470 
6,449 
5,914 
5,422 
7,199 
6,680 
4,120 
3,732 
2,782 
2,414 
1,300 
656 
5 
- 8 0 0 
- 1,692 
- 2,325 
1,055 
2,205 
4,893 
5,697 
64 u 
29,677 
6,001 
12,402 
33,878 
4,335 
9,742 
10,900 
8,552 
5,705 
4,201 
3,905 
Private income0 
Consumption, other usesp 
73,205 
41,025 
75,490 
45,879 
78,878 
51,659 
87,763 
54,351 
84,498 
48,789 
87,394 
54,884 
91,366 
55,394 
92,901 
59,879 
83,626 
54,222 
98.7 
61.6 
115.0 
65.2 
Employment1! (no.) . . 224,782 226,284 225,729 226,916 228,399 224,260 228,889 220,999 216,773 
\ g . e m p l o y m e n t (no.) . . 56,235 59,941 62,034 56,702 56,993 55,361 59,816 54,346 56,914 
Urban employ.a (no.) . . 123,099 125,861 126,588 135,030 134,764 137,121 139,872 138,099 131,224 
construction empl.Q (no.) 45,448 40,482 37,107 35,184 36,642 31,778 29,204 28,554 28,635 
208,350 
56,085 
126,446 
25,819 
Retail prices r 
Cost of livings 
121 
100 
100 
104 
98 
115 
90 
115 
96 
116 
94 
118 
85 
118 
105 
121 
85 
126 
87 
131 
214.4 
94 
134 
Table II-B. Tanzania: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964. (£ thousand, unless otherwise indicated) 
iDP, monetary 
ixport price adjustmenta 
i D P volume a 
Agricultural productb 
Agricultural product volumea 
J rban product^ . . 
vlanufacturingc . . 
Transport and power 
Commerce and services . . 
jovernmentd 
Construction prod.b 
Gross investment . . 
Construction 
Equipment 
Public investment' 
Exportse 
Agricultural exports'" 
Agricultural export volumea 
Mfd. exports? 
Re-exports 
Imports® 
Foodh 
Mfd. cons, goods'1 
Vehicles'1 
Intermed. goods'1 
Fuels'1 
Constr. materials'1 
Equipment!1 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 62 rev* 1963 1964 
79,088 81,760 
—4,283 - 6 5 4 
74,805 81,106 
89 335 92,941 97,945 106,231 114,447 115,448 123,297 133,997 156,375 171,697 
? ' i78 + 112ft + 3 820 + 2 173 - 2 391 + 8 6 9 +1,405 +1,405 - 8 , 9 6 7 -12 ,367 
~86'l57 ~U;089 101,765 108^04 I R O ^ 116,317 124702 135,402 135,492 159,330 
35,120 
30,837 
37,791 
8,335 
8,688 
13,113 
7,655 
6,177 
36,569 
35,915 
41,456 
9,145 
9,273 
14,326 
8,712 
3,735 
41,415 
38,237 
43,094 
9,040 
9,944 
14,775 
9,335 
4,826 
40,299 
41,447 
47,200 
10,711 
10,822 
15,22 
10,495 
5,442 
39,220 
43,040 
52,636 
12,936 
12,392 
15,9862 
11,326 
6,089 
44,543 
46,716 
56,051 
13,672 
13,347 
17,280 
11,752 
5,637 
48,138 
45,747 
59,940 
14,511 
14,474 
17,689 
13,266 
6,369 
43,100 
43,969 
63,981 
14,964 
15,286 
18,077 
15,654 
8,367 
48,475 
49,880 
66,811 
15,356 
15,704 
18,415") 
)• 54,583 
17,336 J 
8,011 6,086 
21,755 
11,215 
9,540 
10,214 
24,653 
11,424 
13,229 
10,904 
23,284 
12,292 
10,992 
9,323 
38,849 
32,835 
28,552 
4,469 
1,545 
39,103 
33,334 
32,680 
4,554 
1,215 
48,316 
42,905 
39,727 
3,988 
1,423 
24,136 
12,826 
11,310 
9,834 
43,126 
37,121 
38,269 
4,390 
1,615 
22,720 
12,537 
10,183 
8,483 
21,826 
11,360 
10,466 
8,060 
22,227 
11,855 
13,372 
7,824 
26,080 
14,628 
11,452 
10,803 
46,411 
38,621 
42,441 
5,691 
2,099 
49,792 
41,296 
43,469 
6,565 
1,931 
58,923 
50,201 
47,810 
6,976 
1,746 
52,839 
42,572 
43,441 
8,315 
1,952 
37,817 
7,704 
13,540 
2,083 
2,324 
2,687 
3,480 
6,001 
49,144 
7,606 
17,133 
3,681 
2,591 
3,076 
5,253 
9,803 
42,234 
7,798 
13,774 
2,850 
2,386 
3,455 
3,652 
8,319 
47,001 
9,134 
15,999 
3,052 
2,331 
4,102 
4,943 
7,440 
42,606 
8,906 
13,352 
2,749 
2,455 
4,125 
3,932 
7,087 
42,555 
7,482 
14.540 
3,187 
2,450 
3,673 
4,035 
7,099 
46,999 
7,851 
16,429 
3,946 
2,832 
3,939 
3,950 
8,054 
50,291 
9,805 
17,469 
3,136 
3,123 
3,578 
4,935 
8,246 
49,651 
51,056 
78,260 
12,842 
10,835 
62,790 
53,823 
87,228 
12,509 
10,928 
68,020 
55,653 
96,214 
14,642 
11,723 
63,791 69,849 
6,357 7,463 
24,401 
15,458 
8,9943 
9,549 
24,509 30,581 
15,626 19,153 
8,883 11,446 
8,124 11,442 
55,969 
45,419 
46,824 
8,215 
2,335 
68,561 
58,785 
49,818 
8,191 
1,585 
76,546 
63,898 
51,531 
11,344 
1,303 
51,503 
10,207 
18,869 
3,451 
3,731 
3,870 
3,726 
7,649 
52,776 
8,769 
20,425 
3,893 
4,370 
3,802 
2,882 
8,662 
59,676 
8,176 
23,173 
2,575 
7,065 
3,803 
3,368 
1,518 
Table n - B . Tanzania: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964. (£ thousand, unless otherwise indicated). (Continued) 
talance of trade (£ mil) . . 
ial. on current acct.' (£ mil) 
rovt. current expendi 
Jovt. current transfers) 
jovt. capital expend.k 
Jovt. tax revenue-™ 
iirect taxes 
ixport taxes 
Customs duties 
Lxcises, other taxes 
iovt. non-tax. rev.m 
jovt . econ. balance11 
Jovt. financial balance11 . . 
'rivate income® 
Consumption, other usesp 
imploymentQ (no.) 
Agricultural employments (no.) 
J rban employments (no.) 
Construction empl.Q (no.) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 62rev.v 1963 1964v 
1,032 -10 ,041 6,082 - 3 , 8 7 5 
—5.61 
3,805 7,237 11,924 
—5.42 —0.78 + 4 . 1 0 
2,548 4,466 
—5.86 —7.03 
14,327 16,877 16,228 16,741 17,311 18,288 18,321 
1,244 1,315 1,595 1,943 2,214 2,860 2,693 
3,337 5,084 5,282 5,454 5,159 3,939 5,672 
21,084 20,080 
3,626 3,505 
7,341 5,674 
17,651 
5,907 
505 
4,820 
6,149 
616 
17,824 
6,016 
28 
5,527 
6,253 
666 
17,780 
5,579 
24 
4,999 
7,178 
700 
19,891 
6,061 
25 
5,312 
8,493 
20,503 
5,394 
24 
6,691 
8,394 
22,529 
5,561 
46 
7,771 
9,151 
21,908 
6,135 
62 
7,695 
8,016 
53 
22,185 
6,073 
55 
8,066 
7,991 
25,133 
6,184 
100 
10,100 
8,749 
3,324 
2,696 
947 
298 
1,552 
657 
3,150 
1,207 
3,192 4,241 3,587 
978 1,381 947 
1,101 5,053 
- 2 , 5 2 5 1,548 
61,437 63,936 
41,974 50,271 
15,785 
+ 6 . 3 9 
7,265 
3,107 
16,870 
22,957 27.8 
4,158 5 .2 
7,263 10.0 
30,222 
7,034 
907 
10,408 
11,873 
34.6 
7 .5 
1 .4 
11.7 
14.0 
6 . 8 
1.6 
71,555 73,050 77,342 83,702 92,539 93,263 98,164 126 153 137 1 
43,741 55,939 54,109 58,880 61,975 65,736 74,350 93,124 96^4 
J 
409,094 384,100 394,209 390,470 390,547 393,268 388,446 
218,094 201,350 207,112 211,351 213,092 220,199 199,021 
191,000 181,750 187,097 179,119 177,455 173,069 189,425 
383,117 368,816 397,028 
220,467 196,820 192,924 
139,844 132,022 188,382 
340,344 351,227 
155,506 153,410 
173,870 186,276 
40,806 39,974 15,722 10,968 11,541 
detail prices r 
Cost of living® 
100 
100 
97 
103 
95 
105 
100 
109 
104 
112 
102 
113 
103 104 103 103 105 
Table II-B. Tanzania: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964. (£ thousand, unless otherwise indicated) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964" 
nonetary . . 112,450 134,740 145,150 154,220 155,500 161,760 175,320 176,810 180,870 192.43 209.21 
t price adjustment4 . . —1,720 —3,469 —4,562 —1,469 + 706 —1,715 0 + 1,615 - 1 , 5 9 9 - 1 , 3 8 2 - 4 , 8 8 9 
rolumea . . 110,730 131,271 140,588 152,751 156,206 160,045 175,320 178,425 179,271 191.05 204.32 
roductb 28,390 29,140 35,050 33,540 34,600 35,580 40,000 38,720 39,860 44.39 48.42 
roduct volumea 26,670 25,671 30,488 32,071 35,306 33,865 40,000 40,335 38,261 43.01 43.53 
i productb . . 77,750 97,560 100,760 111,050 112,530 118,240 127,460 130,290 134,250 143.15 156.51 
.facturingc 15,030 18,720 19,540 21,060 21.750 21,350 22,710 23,580 23,870 25.27 27.32 
port and power 13,080 16,630 17,530 20,730 20,050 21,590 23,130 23,990 25,550 28.22 29.44 
n. and services 35,700 42,910 44,880 49,070 50,270 53,770 56,700 55,720 56,710 60.86 66.76 
rnmentd 13,940 19,300 18,810 20,190 20,460 21,530 23,170 27,000 28,120 28.80 32.99 
traction prod.b 6,310 8,040 9,340 9,630 8,380 7,940 7,860 7,800 6,760 4.89 4.28 
s investment (£ mil.) . . . . 35.27 43.81 45.68 45.62 40.02 40.33 41.41 31.89 33.33 30.40 32.80 
traction (£ mil.) . . . . 20.74 24.11 25.91 27.33 24.31 24.52 23.13 18.09 18.53 14.30 15.30 
pment (£ mil.) . . . . 14.53 19.70 19.77 18.30 15.70 15.79 18.28 13.80 14.80 16.10 18.50 
ic investment* (£ mil.) . . . . 16.73 18.97 14.93 16.44 13.34 13.64 14.41 14.46 12.83 9.80 9.80 
,rtse . . . 28,577 34,051 42,012 42,685 46,149 50,682 53,968 57,692 62,467 70,769 79,428 
ixportsf " . . . . 20,828 25,147 31,401 30,849 34,588 36,015 38,533 38,762 41,576 47,435 49,339 
3XD volumea . . . . 19,108 21,678 26,839 29,380 35,294 34,300 38,553 40,377 39,977 46,053 44,450 
exportsf . . . . 5,241 6,554 6,560 6,949 7,637 9,588 10,409 12,512 13,656 16,187 23,656 
ixports 2,509 2,350 4,051 4,887 3,924 5,079 5,006 6,418 7,235 7,147 6,434 
^ t s s ~ ~ 65,648 77,559 73,855 76,516 66,263 66,996 77,064 75,932 76,834 82,850 87,949 
dh . . 9,518 12.03 
.. cons. goodsh 20,235 26.96 
iclesh . 4,942 6.41 
rmed. goodsh 7,440 11.22 
Ish . 8,524 8.74 
istr. materials^ 4,802 3.66 
lipmenth 10,802 13.82 
of trade . . . -37 ,071 -43 ,508 -31 ,843 -33 .831 -20 ,114 -16 ,314 - 1 9 , 3 7 2 -18 ,240 -14 ,367 -12 ,081 - 8 , 5 2 1 
! curr. acct.i (£ mil.) . . . . - 3 5 . 2 2 - 1 8 . 6 1 - 1 3 . 3 - 1 8 . 6 - 5 . 3 - 4 . 8 + 1 . 4 
Table II-C. Kenya: Principal Economic Data 1954-1964. (£ thousand, unless otherwise indicated) (Continued) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
ovt. current expenditure) 
ovt. current transfers) 
ovt. capital expenditurek 
1962 1963 1964« 
ovt. tax revenue™ 
irect taxes 
sport taxes 
ustoms duties 
xcise and other rev. 
ovt. non-tax rev.m 
ovt. econ. balance"1 
ovt. finan. balance11 
rivate income" 
onsumption, other usesp 
mploymentQ (th) 
gricultural employments (th) 
rrban employ.<3 (th) 
onstruction empl.Q (th) 
etail pricesr 
ost of livings 
34,609 
3,857 
5,891 
33,987 
4,105 
8,016 
34,001 
4,253 
8,016 
38,319 
4,946 
8,105 
39,321 
6,245 
7,677 
41,014 
7,256 
9,397 
43.75 
10.67 
14.08 
35,442 
14,093 
8,113 
13,236 
3,000 
37,743 
14,149 
9,543 
13,745 
1,547 
37,877 
12,442 
10,659 
16,776 
1,662 
38,059 
11,798 
10,001 
16,260 
4,336 
40,947 
12,090 
11,711 
17,146 
4,870 
44,973 
12,407 
10 
13,757 
18,799 
2,650 
833 
—24 
3,756 
1,198 
3,876 
1,285 
— 2 6 0 
—870 
1 ,626 
251 
3,959 
—647 
4.77 
— . 8 0 
47.08 
9.70 
15.98 
48.52 
13.38 
13.67 
21.47 
5.10 
50.30 
13.64 
.30 
14.30 
22.06 
4.47 
3.22 
— 2 . 0 1 
118,778 117,757 123,883 137,261 135,863 135,897 143 91 159 1 
107,822 101,607 103,743 118,687 123,839 120,893 130^46 137.85 
544.4 
223.1 
298.7 
22.6 
615.1 
247.9 
341.8 
25.4 
596.7 
235.2 
332.0 
29.5 
614.4 
253.4 
336.8 
24.2 
593.2 
249.5 
322.8 
20.9 
596.9 
251.7 
326.3 
18.9 
622.2 
271.8 
329.3 
21.1 
589.8 
252.0 
319.9 
17.9 
591.3 
245.5 
323.2 
12.6 
533.3 
219.7 
303.2 
10.4 
547.3 
208.3 
330.8 
8 .2 
100 106 108 111 
100 
111 
101 
112 
103 
113 
105 
115 
108 
122 
108 
122 
108 
124 
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Notes to Table II—A: 
Sources: Statistical Abstract, Annual Trade Report, Background to the Budget, 
various years. 
(a) Export price adjustment is difference between ag. exports at 1960-62 
prices and ag. exports at current prices. Deflator to 1960-62 prices is 
implicit index derived from value at current prices and value at 1960-62 
prices for twelve major commodities; see Y. Kyesimira, "Comparison 
of Agricultural Export Achievements in the East African Countries", 
EDRP 47, 1.10.64, E.A.I.S.R. This same adjustment is used to obtain 
GDP volume, ag. product volume and ag. export volume, by adding 
the adjustment algebraically to the corresponding current-price figure. 
(b) Ag. product includes cotton ginning, coffee curing, sugar manufacture, 
forestry, fishing, hunting. Urban product includes all other elements of 
monetary GDP except construction product. 
(c) Manufacturing includes mining. 
(d) Government includes miscellaneous services provided by public authorities. 
(e) Exports include domestic exports, inter-territorial exports, re-exports. 
( / ) Ag. exports include SITC 0,1,2,4. Mfd. exports include SITC 3, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9. Neither includes re-exports. 
(g) Imports include net imports, inter-territorial imports. 
(/<) Commodity classification of imports is obtained by starting with SITC 
classes and transferring entire value of selected commodities on basis of 
assumed principal end use. Food is all of SITC 0, 1, 4. Mfd. cons, 
goods is part of SITC 5,6,7, 8,9. Vehicles is part of SITC 6,7. Intermed. 
goods is part of SITC 2, 5, 6, 8, 9. Fuels is all of SITC 3. Construction 
materials is part of SITC 2, 6, 7, 8. Equipment is part of SITC 7, 8. 
(/') See P. Newman, "Foreign Investment and Economic Growth: The Case 
of East Africa, 1963-1970—Description of Data Used", Proceedings, 
U. ofE.A. Conference on Foreign Aid, forthcoming. 
(;') Central government expenditure data are for fiscal year beginning in 
each calendar year. Gov. current expenditure is reported recurrent 
expenditures less pensions and gratuities, overseas addition, public debt 
transactions. Gov. current transfers is pensions and gratuities, overseas 
addition, public debt transactions other than UEB (which is also excluded 
from revenue). 
(AT) Gov. capital expenditure is reported non-recurrent expenditures less 
public debt transactions. 
(m) Central government revenue data are for fiscal year beginning in each 
calendar year. Gov. tax revenue is reported recurrent and non-recurrent 
less public debt transactions including UEB, reimbursements, grants 
from abroad. Gov. non-tax rev. is reimbursements plus recurrent 
grants. 
(n) Gov. economic balance is gov. tax revenue less gov. current expenditure. 
Gov. financial balance is econ. balance plus non-tax revenue less current 
transfers. 
(o) Private income is monetary GDP less gov. tax revenue. 
(p) Consumption and other uses is monetary GDP plus imports minus 
exports, gross investment, and gov. current expenditure. 
(q) Employment is African employees, in thousands. Breakdown among 
ag., urban, construction corresponds to product classes in footnote b. 
(r) Retail price index is for African markets, Kampala, month of June, 
base 1957 = 100 shifted to June, 1955. 
(s) Cost of living index is for European civil servants, Kampala, month of 
June, base 1951 = 100 shifted to June, 1954. 
(/) Public investment includes central gov., local gov., EACSO, UEB, UDC. 
(«) National accounts, investment and budget figures preliminary. 
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Notes to Table II-B: 
Sources: Statistical Abstract, Annual Trade Report, Budget Survey, various years. 
Data are actually for the mainland only, i.e., the former Tanganyika, 
(a) See Table II-A. 
tb) 
(e) 
(d) Government includes only public administration and defence. 
(e) See Table II-A. 
( f ) 
(8) 
(h) 
(0 
(J) Central government expenditure data are for fiscal year beginning in each 
calendar year. Gov. current expenditure is reported current expenditure 
less public debt, pensions and gratuities, poll tax transfers. Gov. current 
transfers is public debt plus pensions and gratuities. Note expenditures 
are net of reimbursements beginning 1957-58. 
(AT) GOV. capital expenditure is reported development expenditure. 
(m) Central government revenue data are for fiscal year beginning in each 
calendar year. Gov. tax revenue is reported total revenue less poll tax 
transfers, reimbursements, UK grants, foreign grants for development. 
Gov. non-tax revenue is reimbursements plus UK grants; note these 
are netted out beginning 1957-58. 
(n) See Table II-A. 
(o) 
(.P) 
0q) Employment is African employees, in thousands. Breakdown among 
ag., urban, construction corresponds to product classes in footnote b, 
but breakdown between urban and construction is available only beginning 
1961. Figures 1962 rev. to 1964 are for all races. 
(r) Retail price index is for wage earners, Dar es Salaam, month of June, 
base Dec., 1951 = 100 shifted to June, 1954, seasonally adjusted. 
(s) Cost ofliving index (excluding rent), Dares Salaam, base Dec., 1950 = 100 
shifted to 1954. Not available after 1959. 
(/) Public investment includes central government, local authorities, 
EACSO agencies. 
(«) Revised national accounts concepts and estimates, and employment 
figures for all races with revised sector classification, 
(v) National accounts, investment, and budget figures preliminary. Budget 
figures are partly estimated from statements in budget speech. 
Notes to Table II-C: 
Sources: Statistical Abstract, Annual Trade Report, Economic Survey, various 
years. 
(a) See Table II-A. 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
( f ) 
(8) 
(h) 
(0 For source 57-58, see Table II-A; for later years, Gov. of Kenya, Economic 
Survey, 1964. 
( j ) Central government expenditure data are for fiscal year beginning in 
each calendar year. Gov. current expenditure is reported recurrent 
expenditures less public debt and pensions and gratuities. Gov. current 
transfers is public debt plus pensions and gratuities. 
(k) Gov. capital expenditure is reported development expenditure. 
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(m) Central government revenue data are for fiscal year beginning in each 
calendar year. Gov. tax revenue is reported recurrent revenue, less 
grants from overseas and recurrent U.K. aid, plus miscellaneous develop-
ment revenue. Gov. non-tax revenue is grants from overseas and 
recurrent U.K. aid. 
(/i) See Table II-A. 
\v> » 
(q) Employment is employees of all races, in thousands. Construction in-
cludes only private, so urban includes public construction employees; 
to this extent breakdown departs from product classes in footnote b. 
Urban also includes domestics, 
(r) Retail price index is for wage earners, Nairobi, month of December, 
base Oct.—Dec. 1958 = 100. 
(.?) Cost of living index is for European civil servants, Nairobi, month of 
December, base Aug., 1939 = 100 shifted to Dec., 1954. 
(/) Public investment includes central government, local authorities, U.K. 
government, and EACSO agencies. 
(«) National accounts, investment and budget figures preliminary. 
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CHAPTER HI : T H E OLD PLANS 
While development plans have been periodically prepared 
by all three East African governments throughout the post-war 
years, the plans prior to those issued in 1964 by the Tanzania and 
Kenya governments can all be reasonably characterised as public 
project plans. As noted in the first chapter, "the old plans"1 were 
constructed essentially by selecting and adding together attractive 
public projects within an estimated total available financing, rather 
than by deriving the current development programme from the 
desired future evolution of the economy as a whole. They covered 
expenditures by the central government, plus (perhaps) some public 
agencies, but did not cover private investment nor set targets for 
private economic activity. They presumed that central government 
expenditures would be implemented through standard budgetary 
procedures, and did not attempt to establish implementation 
procedures embracing the entire economy or to design a range of 
policy instruments for inducing supporting private actions. In all 
these respects "the new plans"2 have moved very much further 
toward comprehensive development planning. 
The point of examining the old plans, however, is not to 
criticise them, non-historically, from the standpoint of a compre-
hensive approach, but to describe them in a standardised way, as the 
bases from which the new plans have evolved. The old plans, 
examined in this chapter, and the recent economic trends, discussed 
in the previous chapter, provide the setting for the much more 
ambitious development efforts now being launched. 
Nature and Size 
The old Kenya plan was initially prepared for the three fiscal 
years 1960/61 to 1962/63. Its opening words were: 
The development programme for the three years 1960/63 
has been prepared on similar lines to the 1954/57 and the 
1957/60 programmes, and it is not proposed to repeat general 
observations on the need for planning or on the past history 
of development in Kenya . . . It is sufficient to say that the 
main purposes behind the formulation of a capital budget 
on a three-year basis are continuity in planning, and the co-
ordination and clarification of the objectives of such planning.3 
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It proposed a programme of central government development ex-
penditure which was slightly smaller than in the previous three 
years. The plan gave no information about investment in railways 
and communications by E.A.C.S.O. agencies, or about investment 
in electric power by private companies, though partly owned by 
the government. Later, as part of the transition to independence, 
the plan was simply extended for a fourth fiscal year. The pro-
gramme for 1963/64 was quite similar to the earlier years, with the 
notable exception that the extraordinary Settlement programme 
had already been added on to the plan and was by this time building 
up to a specially-financed budget of over £6 million. The resulting 
four-year development plan is summarised in Table III-l . Note 
that the table is in a standard form which we shall use for comparison 
with the other old plans, and with the new plans in Chapter VI; 
adjustments have been made in a few figures, such as including 
contractor-financed roads, to improve comparability. 
The old Tanganyika plan was adopted a year later, during the 
time of transition to independence, for the three fiscal years 1961/62 
to 1963/64. It commented: 
"The reality of economic planning in the hustle and bustle 
of a fast developing African country bears little or no 
relation to the theoretical work on elegant models, constructed 
in statistical laboratories, of more developed countries. In 
Tanganyika, it has not even proved possible to follow the 
'programming' approach, which starts from overall targets 
of gross domestic p r o d u c t . . . On the other hand, . . . the 
plan is based on an extensive survey of the economy prepared 
by the World Bank Mission and on several subsidiary economic 
and statistical studies . . . 4 " 
The plan, which is summarised in Table III-2, provided for central 
government development expenditure about half as large again as 
in the previous years. It gave some information about private 
participation in electric power and a tourist hotel, but nothing 
about railways and communications under E.A.C.S.O., and assumed 
that the economy would continue to grow at about five per cent per 
year, with private investment rising proportionately. 
The old Uganda plan was adopted still later, well after the 
start of the five fiscal years to which it referred, 1961/62 to 1965/66. 
It constituted at least a first step in the transition from public project 
planning to comprehensive planning. In conception it reached 
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towards comprehensiveness, notably in the chapter dealing with 
'The Aim' (accelerate the growth of gross national product, while 
diversifying the economy and assuring equitable distribution), 
'The Strategy' (emphasise increasing production through efficient 
investment and education), and 'The Tactics' (stating policies 
toward public enterprise, private enterprise, land tenure, external 
trade, Ugandanisation, popular cooperation and foreign and 
domestic financing).5 In execution, however, it moved only a 
modest way. Like Tanganyika, it projected central government 
development expenditure, as summarised in Table III-3, about 
half again as large as in the previous years. Investment by public 
agencies was fully covered, though in very round figures, and the 
chapter on private investment simply described the results of an 
experimental survey of investment intentions, mainly revealing the 
common pattern that intentions fall off for years further in the 
future. After establishing the central government programme and 
the other investment estimates, the plan estimated separately, by 
two rough methods, that it would result in expanding gross domestic 
product somewhere between per cent and 5 per cent per year. 
Table m - 1 : Kenya Development Plan, 1960/61—1963/64: Composition by 
Economic Sector and Type of Organisation (£ th) 
Central Govt. Public Agencies 
Total Recurr. Capital Public Private 
Sources Sources 
Agriculture 6,657 2,249 4,408 
Livestock and Fishing 1,191 557 634 
Land and Water 4,041 1,433 2,608 
Settlement 10,559a 10,559a 
Forests 1,601 1,231 370 
Game and Tourism 249 249 
Mining and Mapping 116 116 
Manufacturing 150 150 
Commerce and Co-ops. . . 48 48 
Credit 
Electric Power b b 
Roads 8,371c 8,371° 
Railway b b 
Airports 599 599 
Posts and Tel. b b 
Education 2,634 2,634 
Health 877 877 
Social Services 54 54 
Information d d 
Housing 1,446 1,446 
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Defence and Police . . . . 1,591 1,591 
Administration 5,101 1,400 3,701 
Local Govt 4,120 4,120 
Reserve 
TOTAL . . 3 8 , 8 4 6 ' " 7 ,034 31 ,812ac [, /, 
(excl. Settlement) . . 
Notes: 
(<?) Sum of actual expenditures 1960/61 and 1961/62, estimated expenditures 
1962/63, budgeted expenditures 1963/64. Settlement is not included in 
total. 
(6) Estimates of private investment in electric power and of EACSO expen-
ditures not stated. 
(c) Roads figure includes 3000 of contractor finance not counted in plan. 
(d) Included in administration. 
Source: Kenya Government, The Development Programme 1960/63 (Sessional 
Paper No. 4 of 1959/60); Development Estimates for the year 1963/64.) 
Table III-2: Tanganyika Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64: Composition by 
Economic Sector and Type of Organisation (£ th) 
Central Govt. Public Agencies 
Total Recurr. Capital Public Private 
Sources Sources 
Agriculture 2,620 a 2,620 
Livestock & Fishing 595 a 595 
Land and Water 1,515 a 1,515 
Settlement — — 
Forests 533 a 533 
Game and Tourism 782 a 482 300 
Mining and Mapping 478 183 295 
Manufacturing 570b 570 b 
Commerce and Co-ops. . . 342 35 307 
Credit 50 50 
Electric Power 4,878 1,878 3,000 
Roads 5,317= 5,317= 
Railway d d 
Airports 205 205 
Posts and Tel. d d 
Education 3,270 350 2,920 
Health 954 954 
Social Services 229 81 148 
Information 151 151 
Housing 552 552 
Defence & Police 2,380 2,380 
Administration 1,100 1,100 
Local Govt. 1,859 1,859 
Reserve 
TOTAL . . 28,380= 649a 24,431= _ d 3,300b 
Notes: 
(a) Breakdown between recurrent and capital costs to be charged to develop-
ment budget not stated in plan. Agriculture excludes 250 charged to 
recurrent budget. 
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(b) Estimates of direct foreign lending to Development Corp. and of private 
participation in projects not stated. 
(c) Roads figure includes 1150 of contractor finance, not counted in plan. 
Hence total differs from published total by this amount. 
(d) Estimates of EACSO expenditures not stated. 
Source: Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/62-
1963/64. 
TableHI-3. Uganda Development Plan, 1961/62-1965/66: Composition by 
Economic Sector and Type of Organisation (£ th) 
Central Govt. Public Agencies 
Total Recurr. Capital p„bnc Private 
Sources Sources 
Agriculture . 11,515 818 3,047 j f 7,200a 200a 
1 L 250 
Livestock and Fishing 1,822 434 1,388 
Land and Water 953 953 
Settlement — — 
Forests 342 52 290 
Game and Tourism 603 51 251 300a 
Mining and Mapping 504 100 234 95» 75a 
Manufacturing 6,800 4,300a 2,500a 
Commerce and Co-ops. . . 1,133 198 235 700a 
Credit 3,300 3,300 
Electric Power 4,500 4,500 
Roads 7,180 7,180 
Railway 3,000 
3b 
3,000 
Airports 329 329 
Posts and Tel 500 500 
Education 6,673 f 1,127 5,546 
351b 
Health 2,300 714b 2,300 
Social Services 386 83b 386 
Information 689 429b 689 
Housing 507 507 
Defence and Police 3,277 1,296b 3,277 
Administration 1,990 913b 1,990 
Local Govt. 7,547 5,547 2,000 
Reserve 2,000 2,000 
TOTAL 67,850° 2,780 36,149 26,145 2,775 
Notes: 
(a) Uganda Development Corp. projects total 15,370, including the private 
participation of 2,775. 
(b) Recurrent costs to be covered in recurrent budget, not charged to develop-
ment budget. Within education, recurrent costs of secondary expansion 
are charged to development. 
(c) Total excludes recurrent costs indicated in note b, and hence differs 
from published total of 71,641, but is consistent with required development 
financing. 
Source: Uganda Government, The First Five-Year Development Plan, 1961/62-
1965/66. 
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Comparing the sizes of the three countries' plans presents 
some difficulties, in view of the different time periods covered and 
the differences in scope. A meaningful comparison can be made, 
however, of average annual development expenditure by the central 
governments, derived from the standardised format of Tables III-1, 
III-2, and III-3 and presented in Table III-4 below. The old plans 
projected annual expenditures of £9.7 million for Kenya, £8.4 
million for Tanganyika, and £7.8 million for Uganda. Relative to 
monetary GDP in 1962, during the plans, this works out to 7.2 
per cent for Uganda, 6.8 per cent for Tanganyika, but only 5.4 
per cent for Kenya. Thus for a reasonably comparable range of 
central government activities, Uganda and Tanganyika were plan-
ning on a distinctly higher rate of development expenditure than 
Kenya. 
At the same time, some other differences among the three 
countries should be noted. Kenya's special land problems led to 
her extraordinary Settlement programme, for which the budget 
rose from 0 per cent in the first year to 3.4 per cent (again referred 
to 1962 GDP) in the last year. However, in terms of their effects 
on the economy these expenditures are mainly redistributive rather 
than expansionary, and in terms of financing they have attracted 
foreign grants and loans which were probably in large part uniquely 
available for this purpose. Uganda's substantial planned invest-
ment by autonomous public agencies amount to an additional 
5.4 per cent of 1962 GDP. However, this mainly reflects the 
historical role played by the Uganda Development Corporation, 
the Uganda Electricity Board, and the Uganda Credit and Savings 
Bank; Kenya and Tanganyika have been more fortunate in finding 
private enterprises to carry out these investments as well as others. 
As noted in the last chapter, total investment rates have been higher 
in Kenya and Tanganyika than in Uganda. Finally, it may be 
noted that some recurrent expenditures are explicitly charged to 
the development budget in all three countries. The differences 
in reporting practices are such that I do not feel able to draw any 
inferences from the proportion of recurrent expenditure listed in 
the tables, but it should be kept in mind that the content of central 
government development expenditure is rather different from the 
content of gross investment by public agencies or private enterprises. 
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Composition of Development Expenditure 
There are some quite interesting differences in the sector 
composition of planned central government development expendi-
tures in the three countries, as presented in Table III-4. The sector 
compositions reflect implicit differences in the strategies being 
pursued, even though such differences in emphasis may not be 
stressed in the texts of the old plans. 
The first point to note is that Kenya planned to devote a much 
larger share to agriculture than the other two countries—about 
35 per cent compared to 21 per cent for Tanganyika and 18 per cent 
for Uganda. This represented a significantly greater emphasis on 
directly productive activities in the sector which was already the 
core of the economy. 
The next point is that all three of the central government 
programmes devoted very little to directly productive activities in 
non-agricultural sectors—tourism, mining, manufacturing, com-
merce and co-operatives, credit. Of course Uganda also projected 
some £15.4 million of investment in manufacturing and estate 
agriculture by the autonomous U.D.C., which if accomplished 
would constitute a major acceleration of its activities and a much 
larger public investment in these sectors than in the other two 
countries. 
The central government expenditures shown for Tanganyika 
included part of the initial financing of a similar autonomous Tanga-
nyika Development Corporation. Thus in the old plans all three 
governments continued to rely on autonomous public agencies or 
private enterprises for development activities in these sectors. 
Moreover, emphasis on economic infrastructures was rather 
similar in the three old plans. Planned expenditures on roads 
and airports were in the range of 19 per cent to 23 per cent of the 
totals, and the direct expenditure on electric power in Tanganyika 
had its counterpart in expenditure by public agencies and private 
enterprises in the other two countries. 
The fourth point brings out a more striking difference in 
strategy: Uganda planned to devote about 27 per cent of her total 
programme to education and welfare activities, Tanganyika about 
20 per cent, and Kenya about 13 per cent. This general difference 
of emphasis among the three countries applied both to education, 
which has a significant productive as well as welfare effect, and to 
the other activities, which are of mainly welfare significance. 
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Table 111-4. Comparison of Sector Composition of Kenya, Tanganyika, and 
Uganda "Old Plans": Average Annual Expenditures by Central 
Governments (£ th. and %) 
Average Annual Expend. Percentages 
Kenya Tang. Uganda Kenya Tang. Uganda 
Agriculture 1,664 873 773 17.1 10.4 9.9 
Livestock and Fishing . . 298 198 364 3.1 2 .4 4 .7 
Land and Water 1,010 505 191 10.4 6.0 2.5 
Settlement 2,640a — a — . 
Forests 400 178 6 4.1 2.1 0 .9 
Game and Tourism 62 161 60 0 .6 1.9 0 8 
Mining and Mapping . . 29 159 67 0.3 1.9 0 .9 
Manufacturing 38 190 — 0.4 2.3 — 
Commerce and Co-ops. 12 114 87 0 1 1 .4 1 1 
Credit — 17 — — 0.2 — 
Electric Power 626 7.5 
Roads 2,094 1,772 1,436 21.6 21.2 18 4 
Railway — — — — — . — 
Airports 150 68 66 1.5 0 .8 0 9 
Posts and Tel — — — — — — 
Education 658 1,090 1,335 6.8 13.0 17 1 
Health 219 318 460 2.3 3.8 5.9 
Social Services 14 76 77 0 .1 0 .9 1.0 
Information — 50 138 — . 0 .6 1.8 
Housing 362 184 101 3.7 2.2 1.3 
Defence and Police 398 793 655 4 .1 9.5 8 .4 
Administration 1,275 367 398 13.1 4 .4 5.1 
Local Govt 1,030 620 1,109 10.6 7.4 14.2 
Reserve — — 400 — — 5.1 
TOTAL 9,712a 8,360 7,786 100.0 100.0 100 0 
Notes: 
(a) Settlement not included in total. 
Finally, Kenya and Uganda each planned to devote about 
28 percent of their total programmes to general government services, 
while Tanganyika aimed at only 21 per cent. From the standpoint 
of economic development, these expenditures may be considered 
mainly for consumption purposes. 
Thus overall it seems possible to make a meaningful generali-
sation about the comparative strategies implied in the three old 
plans. Kenya placed relatively great emphasis on directly pro-
ductive activities in agriculture, relatively little on education and 
welfare, and envisioned substantial expenditure on general 
government services. Uganda placed the least emphasis (rela-
tively) on directly productive activities in agriculture, the most on 
education and welfare activities, and envisioned similar expenditure 
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on general government services. Tanganyika was more or less in 
the middle with respect to agriculture on the one hand and education 
and welfare on the other, and planned the least expenditure on 
general government services. 
Within the individual sectors listed in Table III-4 there are 
also some interesting differences in tactics implied in the particular 
projects selected. Let me give just one illustration, comparing 
the content of expenditure in agriculture, livestock and fishing, 
and land and water in Uganda and Tanganyika.6 The largest 
project in the old Uganda plan was the cotton spraying subsidy 
scheme, an effort to up-grade the technological level of peasant 
cotton culture throughout the country by introducing relatively 
simple non-agricultural inputs. Uganda allocated about four 
times as much as Tanganyika to promoting use of agricultural 
equipment, and planned to spend much more on tsetse control 
as the means of raising livestock production. On the other hand, 
Tanganyika planned to place relatively greater stress on training 
agricultural staff, on general extension as distinguished from specific 
cash crop development programmes and on land and irrigation 
works. These inter-country differences in tactics are in part 
reactions to different objective conditions, such as Tanganyika's 
greater aridity. But they are also in part results of different sub-
jective judgments by agricultural officials of what activities will 
pay off. It would require a detailed study of project histories to 
make a meaningful evaluation, but these tactical differences consti-
tute in effect a set of experiments, the results of which in each 
country should be of keen interest to the others. 
Planned and Actual Expenditures 
Plans express intentions, but actual development expenditure 
may diverge from the plan for a variety of reasons. In the economic 
circumstances of East Africa, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
shortfalls have not occurred because of campaigns to conserve 
foreign exchange or because of lack of total saving and rising in-
flationary pressure. They have occurred, however, because of 
shortage of government finance and because of slowness in 
administration. Comparisons of planned and actual development 
expenditures for the three countries are presented in Table III-5, 
III-6, and III-7. Note that for data reasons it has been necessary 
to modify the format and totals in certain respects from Table III-4. 
47 
Development Planning in East Africa 
Table UI-5. Kenya Development Plan, 1960/61—1963/64: Comparison of 
Planned and Actual Expenditures (£ th.) 
Planned 
Average 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 
Annual Actual Actual Actual Revised 
Expend. Estimates 
Agriculture 1,664 1,803 1,809 1,808 2,383 
Livestock and Fishing 298 362 765 641 169 
Land and Water 1,010 769 756 943 906 
Settlement 2,640a 95a 1,005a 3,604a 7,470a 
Forests 400 423 405 402 516 
Game and Tourism 62 55 64 65 51 
Mining and Mapping 29 35 29 33 — 
Manufacturing 38 — 2 25 1 
Commerce and Co-ops. . . 12 24 24 — — 
Credit — — — — — 
Electric Power — 
Roads 1,344b 994 1,160 1,315 1,891 
Railway — — — — • 
Airports ;; 150 189 266 110 40 
Posts & Tel — — — — — 
Education 658 681 603 467 418 
Health 219 267 157 150 160 
Social Services 14 15 11 4 9 
Information — 89 17 21 28 
Housing 362 690 419 581 215 
Defence and Police 398 636 373 225 189 
Administration 1,275 1,504 1,200 816 1,204 
Local Govt. 1,030 929 923 585 463 
Total (excl. Settlement) . . 8,962ab 9,467 8,985 8,188 8,643 
Budgeted expenditure 10,128 9,834 9,234 8,402 
Notes 
(a) Settlement not included in total. 
(b) Contractor financed roads not included. 
Source: Kenya Government, Development Estimates for the Year 1963/64; 
Development Estimates for the Year 1964/65. 
Table III-6. Tanganyika Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64: Comparison of 
Planned and Actual Expenditures by Ministries^ (£ th.) 
Planned 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 
Average 
Annual Actual Actual Actual 
Expend. 
Agriculture 954 739 
1,255 Veterinary 106 146 1,180 
Water and Irrigation 764 593 
230 Lands and Wildlife 255 224 230 
Forests 178 170 140 172 
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Comm. and Industry 365 217 171 885 
Electric Power (Works) 
Roads (Works) 
Airports (Works) 
626 
1,389= 
68 
650 
1,216 
47 
600 
1,027 
27 
500 
977 
105 
Education 
Health 
Social Services (Co-ops, C.D., Labour, 
Nat. Culture) 
1,090 
318 
165 
1,172 
230 
167 
1,058 
58 
278 
1,042 
154 
323 
Defence and Police 
Administration (Vice-President., Justice) 
Local Government 
793 
417 
489 
628 
535 
617 
270 
381 
283 
689 
379 
551 
TOTAL 7,977= 7,352 5,704 7,263 
Budgeted expenditure 
Finance assured 
8,210 8,344 
5,520d 
12,668 
9,918d 
Notes: 
(a) Figures are for ministries or departments within ministries, with names 
in parentheses if not apparent. Note: expenditures by Works for other 
ministries are allocated to them. 
(c) Contractor financed roads not included. 
(d) Based on statements in the budget and the budget speech. 
Source: Tanganyika Government Appropriation Accounts, Revenue Statements, 
Accounts of the Funds, and other Public Accounts for the Year 1961/62; 
same, for the Year 1962/63; same, for the Year 1963/64. 
Table III-7. Uganda Development Plan, 1961/62-1965/66: Comparison of 
Planned and Actual Expenditures by Ministries First Three Years (£ th.) 
Planned 
Average 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 
Annual Revised 
Expend. Actual Actual Estimates 
Agriculture 941 318 1,216 1,362 
Animal Industry 372 158 180 413 
Min. and Water Resources 374b 303 271 395 
Roads and Airports (Works) 1,793 1,602 441e 129= 
Education 1,335 468 978 1,822 
Health 460 892 296 357 
Community Development 97 36 84 190 
Information 191 79 233 362 
Housing and Labour 101 c 517e 414= 
Defence and Police 655 489 332 791 
Administration (Prime Minister, Justice, 
and Finance) 88 114= 78 109 
Regional Administration 1,109 362= 264 558 
Reserve 
TOTAL 
Budgeted expenditure 
Finance assured 
400 — — — 
7,916b 4,824 4,787 7,003 
5,465 6,381 9,730 
7,530d 
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Notes: 
(a) Figures are for entire ministries, with names in parentheses if not apparent. 
(b) Water resources and total include an estimated 130 each year for contract 
drilling for local governments; this service is included in reported annual 
expenditures by the ministry but as a self-financing service was not 
counted in development plan. 
(c) Housing activities in 1961/62 were classified in Administration and 
Regional Administration. 
(d) Based on statements in the budget speech. 
(e) Some expenditures previously in Works transferred to Housing and 
Labour. 
Source: Uganda Government, Estimates of Expenditure 1963/64; Draft Estimates 
of Development Expenditure 1964/65. 
Actual development expenditure under the old Kenya plan 
had almost no shortfall, ending up at about 98 per cent of the 
planned level. Each year (except the last) there was a moderate 
shortfall relative to the budgeted expenditure, but the budget was 
regularly pushed sufficiently ahead that the final outcome for all 
four years was very close to the plan. Moreover, the sector 
composition of actual expenditure ended up quite similar to that 
envisioned in the plan. Thus though the Kenya plan was smaller 
in size relative to the economy than in the other two countries, 
it was fully carried out. In addition, the extraordinary Settlement 
programme built up from nothing to a rate of actual expenditure 
of over £7 million. 
In Tanganyika actual development expenditure had a moderate 
shortfall, and came out at about 85 per cent of the plan. The 
shortfall was concentrated in the fiscal year 1962/63, and was 
largely due to lack of finance; in that year the government introduced 
a complete freeze on starting new projects. In his budget speech, 
the Minister of Finance discussed in a quite illuminating way the 
financial problems involved in shifting from complete reliance on 
U.K. financing, provided largely on a programme basis and often 
after expenditure had been initiated, to a system of foreign aid 
from many sources, largely on a project basis and with the necessity 
of complete agreement before initiating expenditure.7 At the same 
time, in both the last two years the approved budget ran far ahead 
of the assured financing and the rate of expenditure realistically 
attainable. The overall shortfall was distributed fairly evenly 
among sectors. 
In Uganda, finally, there has been a quite large shortfall during 
the first three years of the old plan; actual expenditure was about 
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78 per cent of total budgeted expenditure in the first three years, 
or about 70 per cent of planned average annual expenditure during 
the five years. As in Tanganyika, lack of finance in fiscal year 
1962/63 was an important causal factor; though a rise in expenditure 
was budgeted in that year funds were not actually released by the 
Ministry of Finance, and this slowdown carried over to affect 
1963-64. Moreover, in Uganda the shortfall was sharply concen-
trated in two sectors—roads, where central government expenditure 
was squeezed very sharply, and local government, where proposed 
development assistance was cut back decisively. Then in 1964/65 
(not shown in Table III-7), buoyant tax revenues from Uganda's 
export boom very much eased the financial constraint, and expen-
diture (according to the revised estimate) rose to £12.4 million; 
at least temporarily administrative rather than financial problems 
became operative. The government has also added, net, about 
£28 million of expenditure to the original plan, when and if financing 
is available.8 The largest relative increases are for agriculture, 
health, defence and police. As of June, 1965, however, it seemed 
likely to the writer that most of these additions would carry 
over into the new plan beginning in 1966/67, along with some original 
projects, so that despite acceleration of expenditures there would 
still be some shortfall from the old plan. 
These departures of actual development expenditures from 
the plans suggest some qualifications to the comparisons among 
Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda noted above. With respect to 
size, the spread in terms of actual expenditure between Tanganyika 
(5.8 per cent of 1962 GDP) and Kenya (5.3 per cent) is much 
narrower, and as a consequence of the shortfalls Uganda (5.0 
per cent) is actually similar to Kenya. With respect to sector 
composition, the main modifications are that Uganda's actual 
share for economic infrastructures has been distinctly less than in 
the other two countries, and that her share for general government 
administration has actually been something like Tanganyika's 
rather than Kenya's. 
Financing 
In view of the importance of the financial constraint in East 
African circumstances, it is particularly relevant to examine the 
planned and actual sources of finance for the old plans. The plans 
in all three countries expected to draw heavily on foreign financing, 
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though in different degrees. As shown in Tables III-8, III-9, 
and 111-10, Kenya planned something approaching 90 per cent 
foreign financing, Tanganyika about 79 per cent and Uganda about 
73 per cent. (The Kenya figures exclude Settlement, which is 
almost entirely supported by foreign grants and loans.) Among 
the domestic sources, drawing down existing funds and hoped-for 
domestic borrowing bulked larger than taxation and other domestic 
revenue. None of the old plans projected as much as £1 million 
per year from these latter two sources. 
As the plans have actually worked out, Tanganyika and Uganda 
have found themselves able to allocate more tax revenues to their 
development budgets—Tanganyika raising the figure from £1.0 
to £3.4 million over the three years, and Uganda from £2.8 million 
over five years to £3.0 million in the first three years, and an 
additional £4.7 million in 1964/65. This (combined with the 
shortfalls) has lowered the share of actual foreign financing to 
59 per cent in the case of Uganda and something like 73 per cent 
in the case of Tanganyika. Note that these percentages refer to 
utilisation of foreign grants and loans for actual expenditure, not 
to their initial approval. Kenya, on the other hand, has not had 
to allocate additional tax revenues to development, and her propor-
tion of foreign financing has apparently been even higher than 
planned. All three countries have obtained more foreign grants 
than expected, which means that at least during the years bridging 
independence the terms of foreign financing have been relatively 
easy. 
Table III-8. Kenya Development Plan, 1960/61-1963/64: Planned and Actual 
Financing (£ mil.) Plan: Actual: 
Central Govt. Central Govt. 
Taxation 0 .7 0 .3 
Other domestic revenue . . 1.4 0 .2 
Drawing down funds 0 .6 1.0 
Domestic borrowing . . . . 0.9a c 
Percentage Domestic 1 0 % 4 % 
Foreign grants . . 
Foreign loans . . 
Foreign assistance in negotiation 
Balance not covered 
6.5 
3.0 
21.6a 
1.2 
8.1 
25.7° 
Settlement 10.6b 9.1b 
Percentage Foreign 90% 96% 
TOTAL 35.8ab 35.3bc 
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Notes: 
(а) Domestic borrowing and total do not include estimated contractor 
finance for roads of 3.0. Foreign assistance in negotiation is entire loan 
programme and includes some domestic borrowing. 
(б) Settlement is almost entirely foreign financed. It is not included in total, 
(c) Domestic borrowing and total do not include actual contractor finance 
for roads of 4.8. Foreign loans are residual, and include some domestic 
borrowing. 
Source: Kenya Plan; Kenya Government, Appropriation Accounts, Other 
Public Accounts, and Accounts of the Funds for the Year 1963/64; same, 
for 1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63. 
Table III-9. Tanganyika Development Plan, 1961/62-1963/64: Planned and 
Actual Financing (£ mil.) 
Plan: Actual: 
Central Govt. Central Govt. 
Taxation . . . . . . 1.0 1.1 
Other domestic revenue — 2.3 
Drawing down funds . . . . . . . . . . -— — 
Domestic borrowing . . . . . . 4.0b 2.0° 
Percentage Domestic 21% 27% 
Foreign grants 7.5a 9.4 
Foreign loans 11.5a 5.6 
Foreign assistance in negotiation a 
Balance not covered — — 
Percentage Foreign 79% 73% 
TOTAL . . 24. OB 20.3 
Notes: 
(a) Expected grants and loans are taken from the plan, but the plan text and 
the 1961/62 budget speech indicate that 2 .5 grants and 8.8 loans were 
not assured. 
(b) Domestic borrowing and hence the total do not include estimated 
contractor financing of road projects of 1.1. 
(c) Unsecured deficit. 
Source: Tanganyika Plan; Tanganyika Government, Budget Survey 1964/65; 
same, 1965/66; Tanganyika Government, Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure, 1963/64. 
Table 111-10. Uganda Development Plan, 1961/62—1965/66: Planned and 
Actual Financing First Three Years (£ mil.) 
Plan (5 yrs.) Actual (3 yrs.)d 
Central Govt. Agencies Central Govt. 
Taxation 1.1 2.0° 1.7 
Other domestic revenue 1.7 12.4ab 1.3 
Drawing down funds 3.9 1.2 2.8 
Domestic borrowing 3.8 4 . l a 1.0 
Percentage Domestic 27% 68% 41% 
53 
Development Planning in East Africa 
Foreign grants 
Foreign loans 
Foreign assistance in negotiation 
Balance not covered 
5 . 1 
5 . 2 
7 . 0 
1 1 . 2 
2 . 3 b 
2 . 7 a 
4 . 2 a 
4 . 4 
5 . 4 
Percentage Foreign 7 3 % 3 2 % 5 9 % 
TOTAL 3 9 . 0 2 8 . 9 a 1 6 . 6 
Notes. 
(a) Estimated financing for Uganda Development Corporation projects con-
sists of 7.2 from operating surpluses (in other domestic revenue) 2 .7 from 
foreign loans in negotiation, 2 .8 from private participation (in domestic 
borrowing), 2.7 not covered. 
(b) Estimated financing for Uganda Electricity Board 2.2 from operating 
surpluses, 2 .3 from foreign borrowing. 
(c) Local government revenue. 
(d) Figures are actual for 1961/62 and 1962/63, revised estimates for 1963/64. 
Source: Uganda Plan; Uganda Government., Financial Statement and Revenue 
Estimates 1964/65; same, 1963/64. 
The heavy reliance on foreign financing in the old plans has 
two notable implications. First, if difficulties arise in making 
arrangements for foreign finance which has been expected, a 
country's actual development expenditure is almost sure to be 
held back below the planned level. The experience of both 
Tanganyika and Uganda demonstrates this risk, which could be 
diminished if a larger proportion of domestic financing were assured, 
and particularly if domestic sources were more flexible from year 
to year. Of course, if a country is fortunate enough to be able to 
obtain foreign finance at a steady rate to cover nearly all its develop-
ment expenditure, as Kenya seems to have been under the old 
plan, that is splendid, but it is an unlikely situation for ambitious 
plans. 
Second, under the old plans foreign finance clearly covered 
much more than the direct import content of the central government 
development expenditure. I shall suggest in the next chapter 
that a reasonable estimate of direct plus indirect import content for 
Uganda and Tanganyika, allowing for both induced domestic 
consumption and required domestic investment during rapid 
growth, is in the range of 60-80 per cent. Thus in Uganda and 
Tanganyika the actual foreign finance used for the old plans pro-
bably more or less covered the normal indirect imports as well 
(I refer to normal indirect imports because in the economic circum-
stances of retarded growth which were actually experienced, indirect 
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imports would be substantially diminished.) In Kenya the actual 
foreign finance went further, but her direct and indirect import 
requirements are also higher. If in future foreign finance were 
available only for the direct import content of development expen-
diture, this would constitute a major change from the past, and 
pose much more stringent financing problems for the East African 
governments. 
Impact on Trends in the Economies 
Broadly speaking, the old plans were designed to carry forward 
and reinforce the previous growth trends in the East African 
economies, and did not attempt markedly to accelerate these 
trends. As they worked out in practice, they have not been able 
to offset the forces of general economic retardation operating in 
the period 1958-62, as discussed in the last chapter, and the fortunate 
export boom in 1963 and 1964 must be reckoned as fundamentally 
independent of the plans. 
The principal shortcomings of the old plans—in relation 
to the goal of substantially accelerating economic development 
which the governments now propose—may be summarised as 
follows. First, central government expenditure programmes were 
too modest in size to accomplish more. The old Kenya plan pro-
jected a fall in the share of GDP devoted to these activities, and 
apart from the extraordinary Settlement programme has operated 
as planned. Uganda planned a rise, but has not been able to 
finance and implement it in practice. Tanganyika accomplished 
an increase in the share of central government development expen-
diture in GDP, but only from about five to about six per cent. 
In an economic setting of stagnant or declining private investment, 
the old plans could not prevent an overall decline in the gross 
investment rate, as noted in the last chapter. In that kind of 
setting, to accelerate growth government investment would have 
had to play a major leading and energising role. 
Second, the old plans did not aim at any significant structural 
changes in the economies, either in altering past trends in the rela-
tions between agricultural product and employment and urban 
product and employment, or in modifying existing relations among 
exports, domestic production, and import demands. Uganda 
perhaps attempted to do most in the urban sectors, through the 
medium of autonomous public corporations, while Kenya attempted 
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most to reinforce the agricultural sector. But though there are 
differences among the three countries, in general the old plans 
continued to emphasise general government services, education 
and welfare, and economic infrastructures. As noted in the last 
chapter, sector shifts have actually tended to slow down compared 
to the mid-fifties, and (if allowance is made for the effect of the 
lower investment rate) there has been very little overall import 
substitution. 
Finally, the old plans did not attempt to be comprehensive. 
They did not start from future objectives for the economy as a whole 
and derive the plan as the means to attain them, nor cover private 
investment and private expansion targets, nor try to extend imple-
mentation procedures through a suitable range of policy instruments 
to the entire economy. Of course making a plan comprehensive 
in no way guarantees that it will succeed in substantially accelerating 
the rate of growth of the economy as a whole. But in the light of 
experience with the old plans in recent economic circumstances 
in East Africa, it is reasonable to conclude that a major advance 
toward comprehensiveness may be at least a necessary condition 
for more rapid economic development. 
Footnotes: 
1. See footnote 2 in Chapter I, and sources for Tables III-l , III-2, and III-3 
in this chapter. 
2. See footnote 3 in Chapter I. 
3. Kenya Government, The Development Programme 1960/63, p.l. 
4. Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/62-
1963/64, p . l . 
5. Uganda Government, The First Five-Year Development Plan, 1961/62-
1965/66, pp. 8-14. 
6. For more specific details see Table 4 and text discussion in my paper, 
"Coordination of Development Plans in East Africa", E.A.I.S.R. 
Conference Papers, Jan., 1964. 
7. Tanganyika Government, Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance, 
1962/63. 
8. Uganda Government, Background to the Budget, 1965/66. 
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CHAPTER IV: A STATISTICAL PROJECTION MODEL FOR 
THE EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIES 
Starting from the status of development planning in "the old 
plans", and given the desire of the East African governments to 
accelerate recent rates of economic growth substantially through 
more comprehensive planning, the most important improvement 
immediately attainable is to introduce more inclusive and coherent 
aggregative plan frameworks. As noted in the first chapter, the 
aggregative analysis should provide a set of aggregative targets 
for the economy during the plan—consistent with each other, 
compatible with past economic relationships or identifiable changes 
in them due to policy measures, and judged to be the maximum 
attainable during the current plan-period. The targets specify 
such economic variables as national income and product, total 
exports and imports, government tax revenues, capital formation 
by government, public agencies, and private enterprises, total 
borrowing and assistance from abroad, non-agricultural employ-
ment, output of major agricultural products and total supply 
of educated manpower. Defining the set of aggregative targets 
should first pose, and then be based upon, the key strategic decisions 
which the government has to make in establishing a viable develop-
ment plan. The set of targets in turn provides the plan framework 
toward which all specific development activities are directed. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an aggregative model 
for the East African economies which can be used in making this 
kind of aggregative projection for development planning, which 
can be calculated with available statistical series, and which can be 
applied in comparisons among the three economies. The model 
will then be applied in the next chapter to making a projection of 
the Uganda economy to 1981, suitable for defining at least an 
initial draft framework for the new Uganda plan, and in the following 
chapter to analysing the new Tanzania and Kenya plans. 
Desirable Characteristics of a Model for East Africa1 
The model should first of all be designed for making inter-
mediate-term economic projections which will highlight the key 
strategic decisions necessary for the plan to succeed. The model 
should specify the network of linkages between the desired objec-
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tives for the economy as a whole and the development expenditures 
and policies subject to government decision. In principle the 
model might be used either to estimate, from given objectives, 
the 'required' development expenditures and policies to attain 
them, or from given development actions, the 'expected' attainment 
of objectives. In practice such a model is commonly used in a 
process of successive approximation, and the final judgment that 
the actions and the objectives are consistent and feasible must 
include an admixture of hunch and hope as well as the statistical 
calculations. The underlying projection model, however, should 
make explicit those structural aspects of the economy which are 
believed to have a continuity of their own, and which, therefore, 
impose tests of consistency and feasibility on the government's 
planned development expenditures and policies. 
A practical projection model must be adapted to available 
statistical series. In the three East African countries the main 
bodies of statistical information available for a model are gross 
domestic product estimates built up from the product side for 
various sectors, merchandise export and import data derived from 
customs operations, rather rough estimates of gross capital forma-
tion with little detail, central government revenue and expenditure 
accounts using budgetary definitions for fiscal years and reported 
employment figures for various sectors. Two major pieces of 
statistical information which are frequently used in development 
models for higher-stage underdeveloped countries, as in Latin 
America, are lacking here: independent gross domestic product 
estimates built up from the expenditure side for all final demands 
including household consumption, and input-output estimates 
linking final demands, intermediate demands and gross product 
in the various sectors. However, for the present stage of de-
velopment in East Africa it may be possible to design a simplified 
projection model which leaps over the missing pieces and yet 
is quite useful for analysis with the observations we have. 
In view of the present extensive economic cooperation among 
the East African countries, and the interest in further coordination 
of development efforts, it may be especially interesting to have a 
general projection model which can be applied with a limited number 
adaptations to all three countries. This would permit standardised 
comparisons of economic structures, of past growth, and of future 
plans.2 
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Definition and Rationale of the Model 
The model is presented systematically in algebraic form in 
the Appendix to this chapter. Before examining it in detail, 
however, let us note certain general characteristics. First, it is a 
sector model distinguishing six producing sectors of the economy, 
seven kinds of imports, two classes of exports, four forms of capital 
formation, four kinds of government taxes and certain other vari-
ables. Thus it embodies substantially more specific information 
than a purely aggregative model but still much less detail than is 
involved in planning development actions within ministries. Second, 
it portrays an economy in which everything depends, by way of the 
structural relationships among its parts, upon five autonomous 
variables: the quantity of agricultural exports, the prices of those 
exports, the value of manufactured exports, import substitution 
in manufactured products and central government current expendi-
tures. In particular, it specifies that required capital formation is 
derived within the model from implied increases in domestic pro-
duction. Third, the parameters describing the structural relation-
ships among parts of economy must each be projected into the 
future. Some are assumed to remain unchanged or to follow 
a time-trend, while others are assumed to be adjustable by govern-
ment policy. Fourth, it is a linear model; capital formation, 
though in principle non-linear, is represented by a linear approxi-
mation depending on a tentative initial estimate of rate of growth. 
Thus though the algebra is somewhat laborious, it is mathema-
tically simple. Finally, the model is designed to emphasize three 
potential constraints on development expenditures and policies: 
the balance of trade, which depends mainly on the various import 
parameters; the government budget surplus or deficit, which depends 
mainly on the tax revenue parameters; and the required saving, 
which depends mainly on the capital formation parameters. 
The 37 variables of the model are defined in the first section 
of the Appendix, and only a few points of definition need comment 
here. Both imports and exports include interterritorial trade, and 
many transfers have been made among the SITC classes of imports 
to arrive at somewhat more homogeneous import categories. 
It is assumed that import substitution can affect food, consumer 
manufactures, intermediate goods, and construction materials, but 
not consumer vehicles, fuel, and equipment. Agricultural exports, 
agricultural product, and G D P are adjusted for changes in prices 
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of agricultural exports, which clearly are a key phenomenon in the 
Uganda economy; given the ambiguity of information on domestic 
prices and the lack of any pronounced general price trend 1954-62, 
however, no other price adjustments seemed justified. Government 
expenditure and tax revenue are first adjusted to exclude capital 
and transfer transactions from the budgetary data. Then the 
figures for the fiscal year beginning in any calendar year are used 
in conjunction with production and trade figures for the calendar 
year, to reflect crudely the lag of cash expenditures behind use of 
resources and of revenues behind tax obligations. A variable which 
appears in many relationships is private income, defined as the 
current value of gross domestic product less government tax revenue. 
The model itself is presented in the second section of the 
Appendix; there are 11 accounting identities and five autonomous 
variables, leaving 21 functional equations. Let us examine the 
rationale of these functional equations with some care. 
The gross product variables for the various producing sectors 
are treated either as functions of particular final demands, or of 
private income and hence implicitly of consumer spending, or of 
gross product in other sectors and hence implicitly of intermediate 
demands. Thus government product and construction product 
are treated simply as proportions of government current expenditure 
and construction investment, respectively. Agricultural product, 
measured in constant prices, is assumed to be a function primarily 
of the volume of agricultural exports, but also of manufactured 
exports and import substitution, reflecting agricultural inputs 
into manufacturing, and of private income, reflecting domestic 
consumer demands. Manufacturing product is of course partly 
a function of manufactured exports and import substitution, but 
mainly of private income and hence domestic consumer demands. 
Services product is treated as entirely dependent on private income. 
Transport product, on the other hand, is assumed to depend on 
intermediate demands stemming from agricultural product at 
constant prices and manufacturing product. From the standpoint 
of methodology, the fundamental question about the model is 
whether these simplified relationships for the various producing 
sectors adequately represent the more complex interconnections 
with final demands and intermediate demands which actually exist. 
The seven import variables are also treated in a variety of 
ways. The three kinds of consumer imports—food, manufactures 
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and vehicles—are assumed to be functions simply of private income; 
the reason for distinguishing the three kinds rather than combining 
them is to permit different degrees of import substitution in pro-
jecting the import parameters. Intermediate imports are treated 
partly as a function of manufactured exports and import substitution, 
reflecting imported inputs directly into manufacturing, but mainly 
of GDP volume. Fuel imports are related only to G D P volume. 
Construction material imports and equipment imports are assumed 
to depend upon construction investment and equipment investment, 
respectively; since these import parameters are comparatively 
high and since the rate of investment in the model varies substan-
tially with the rate of growth of GDP, construction and equipment 
imports are comparatively variable elements of the overall import 
bill. It may be noted that import substitution must be estimated 
independently before the model is used in projection, in the course 
of specifying the future import parameters; the changes in these 
parameters then define the import substitution variable, which as 
we have seen affects manufacturing product, agricultural product, 
and intermediate imports. 
Construction investment and equipment investment, with the 
breakdown between public and private investment handled separ-
ately, are in principle functions of marginal net capital-output 
ratios tied to increases in gross product and of retirement coeffi-
cients tied to the level of gross product. These non-linear func-
tions are approximated, however, by linear functions. Thus 
construction investment and equipment investment are actually 
projected in assumed ratios to gross product, the ratios being raised 
or lowered according to the rate of growth which is expected to 
result from the projection; if the expected rate of growth should 
prove to be substantially in error, the investment parameters must 
be adjusted in a second approximation. The model specifies that 
investment depends, not on G D P for the entire economy, but on 
urban gross product, the sum of gross product in government, 
manufacturing, services and transport. Thus a small amount of 
capital formation in agriculture is ignored—Tanzania figures sug-
gest not more than ten per cent of the total—but the model properly 
emphasizes that required investment depends mainly on non-
agricultural expansion. 
The four forms of government tax revenue are derived in the 
model from revenue coefficients, in principles set in the tax laws, 
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and appropriate tax base variables appearing in the model. Export 
tax revenue is treated as a function of the current value of agri-
cultural exports; revenue thus varies proportionately with changes 
in quantity, but the revenue coefficient must be adjusted independent-
ly for changes in agricultural export prices. Customs revenue is 
treated simply as a proportion of the value of imports; the para-
meter can be adjusted for changes in the mix of high-duty and low-
duty imports. Direct tax revenue and indirect (i.e. excises and 
all other) tax revenue are related to private income, representing 
the tax base for the former and the presumed influence of consumer 
demands for the latter; in a projection the two coefficients can be 
adjusted separately for tax policy changes.3 
Employment is not explicitly treated in the model as presented 
here, but could be readily added as a supplementary variable or 
variables related to sector gross products, after allowance for 
trends in productivity per employee. 
The third section of the Appendix lists the parameters of the 
model. In general they can be calculated from observed ratios in 
the years 1954-62; in a projection they are either assumed to 
carry over unchanged, or to follow a simple time-trend, or to be 
adjusted as a result of some specific policy influence like import 
substitution. Two further points about certain of the parameters 
may be noted. The parameters representing the direct affect of 
manufactured exports and import substitution on manufacturing 
product, agricultural product, and intermediate imports are esti-
mated roughly from proportions which appear to prevail for all 
manufacturing in the 1961 Kenya Census of Manufacturing. The 
retirement coefficients for construction and equipment are estimated 
on the basis of assumed useful lives, past rates of growth and past 
investment rates. These retirement coefficients were then used with 
actual gross investment and actual increases in urban gross product 
during the two four-year periods 1954-58 and 1958-62 to calculate 
marginal capital-output ratios. It was some comfort to find that 
for Uganda and Tanzania the results were not dissimilar in the 
two periods, even though the rate of investment and rate of growth 
were much lower in 1958-62; Kenya presumably built up even more 
excess capacity than the others in the retardation period.4 
The last section of the Appendix sets forth some of the algebraic 
relationships to be used in calculations with the model. The 
algebra is somewhat laborious but mathematically simple. In the 
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end, as shown in the last three reduced form equations for GDP, 
government tax revenue, and imports, all of the parts of the model 
depend on the five autonomous variables and linear combinations 
of the projected parameters. 
The conception of the development process in East Africa 
which is embodied in the model has the following major emphases. 
Various producing sectors, particularly agricultural and non-
agricultural, have different effects on imports, investment require-
ments and tax revenues. What happens domestically is influenced 
largely though not entirely by agricultural export quantities and 
prices. Required capital formation both public and private is 
determined by the rate of growth of domestic production, and the 
import bill is quite sensitive to variations in capital formation. 
Import substitution in manufactures is a prime potential source of 
structural change. Government development actions can affect 
significantly government current expenditure, the share of public 
investment, tax revenue coefficients and the extent of import 
substitution, but not other structural parameters of the economy. 
Finally, progress in development is limited by one of three potential 
constraints: the balance of trade, the government budget surplus or 
deficit, and the saving implied by required capital formation.5 
Estimating Future Parameters and Autonomous Variables 
Using the model to make intermediate-term projections for 
development planning involves two preparatory sets of operations: 
estimating the 25 future parameters and projecting independently 
the five autonomous variables. In some parts of the model the two 
operations interact. 
Estimating the future parameters should in principle stick 
closely to the observed past parameters, since these are conceived 
to represent those structural aspects of the economy which have 
a continuity of their own. Adjustments of some past parameters 
may be needed, however, to reflect three kinds of predictable 
structural change: simple time trends which are observed in the 
data and are compatible with our understanding of the economy, 
changes due to government policy and expected alterations in the 
growth of those autonomous variables which interact with a few 
of the parameters. Table IV-1 presents the observed parameters 
for Uganda for the three years 1954, 1958 and 1962,6 and in the 
last two columns the assumed parameters for a 'moderate' projection 
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a n d a n ' a m b i t i o u s ' p ro jec t ion t o 1981. T h e r a t i ona l e f o r t h e la t ter 
set of p a r a m e t e r s will be discussed in the next chap te r . T o i l lus t ra te 
the p rocedure , however , let us e x a m i n e the logic suggested in the 
t ab le f o r e s t ima t ing t h e f u t u r e p a r a m e t e r s of the ' m o d e r a t e ' p r o -
jec t ion . 
Table IV-1. Comparison of Actual Uganda Parameters 1954-62 and Assumed 
Parameters for 'Moderate' and 'Ambitious' Projections 
'Mocler- 'Anibi-
ate' Pro- tious'pro-
1954 1958 1962 jection jection 
al (assumed) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
a3 (assumed) .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 
m2=Pa*—al Ea*—a3(Em+Sm)/Y .118 .0915 .131 .131 .131 
g =Pg /G .426 .514 .609 .740a ,740a 
m2 (assumed) .5 .5 .5 .5 ,6h 
ml =Pm-m2(Em+Sm)/Y .0829 .0715 .0649 .0649 .0649 
s =Ps /Y .218 .240 .269 .313a .313 
t =Pt/Pa* + Pm .0957 .127 .132 .132 ,132a 
h = P k / K .324 .364 .466 ,546a .546 
cl = M a / Y .0512 .0802 .0618 ,0558b ,0309a 
c2 = M m / Y .165 .145 .157 ,141b ,0785f 
c3 =Mv/Y .0411 .0269° .0331 .0331 .033K 
i3 (assumed) .2 .2 .2 .2 ,lh 
il = M i —i3(Em+Sm)/GDP*. . .0187 .0193 .0246 ,0221b . 0116f 
i2 = M f / G D P * .0210 .0241 .0217 .0217 .0217 
j l = M k / K .221 .225 .198 ,178b • 05g 
j2 = M q / Q .585° .702 .689 .689 .689 
k' = K / U .372 .256 .158 .285° . 355' 
q' = Q / U .196 .180 .135 .215° .245' 
pi =ICp/K .653 .496 .458 .458 .458 
P2 =QP/Q .891 .926 .944 .944 .944 
rl = R d / Y .0398 .0496 .0467 .0467 ,0537k 
r2 =Re/Ea .133 .122 .0792 . 139d . 161 
r3 = R m / M .146 .148 .228 ,308a ,354k 
r4 =Ri /Y .0784 .0787 .0841 ,090a ,104k 
Notes. 
(a) Assumes trend continues. 
(b) Assumes 10% import substitution. 
(c) Assumes a 7% average annual rate of growth of urban gross product, 
compared to about 8% in 1954-58 and 4 % in 1958-62. 
(d) Assumes 1963 parameter of .160 will decline with 1 % per year price fall. 
(e) Considered unrepresentative in relation to preceding or following years. 
( / ) Assumes 50% import substitution. 
(g) Assumes 75 % import substitution. 
(/;) Assumes shift of 50% of intermediate imports from i3 to m2. 
(0 Assumes as first approximation a 9 % average annual rate of growth of 
urban gross product. 
( j ) Assumes export tax rates raised 33%, offsetting 25% decline in prices, 
giving same effective tax rate as 1963. 
(k) Assumes tax rates raised 15% in addition to trends implying rise of 0% 
for direct taxes, 7% for indirect taxes, 35% for customs duties. Overall 
rate rise for all taxes is about 30 % including trends. 
T o begin wi th , the p a r a m e t e r s al , reflect ing the re la t ion be tween 
agr icu l tu ra l expor t s a n d agr icu l tura l p r o d u c t , b o t h at c o n s t a n t 
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prices, and a3, m2 and i3, reflecting the direct impacts of manufac-
tured exports and import substitution, are simply assumed from 
independent evidence, leaving certain residuals to be explained by 
the calculated parameters. Among the six gross product para-
meters, a2, ml, and t—for agriculture, manufacturing, and transport 
—show some variation over the years 1954-62, but this seems 
compatible with a presumption of constancy, so the future para-
meters are assumed the same as in 1962. The other gross product 
parameters, g, s, and h—for government, services, and construction 
—show a reasonably clear upward time-trend 1954-62, and this is 
understandable as a rise in wages and profits relative to material 
inputs in these sectors, so the future parameters are projected with a 
continuing trend. 
Among the seven import parameters, c3, i2, and j2—for 
vehicles, fuel, and equipment—are presumed not to be subject to 
import substitution, and as the observed parameters 1954-62 
appear compatible with this presumption, their future values are 
assumed to continue at the 1962 level. On the other hand, cl, c2, 
il, and jl—for food, consumer manufactures, intermediate goods, 
and construction materials—are presumed to be subject to import 
substitution, and even though this was not reflected in the obser-
vations for 1954-62, a ten per cent fall in these coefficients is assumed 
for the 'moderate' projection. Such a change would depend on 
appropriate development policies promoting import substitution 
in manufactures, and a more refined assumption ought to take 
account of the specific policies which the government expects to 
pursue. The value for the import substitution variable Sm, implied 
by these parameter changes, is about £2.3 million at 1962 levels of 
GDP. 
Turning to the four tax revenue parameters, rl for direct taxes 
is simply projected at the 1962 figure; despite the progressive 
structure of the personal income tax rates, its narrow tax base, 
and its modest yield relative to business income and graduated 
personal taxes, do not seem to imply any significant change in the 
direct tax parameter. On the other hand, r3 and r4 for customs 
duties and indirect taxes are assumed to continue to rise in line 
with the trends observed in the calculated parameters 1958-62. 
This of course implies continuing changes in tax rates; it represents 
a judgment that raising additional revenue from these sources is 
politically and economically attractive, and that future Finance 
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Ministers are likely to continue the pattern of behaviour of the 
recent past. Finally, r2 for export taxes is estimated on the basis 
of assumed export prices with present tax rates, which make yields 
highly elastic with respect to prices. Thus largely due to the 
fluctuation in coffee prices, the observed r2 parameter fell from 
about 12 per cent in 1958 to about 8 per cent in 1962, and then 
jumped to about 16 per cent in 1963. The estimated future para-
meter starts from the 1963 level of agricultural export prices and 
assumes an average annual fall of 1 per cent from the 1963 level 
From the standpoint of methodology one could make almost any 
assumption about future tax revenue parameters, as they are clearly 
subject to government policy decision. But it may be especially 
interesting to examine the budgetary implications of these 'expected* 
tax decisions in a context of resumed expansion of both government 
expenditure and GDP. 
The investment parameters k' and q'—for construction and 
equipment, respectively—depend on the rate of growth of U, 
urban gross product, and hence in a projection on the tentative 
initial estimate of this rate of growth derived from the five autono-
mous variables. They cannot be estimated simply from past 
observed parameters unless the past rate of growth is expected to 
continue unchanged. In the tables the assumption for the 'moder-
ate' projection is that U recovers to a rate of growth a little below 
that of 1954-58, but nearly double that of 1958-62. 
The other operation in using the model for projection is to 
project the five autonomous variables on the basis of ad hoc 
considerations. Agricultural export volume, Ea*, depends mainly 
on domestic supply conditions, and should be checked with past 
trends; in the 'moderate' projection a rate of growth of 4 per cent 
per annum is assumed, which is approximately equal to the trend 
from 1949-50 average to 1962-63 average. On the other hand, the 
export price adjustment, T, depends on world markets; here a 
decrease of 1 per cent per annum is assumed, which compares with 
3 per cent 1954-63 and 0 per cent 1949-50 average to 1962-63 
average. Manufactured exports, Em, should consider both past 
trends and expected new developments; in the circumstances of 
Uganda the range of products involved in manufactured exports is 
sufficiently narrow that a main-product approach, particularly for 
copper, is feasible. Government current expenditure, G, is in 
principle entirely a policy variable, though in practice it is reasonable 
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to check its trend relative to that of GDP. Finally, the import 
substitution variable, Sm, is derived at the base-year level of G D P 
from the assumed changes in import coefficients, which depend in 
principle on the import substitution policies pursued; the base-year 
value must then be projected forward on the basis of the tentative 
initial estimate of G D P growth. 
It is clear that at a number of points the two operations— 
projecting the autonomous variables and estimating the future 
parameters—interact with each other. In practice, the procedure 
is first to project the autonomous variables, then to make a tentative 
initial estimate of the rate of growth of GDP which will result, based 
on their trends compared to the past, and then to use this initial 
estimate in setting the parameters, particularly for gross investment. 
If when the projection is actually calculated this initial estimate 
of GDP growth proves substantially in error, further adjustments 
in the parameters and a revised calculation would have to be made. 
Structure of the East African Economies as Expressed in the Model 
Once a statistical projection model has been fitted with data 
for a country's economy,7 it can provide an illuminating picture of 
the economic structure, either for changes over time or in com-
parison with other countries. This structural analysis can be 
carried out at three levels of generality: at the level of the principal 
variables of the model and the broad relationships among them, 
at the level of the individual parameters and at the level of the 
reduced-form 'multipliers' showing the direct and indirect effects 
of the autonomous variables via the entire network of equations 
and parameters in the model. 
Certain major features of the three economies are immediately 
apparent in the principal variables of the model and a few simple 
ratios among them. These have been summarised in Table II-1, 
II-2, and II-3, and structural characteristics at this level of generality 
have already been discussed in Chapter II. 
Much more specific structural comparisons can be made at the 
level of the individual parameters, which are presented in Table 
IV-2 both as calculated for a recent year and as assumed for pro-
jections. At the same time, we must be cautious in interpreting 
individual parameters as calculated, because even though they are 
conceptually identical, differences in definitions and estimating 
procedures in the three countries' statistical data (particularly in 
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(h) Assumes as first approximation 10% average annual rate of growth of 
urban gross product, as in Plan. Derived from k = K / A U = 2.8, 
q = Q / A U = 1.6, Ret K = . 0 4 U , Ret Q = .11U. 
(0 Kenya parameters are for 1963 rather than 1962. 
(J) Rounded values, summing to 1.0, of estimates prepared by C.W. Howe 
and H. Karani, "A Projection Model for the Kenya Economy", East 
African Economic Review, June 1965, weighting manufacturing industries 
according to their 1963 shares in Kenya's manufactured exports. 
(k) 1961-62 average. 
(m) 1963. 
(n) Uganda 'moderate' projection is used here, as more relevant for compara-
tive purposes than the 'ambitious' projection discussed in Chapter V, 
though it differs from the other countries' projections in covering a 
longer period (1981 rather than 1970) and in the assumptions about 
changes in parameters, 
(o) Tanzania and Kenya 'model' projections are designed to express in 
terms of the model the assumptions of their new plans. See Chapter VI 
for further discussion. 
(p) Rounded value estimated by C.W. Howe and H. Karani, loc.cit. 
(q) 1961. 
(r) 1961-63 average. 
(s) Assumes 25 % import substitution. 
(t) Assumes 5% import substitution. 
(u) Assumes as first approximation 6% rate of growth of urban product, 
k = K / A U = 2.4, q = Q / A U = .8. R e t K = .04U, Re t . Q = .1111. 
The import parameters from cl to j2, on the other hand, show 
some meaningful differences. Tanzania's comparatively high 
import dependence in 1962 is shown to be concentrated in her 
imports of food products and manufactured consumer goods, 
while Kenya's is concentrated in her imports of intermediate goods. 
At the same time the Tanzania projection model, following the 
guidelines of the official plan, assumes a much higher future degree 
of import substitution than does the Kenya model or the 'moderate' 
Uganda model. However, it is only a little more than in the 
'ambitious' Uganda model examined in the next chapter. 
The 1962 investment parameters, from k' to p2, simply reflect 
the fact that the recent investment rate in Tanzania has been higher 
than in Uganda and Kenya. The differences in investment para-
meters for the projection models are more interesting. They 
reflect marginal capital-output ratios which are lowest for Tanzania, 
next for Kenya, and highest for Uganda. They also reflect initial 
estimates of the rate of growth of urban gross product which are 
highest in Tanzania, lower and similar for Uganda and Kenya. 
The latter factor is more powerful than the former, so Tanzania 
ends up with the highest projected investment parameters, then 
Uganda and then Kenya. (Again it should be noted that the 
'ambitious' Uganda model examined in the next chapter is more 
like Tanzania in this respect.) 
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Finally, the tax parameters from rl to r4 bring out the dis-
tinctively high reliance on export taxes in Uganda, the relatively 
low average rate of duty on Tanzania's mix of imports, including 
inter-territorial goods and Kenya's distinctively high reliance on 
direct taxes and other indirect taxes, as well as the low average rate 
of customs duty on her import mix. Looking at the projection 
parameters, Tanzania appears to have an overall tax structure 
which is distinctly less income-elastic than either Uganda's or 
Kenya's. 
The ultimate impacts on the three economies of changes in 
autonomous variables like agricultural exports cannot, of course, 
be determined from the individual parameters. The direct and in-
direct effects of such changes depend on all the parameters and the 
entire network of relationship expressed in the model. At this 
third level of structural analysis, therefore, Table IV-3 presents some 
of the most interesting of these 'multipliers', i.e. the parameters of 
the reduced-form equations obtained by solving the full model 
algebraically. It should be noted that the multipliers have been 
calculated for the projection models, and these include the effects 
of estimated future parameter changes. 
Table IV-3. Some Significant Multipliers in the Models of the Uganda, Tanzania, 
and Kenya Economies a.b 
Uganda Tanzania Kenya 
A. Increase in GDP per unit increase in: 
Agric. export volume (Ea*) 2.07 1.94 2.44 
Export prices (T)<= 1.80 1.51 1.90 
Import substitution or mfd. exports (Sm, Em) 1.83 1.68 1.89 
Government current expenditure (G) . . 1.60 1.66 1.61 
B. Increase in government tax revenue (R) per unit increase in: 
Agric. export volume (Ea*) .53 .37 .65 
Export prices (T)c 46 .28 .49 
Import substitution or mfd. exports (Sm. Em) .44 .37 .57 
Government current expenditure (G) . . .36 .34 .44 
C. Increase in imports (M)per unit increase in: 
Agric. export volume (Ea*) .59 .57 .88 
Export prices (T)c .54 .44 .71 
Import substitution or mfd. exports (Sm, Em) .83 .79 1.06 
Government current expenditure (G) . . .60 .65 .67 
Notes: 
(a) With the parameters listed in Table IV-2. See footnotes n and o of 
that table for comment on the models used. 
(,b) Multipliers are parameters of the reduced form equations obtained by 
solving the full model with all its parameters. See part D of the Appendix, 
(c) Represents an increase in agricultural export prices sufficient for a unit 
increase in value, with quantity constant. No adjustment is made for 
the effect of higher prices on effective tax rates, however. 
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First, let us examine the GDP multipliers, that is the amount 
of GDP which is generated directly and indirectly by the various 
autonomous variables, as shown in section A of the table. Uganda's 
multiplier of 2.07 for agricultural export volume asserts that a 
rise of £1 million in the quantity of agricultural exports will lead 
directly to a rise of £1 million in agricultural product and indirectly 
to a further rise of a little more than £1 million in other sectors of the 
economy to increase the volume of transportation, to satisfy the 
demands arising from increased private income, to provide the 
capital formation needed to expand domestic production and so on. 
The multiplier for agricultural export prices is somewhat lower, 
essentially because it has no immediate link with increased transport, 
and operates only through increased private income and capital 
formation.9 Uganda's multiplier for import substitution or manu-
factured exports is about the same as for agricultural export prices, 
because of two main offsetting effects: the larger import content of 
manufactured products tends to lower the multiplier while the 
higher investment requirement tends to raise it. 
For all three East African countries the GDP multiplier for 
agricultural export volume is higher than for any other autonomous 
demand, which is a point of some interest. It is in the order 
of 2.0 for Uganda and Tanzania, 2.4. for Kenya (higher because of 
induced transport and services), with the other GDP multipliers 
ranging down to about 1.5. Considering that both induced con-
sumption and induced investment are included, these are remarkably 
low GDP multipliers, and reflects mainly the East African economies' 
heavy dependence on imports. Comparing the three countries, 
the fact that Tanzania's G D P multipliers are consistently lowest 
represents largely her relatively great import dependence, while for 
Kenya spread effects in transport and services offset high import 
dependence. 
Second, the amount of government tax revenue resulting 
directly and indirectly from the various autonomous variables is a 
relevant question for financial planning. For all three countries the 
tax revenue multipliers shown in section B of the table are strikingly 
high, ranging from about 35 per cent to about 60 per cent. (Note 
that they are stated per unit of each autonomous variable; to state 
them per unit of G D P each must be divided by the corresponding 
GDP multiplier).10 Comparing the three countries, Tanzania's 
direct and indirect revenue yields are distinctly below Uganda's, 
71 
Development Planning in East Africa 
which reflects the comparatively low income-elasticity of her tax 
structure noted above, while Kenya's are above Uganda's. 
Third, the magnitude of direct and indirect import requirements 
stemming from the various autonomous variables may have consi-
derable policy significance. It is a highly relevant observation in 
weighing the ultimate impact of development projects, and in 
foreign aid negotiations may be an important point at issue. For 
Uganda and Tanzania direct and indirect import requirements 
appear to be in the order of 60 per cent for agricultural exports and 
government expenditures, jumping to about 80 per cent for import 
substitution and manufactured exports. For Kenya import require-
ments are consistently higher, and reach over 100 per cent of the 
autonomous demand (56 per cent of the resulting GDP) for import 
substitutes or manufactured exports.11 Thus allowing for induced 
domestic incomes and rising investment requirements, quite large 
fractions of additional demands emerge ultimately as imports.12 
Comparing the three countries, Tanzania's relatively high import 
content of GDP is roughly compensated for by her lower G D P 
multipliers, so her ultimate import multipliers work out to be 
remarkably similar to Uganda's. But Kenya's high import content 
of GDP, particularly for intermediate goods and capital goods, 
combined with high GDP multipliers, make her import require-
ments distinctly the highest of the three countries. 
Footnotes: 
1. Portions of this chapter have been published previously in my article, 
"The Rationale and Uses of a Projection Model for the East African 
Economies", East African Economic Review, June, 1965. 
2. Some modifications of the general model may be appropriate for use in 
a particular country, or course. C. W. Howe and H. Karani have 
applied what is in many ways a more refined version of this model to 
Kenya. See their paper, "A Projection Model for the Kenya Economy", 
East African Economic Review, June, 1965. For the sake of greater 
comparability between countries, however, in this monograph I have 
used the same model for Kenya as for Uganda and Tanzania. 
3. A national accounting point may be noted here. Customs and indirect 
tax revenue are not included conceptually in GDP at factor cost, but 
constitute part of the margin between GDP at factor cost and at market 
prices. Thus in principle we should deduct only direct and export taxes 
from GDP at factor cost to arrive at the variable called private income. 
Since the East African statistics do not provide an independent estimate 
of GDP at market prices on which to base the model, however, and 
since changes in customs duties and indirect taxes probably would affect 
consumer demands out of a given GDP at factor cost, I have preferred 
in the model to subtract all taxes to obtain private income. I am indebted 
to Brian Van Arkadie for clarifying discussion on this point. 
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4. For Uganda, the results were 3.5 and 4.3 for construction, 1.4 and 1.0 
for equipment, in the two periods; for Tanzania, 2 .9 and 2.8 for construc-
tion, 1.8 and 1.4 for equipment, respectively; for Kenya, 2 .4 and 3.2 
for construction, and .85 and .45 for equipment, respectively. 
5. The fact that the model does not explicitly treat educated manpower as a 
potential constraint is a weakness. Manpower needs can be examined, 
however, in a supplementary analysis tied to the model. See E.R. Rado 
and A. R. Jolly, "The Demand for Manpower—An East African Case 
Study", Journal of Development Studies, March, 1965. See also Chapter 
V, section on manpower. 
6. Parameters for intervening years were also examined, but are not 
reproduced here. 
7. I am indebted to a number of people for contributing to the statistical 
calculations. For Uganda, Isaiah Kinyenye, then a student at Makerere, 
carried out much of the data work. For Tanzania, John Kinyunyu, 
economist at the Tanzania Directorate of Development Planning, offered 
extremely valuable help and co-operation. Note that although the model 
was applied only to Tanganyika, the mainland part of Tanzania, the new 
name is used in this and the following chapters. For Kenya, I am 
indebted to C.W. Howe and H. Karani (article cited in footnote 2) for 
many of the data series, and to Anne Cooper, research assistant at 
E.A.I.S.R., for other data work and for fitting the model. 
8. The Kenya parameters shown here differ from those of the Howe-
Karani model, loc. cit., because of both conceptual and statistical differ-
ences. For the sake of greater comparability with Uganda and Tanzania, 
I have generally calculated the Kenya parameters by the same procedures 
as for the other countries. However, for three parameters significantly 
affecting the reduced-form results of the model—i3, m2, and a3, re-
presenting intermediate imports, manufacturing inputs, and agricultural 
inputs into domestic manufacturing of exports or import substitutes— 
I have used rounded values originally estimated by them. For Uganda 
and Tanzania, I have represented the input pattern for future import 
substitution (which is more important than present manufactured 
exports in their case) by estimates derived from the whole range of Kenya 
manufacturing industries in the 1961 industrial census. For Kenya, 
however, Howe and Karani obtained different estimates of these para-
meters, by weighting industries according to their share of manufactured 
exports (which are of course already highly important in Kenya) rather 
than their share of manufacturing output. In particular, their estimates 
indicated a higher direct import content for the products moving into 
exports than for manufactured products in general, and a lower agri-
cultural content. For these three parameters I have therefore used 
rounded values of their estimates. 
9. A technical point to note here is that the GDP multipliers refer to current 
value of GDP. For agricultural export prices, the multiplier with respect 
to GDP volume would be only . 80, since the initial unit increase in prices 
would not affect G D P volume. This distinction does not matter for the 
other autonomous variables. 
10. It should also be recognised that the tax parameters are quite aggregative 
and proportional. For much more precise estimates see D.P. Ghai, 
Taxation for Development: a Case Study of Uganda, East African 
Publishing House, 1966. 
11. Kenya's is higher by 10% simply because of her higher i3 import para-
meter, as noted in footnote 8. Since i3 specifies direct intermediate-
goods imports for import substitution or manufactured exports, the 
remainder represents indirect requirements. 
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12 However, with the exception of Kenya's import multiplier for import 
substitution or manufactured exports, they are all less than 100%. 
Therefore a unit increase of expenditure in the domestic economy, even 
if financed entirely by monetary expansion, does not lead ceteris paribus 
to an equal drain on foreign exchange, as is sometimes implied in simpli-
fied monetary analyses. I am indebted to Clive Gray, of the Kenya 
Ministry of Finance, for discussion clarifying this point. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV: 
A PROJECTION MODEL FOR THE EAST AFRICAN ECONOMIES. 
ADAPTED TO AVAILABLE STATISTICS 
A. Variables 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product = monetary G D P at factor cost 
Pa = gross product of agriculture = agriculture, cotton ginning, coffee 
curing, sugar manufacture, forestry, fishing, hunting 
Pm = gross product of manufacturing = mining, manufacture of 
food products, miscellaneous manufacturing 
Pk = gross product of construction = construction 
Pt = gross product of transport = transport, communication, 
electricity 
Ps = gross product of services = commerce, miscellaneous services 
(private), rents 
Pg = gross product of government = government administration, 
miscellaneous services (public), local government 
U = urban gross product = Pg + Pm + Ps + Pt 
M = imports = net imports, interterritorial imports 
Ma = imports of food = SITC 0, 1, 4 
Mm = imports of consumer manufactures = SITC 5 (part), 6 (part), 
7 (part), 8 (part), 9 (part) 
Mv = imports of consumer vehicles = SITC 6 (part), 7 (part) 
Mi = imports of intermediate goods = SITC 2 (part), 5 (part), 6 (part), 
8 (part), 9 (part) 
Mf = imports of fuel = SITC 3 
Mk = imports of construction materials = SITC 2 (part), 6 (part), 
7 (part), 8 (part) 
Mq = imports of equipment = SITC 7 (part), 8 (part) 
E = exports = domestic exports, inter-territorial exports 
Ea = agricultural exports = SITC 0, 1, 2, 4 
Em = manufactured exports = SITC 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
T = export price adjustment = Ea (1960-62 prices) less Ea 
Ea* = agricultural exports volume = Ea + T 
Pa* = gross product of agriculture volume = Pa + T 
GDP* = Gross Domestic Product volume = GDP + T 
K = construction investment = gross capital formation: government 
construction plus private construction 
Kg = government construction = central government buildings, local 
government, common services organisation 
Kp = private construction = remainder: urban building, rural 
industrial building and construction 
Q = equipment investment = gross capital formation: government 
equipment plus private equipment 
Qg = government equipment = central government: plant, equipment, 
and vehicles 
Qp = private equipment = remainder plant, equipment, and vehicles 
G = government current expenditures = actual recurrent expenditures 
less public debt transactions, pensions and gratuities, overseas 
addition, for fiscal year beginning in any calendar year 
R = government tax revenue = actual recurrent and non-recurrent 
revenue, less public debt transactions, reimbursements, and 
grants from abroad, for fiscal year beginning in any calendar 
year 
Rd = revenue from direct taxes 
Re = revenue from export taxes 
Rm = revenue from customs 
Ri = revenue from indirect taxes = excises, licences and fees, rents 
and interest, miscellaneous, contributions from local funds 
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Y = private income = Gross Domestic Product less government 
revenue 
Sm = import substitution in manufactures = decrease in imports 
of food, consumer manufactures, intermediate goods, and 
construction materials compared to what imports would be 
with unchanged import coefficients 
B. The Model 
Pa + P g + Pm + Ps + Pt + Pk = GDP 
Pg + Pm + Ps + Pt = U 
Ma + Mm + Mv + Mi + Mf + Mk + Mq = M 
Ea + Em = E 
Ea + T = Ea* 
Pa + T = Pa* 
GD P + T = GDP* 
Kg + Kp = K 
Qg + Qp = Q 
Rd + Re + Rm + Ri = R 
GD P — R = Y 
Ea*, T, Em, Sm, G are autonomous 
Pa* = al Ea* + a2 Y + a3 (Em + Sm) 
Pg = gG 
Pm = ml Y + m2 (Em + Sm) 
Ps = s Y 
Pt = t (Pa* + Pm) 
Pk = h K 
Ma = cl Y 
Mm = c2 Y 
Mv = c3 Y 
Mi = il GDP* + i3 (Em + Sm) 
Mf = i2 GDP* 
Mk = j l K 
Mq = j2 Q 
K = kl A U + k2U = k ' U 
Note: The parameter k ' is derived as an approximation depend-
ing upon the capital coefficient k l , the retirement coefficient 
k2, and the estimated rate of growth of U. 
Q = ql AU + q 2 U = q ' U 
Kp = pi K 
Qp = p2 Q 
Rd = rl Y 
Re = r2 Ea 
Rm = r3 M 
Ri = r4 Y 
C. Parameters 
Note: Most parameters are estimated as simple ratios from 
annual observations for the years 1954-62. Some are estimated 
independently, as noted below. All must be projected for 
future years. 
a l = 1.0 
Note: al treats the full value of agricultural exports as part of 
the gross product of agriculture. 
a2 = Pa* — al Ea* — a3 (Em + Sm) 
Y 
g = Pg/G 
a3 = .30 
m2 = .50 
i3 = .20 
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CHAPTER V: D E V E L O P M E N T GOALS FOR UGANDA IN 
1981 
The rate of growth of the Uganda economy during the period 
of general economic retardation, 1958-1962, was distressingly slow, 
as discussed in Chapter II. The abrupt increase of incomes during 
the export boom, 1963-1964, was dramatic and gratifying, but was 
almost entirely due to a jump in the value of agricultural exports 
which could not reasonably be expected to continue, rather than 
to any pervasive effects of the first three years of the old plan, as 
discussed in Chapter III. The question naturally arises: would it 
be possible to transform this picture, and to guide the Uganda 
economy onto a path of markedly accelerated economic growth? 
Or to put the question more operationally: assuming more normal 
export conditions in the future, what would be the conditions 
necessary for shifting to a markedly accelerated path ? 
During the years 1964 and 1965 the planning officials of the 
Uganda government were engaged in preparing the new development 
plan for fiscal years 1966/67-1970/71. At an early stage a 'desirable' 
goal of doubling per capital income over the next three five-year 
plans, from 1966 to 1981, was suggested. The analysis described in 
this chapter was prepared unofficially by members of the economics 
research group at the East African Institute of Social Research, 
as a contribution to the government's consideration of the feasibility 
of this goal.1 Subsequently, after accommodating this 1981 
analysis and other official projections, and further work in translating 
the 1981 objectives into guidelines for the 1966-71 plan, planning 
officials proposed an initial plan framework which was broadly 
similar to that presented here. The government, as reported in the 
press, approved this longer term goal and initial framework, and 
directed that detailed feasibility be further examined in the course 
of working out the specifics of the new plan.2 
From the standpoint of methodology, the statistical projection 
model discussed in the last chapter was designed just for the purpose 
of making aggregative projections of this kind, as part of the com-
prehensive planning process. The projection should highlight the 
strategic decisions which the government needs to make to embark 
on such an ambitious plan—the size of the development programme, 
the lines of development activity to be emphasised, and the main 
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directions of government economic policy—and should sketch a 
broad picture of the progress which seems attainable. The following 
analysis of development goals for Uganda in 1891 may also serve 
to illustrate this first function of comprehensive development 
planning. 
The Growth Objective and Other Goals 
The central objective around which this analysis is built is to 
double per capita income during the period covered by the next 
three five-year plans, 1966-1981. The purpose of the analysis is to 
examine the conditions necessary for achievement of this objective. 
Doubling per capita income implies a rate of growth of gross 
domestic product in the monetary sector of about 8.4 per cent 
per year from 1966 to 1981. Such a rate of growth is near the upper 
end of the range of growth achievements of other countries through-
out the world in the last twenty years. It is essentially the same 
as that projected in the new Tanzania plan. Above all, this objec-
tive is ambitious in comparison with past experience. If Uganda 
is to be developed, however, past experience must not be continued. 
This ambitious goal cannot be achieved by simple reproduction 
of past growth patterns. It will require achievement of investment 
rates higher than have been previously thought possible, a changing 
industrial structure, new patterns of employment, changes in the 
composition of imports and exports, substantially increased tax 
rates, and high rates of domestic saving and capital inflow. The 
organisation of such a transformation will be the task of several 
successive five-year plans. In devising the plan for 1966-71, 
however, it will be helpful to have a longer view of where the 
economy is going. Unless such a view is asserted at the outset, 
horizons are likely to be set by past experience and goals limited 
by immediate possibilities. This analysis, therefore, attempts to 
draw a picture of the possible economy of 1981, and of the path to 
be taken to reach it. 
In addition to the central objective of high growth there are 
other goals the government may wish to set. Some other goals 
might be: 
(a) expansion of employment opportunities at a faster rate 
than the growth of population, so that the employed labour 
force can become an increasing proportion of the popu-
lation; 
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(b) expansion of education so that by 1981 the supply of 
Ugandans will be sufficient to fill substantially all high 
level professional and managerial posts; 
(c) extension of welfare and community service throughout 
the country, so that by 1981 certain minimum facilities 
will be available to all of the people; 
(d) provision of adequate conditions for urban living by many 
more Africans, so that by 1981 the main towns are as 
much as three times as large as today, with some minimum 
standard of housing and facilities; 
(e) a relative shift from dependence on exports toward sales 
in the domestic market for agricultural producers, who 
will continue to constitute the majority of the population. 
Progress toward all of these goals is compatible with the 
central growth objective, but it must be stressed that only by 
attaining a high rate of overall economic growth can progress be 
acceptably rapid. 
Magnitude of the Investment Effort 
To begin the process of economic transformation, an investment 
effort will be required greater than any in previous Uganda experi-
ence. It will also be necessary to improve rapidly the accumulated 
education and productive skills of the labour force, as discussed in a 
later section of this chapter. But expanding the stock of capital 
much more rapidly than in the past is certainly an essential condition. 
Moreover, if the annual rate of growth of output is to be raised 
dramatically, the proportion of output devoted to capital formation 
rather than to other uses (i.e., the rate of investment) must be 
sharply increased. 
How much the rate of investment will have to be increased 
depends on the net capital-output ratio, specifying the net invest-
ment needed to provide additional capital per unit of additional 
output, and the retirement rate, specifying the investment needed 
to replace capital being retired. In the projection model being 
used here, the net capital-output ratios and the retirement rates, 
for construction and tor equipment separately, are defined relative 
to urban product rather than to total GDP, and have been estimated 
from calculated ratios in the past sub-periods 1954-58 and 1958-62.3 
However, to facilitate interpretation, we may note that these 
investment parameters can be approximated by an overall capital-
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output ratio of 3.0, and a retirement rate of 7 per cent, both relative 
to monetary GDP. The implicit overall capital-output ratio is 
lower than in the past in Uganda, but higher than in the past in 
the other East African countries.4 
The key implication of these investment parameters is that the 
target growth rate of 8.4 per cent per year after 1966 will require 
an investment rate of 32 per cent of monetary GDP. This 
represents about twice the recent share of investment in gross 
product. Moreover if the goals for all three five-year plans are 
to be attained, this high investment rate must be achieved within 
the period of the next five-year plan. Any slack in present utilisa-
tion of capital may help in the transition; but it would not be 
prudent to aim at anything less than a doubling of the investment 
rate by 1971. 
Recent years may not provide the most relevant indication of 
whether this ambitious development effort is attainable, however. 
Uganda has achieved much higher rates of capital formation in 
the past. In 1955, for example, investment was about 28 per cent 
of GDP volume (agricultural exports at 1960-62 prices), as noted 
in Chapter II. In general in East Africa, the investment rates 
achieved during the mid-fifties were near the effort envisaged for 
Uganda in the future. Note Kenya's 32 per cent rate and Tanga-
nyika's 29 per cent rate in 1954. 
It is important to realize that although reaching a higher 
investment rate will reduce the share of resources available for 
consumption and other current uses, achievement of the higher 
growth rate will in a few years provide a higher level of output 
from which higher absolute consumption standards can be enjoyed 
than if the investment rate had continued low. During the next 
several years, the phase of 'shifting gears' while the share of invest-
ment is being raised, the development effort requires restraint on 
consumption; consumption increases absolutely, but is below 
what could be enjoyed if the development effort were not increased. 
The model projection indicates that by 1971, however, the temporary 
shortfall in consumption and other current uses can be more than 
made up, and thereafter the gains mount rapidly. 
If the high growth objective is to be achieved, it is essential 
that the public be persuaded to accept restraint on the increase of 
consumption in the early years. To accept restraint they must be 
persuaded that they will eventually reap the benefits in higher 
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levels of living. This job of education and persuasion will form 
an important element in the success of the next three five-year 
plans. One contribution of a long-range perspective to 1981 is 
to show the ultimate returns from the efforts needed in the near 
future. The task of persuading the public to accept restraint is of 
course more likely to be successful if part of the investment pro-
gramme is seen to be creating facilities near to popular desires and 
aspirations, such as schools and hospitals. 
How is this increase in capital formation to be brought about ? 
It has been characteristic of the Uganda economy, as noted in 
Chapter II, that a high proportion of capital formation has been 
carried out under public auspices, including public agencies like 
the U.D.C. and the U.E.B. as well as the central government. 
In the past, something like 60-70 per cent of investment has been 
public. In the future, it seems likely that the share of public invest-
ment will need to be if anything higher than in the past, as the 
government takes the lead in raising total capital formation. If 
the public sector simply plays the same relative role as in the past, 
it should invest about 20 per cent of total product, while the private 
sector would be responsible for investing about 12 per cent. 
Investment by the central government itself ought to increase from 
£5 million in 1962 to about £23 million by 1971 and £54 million by 
1981. 
The leading role for public agencies has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The major disadvantage is the tremendous respon-
sibility it places on the shoulders of the public authorities to organise 
large investment projects, to raise tax revenues rapidly and increase 
the budgetary contribution to development investment, and to tap 
energetically both foreign and domestic sources of lending for 
development. The advantage is that the public sector is more 
susceptible to planning control than the private sector. In parti-
cular, the high rates of public investment implied by this pro-
gramme will doubtless require the Uganda Development Corpora-
tion and any similar organisations created in the future to extend 
their activities in new areas. 
Continuing reliance on extensive public investment still implies 
a dramatic expansion of private investment compared to the recent 
past. —from about £5 million in 1962 to as much as £22 million 
in 1971 and £52 million in 1981. The specific opportunities for 
private investment can only be spelled out in the detailed prepara-
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tion of the five-year plan, but if private investment can be expanded 
at the same rate as public investment it will be a considerable 
achievement. 
High Growth and Structural Changes 
The specifics of the 1981 projection for the Uganda economy, 
using the statistical projection model, are discussed in the next 
two sections. Summarising these results, there are four major 
structural changes, besides raising the rate of investment, which 
are involved. These four additional elements of development 
strategy are stressed in this section. 
(i) Effect of the high investment rate on the economic structure.— 
Raising the rate of investment would not only expand future capacity 
to produce, but also affect the composition of current output. 
As investment expands as a proportion of GDP, so do those indus-
tries which produce investment goods. 
The effects of a high investment rate in the case of Uganda will 
depend very much on the composition of the investment as between 
construction and building or machinery and equipment. Many 
of the building materials used in the construction industry are 
already produced in Uganda. Cement, some structural steel, 
bricks, and asbestos products are all manufactured domestically. 
Also, construction itself is a substantial source of wage income for 
Uganda workers, and to an increasing extent results in profits for 
local contracting firms. In the future, extending the range of 
building materials produced domestically is likely to be one of the 
most economically attractive fields for new manufacturing activity. 
Therefore rising investment in the form of construction and building 
will directly affect domestic product, and indirectly provide consi-
derable impetus to other domestic industries. By contrast, most 
machinery and equipment is imported and is unlikely to be attrac-
tive to produce domestically during the time-span being considered 
here. Therefore rising investment in the form of machinery and 
equipment will mainly have a direct impact on the import bill, with 
little indirect stimulus to the rest of the economy. 
On the other hand, it is true that once installed and in use, 
regardless of whether domestically produced or imported, machinery 
and equipment tend to be more productive in creating additional 
capacity than is construction. Thus if it were possible to reduce 
the proportion of construction in total investment, relative to 
84 
Development Planning in East Africa 
machinery and equipment, this would reduce the overall capital-
output ratio, and hence a lower rate of investment might suffice to 
support the target rate of growth. It is sometimes suggested that 
this would be a desirable principle of development strategy. Some-
thing may be done in the project-screening stage to hold down 
capital costs generally by economizing on new buildings in all 
sectors. But in order to have a significant aggregative effect on the 
composition of total investment, the main operational thrust of this 
strategy would have to be to expand more rapidly those sectors with 
low construction costs and less rapidly those with high construction 
costs. In practice a pronounced reduction in the share of construc-
tion in total investment would probably require explicit government 
restraint on private investment in housing. 
All things considered, in the present stage of development in 
Uganda extending the linkages among domestic industries is a 
promising approach, and it seems wise to plan on a composition 
of investment in the future not far different from the past, i.e., 
about three-fifths construction and two-fifths equipment. If 
anything the share of construction may tend to rise, because of the 
prominent role projected, for central government investment, which 
is almost entirely construction. If this judgment is correct, then the 
construction industry will have to expand more dramatically than 
any other sector of the economy—nearly four times by 1971 and 
thirteen times by 1981. At the same time, a very sharp rise in equip-
ment imports will be needed. 
The future expansion of the construction industry also relates 
closely to two of the other development goals mentioned above. 
If one object of the plan is to develop the urban environment 
to provide for an increasing proportion of Africans living in large 
towns, rapid growth of housing construction is clearly implied. 
With suitable public policies, moreover, housing construction and 
rental is attractive as a field for small-scale private investment. 
The alternative view would assert that housing development should 
have a low priority, to hold down the required investment rate, 
and that the primary aim should be expansion of actual manu-
facturing facilities leaving the urban dweller in the meantime to 
find what accommodation he can. This issue of goals will of 
course have to be settled by political leaders. 
The second point involves employment objectives, as discussed 
further in a later section. From this point of view the construction 
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industry has the desirable property that it is a heavy user of labour 
and that its rapid expansion would provide a great increase in the 
number of available jobs. At the moment, every £1 million of 
construction spending provides employment for about 3,000 
workers, which is about twice the ratio for other non-agricultural 
sectors. Moreover, construction is not one of those industries 
in which labour saving shifts in technique are likely to be 
considerable. 
(ii) Import substitution and the growth of manufacturing.—The 
second major structural change required for a high-growth economy 
is the growth of manufacturing to supply many goods currently 
imported. This is an important element of development strategy 
for two reasons. First, in order to achieve the marked expansion 
in imports of equipment required by a high investment rate it will 
be necessary to restrain the rise of other items in the import bill, 
so as to keep within the foreign exchange constraint, including 
conceivable foreign borrowing. Second, in order to attain the 
target rate of growth for overall GDP, given the likely limits on 
the rate of growth of agricultural exports even with ambitious 
agricultural efforts (see below), some non-agricultural sector besides 
construction must take the lead in expanding at above the target 
rate. A more rapid advance in industrialisation is needed for its 
effect on domestic incomes as well as for its effect on the balance 
of payments. 
The expanding market for the manufacturing sector can be 
divided into three categories: (a) growth in domestic demands 
already supplied by existing industries as incomes rise; (b) import 
substitution in processed foods, consumer goods (particularly non-
durables), intermediate goods other than fuels, and construction 
materials; (c) growth in manufactured exports. Simple growth 
of demand with rising incomes will be a large factor absolutely if 
the objective of doubling per capita incomes by 1981 is attained, 
but (given the income elasticities for the limited range of manu-
factured products currently produced) will not suffice to make manu-
facturing a leading sector. Manufactured exports which can be 
sold competitively in world markets are likely to be quite limited 
at the present stage of development, so growth of such exports 
is likely to depend mainly on sales within the East African Common 
Market (or other preferential arrangements), with imports approxi-
mately balancing exports. Thus a substantial degree of import 
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substitution, i.e. a rise in the share of domestic products in a growing 
market for manufactured goods from all sources, is a necessary 
condition for making manufacturing a leading sector. Import 
substitution in this relative sense is also the only way to restrain 
the growth of other imports and release foreign exchange for capital 
equipment.5 
The import substitution projected in the model is very consi-
derable — 50 per cent in food products, manufactured consumer 
goods, and intermediate goods other than fuels, and 75 per cent 
in construction materials. These are 1981 percentages, but by 
1971 something approaching half of this degree of import substitu-
tion ought to be established. Fulfilling this condition will involve 
production of many goods which have not previously been produced 
in Uganda, as well as expanding existing industries to supply a 
rising snare of their markets. Inspection of Uganda's current 
import bill suggests that the largest field of manufacturing expansion 
in terms of value must be textiles and clothing. In so far as textiles 
and clothing are still imported by 1981, they should come from other 
parts of East Africa on the basis of local specialisation, Uganda's 
inter-territorial imports having their counterpart in other inter-
territorial exports. Food products and building materials will 
follow textiles and clothing in terms of increased output value. 
There must also be numerous light industries, each individually 
of small value, but taken together making a significant contribution 
to Uganda's industrialisation. 
(iii) Accelerated agricultural expansion.—The agricultural 
sector probably will not be able to keep pace with the target overall 
rate of growth of the economy; there will be a relative shift to other 
sectors, particularly construction and manufacturing, as sources 
of income and output. Nonetheless the present weight of agriculture 
in the economy is so substantial that an accelerated rate of growth 
in agriculture is a necessary condition for attaining the ambitious 
overall growth objective. Moreover, agriculture offers the most 
direct way of raising incomes for the bulk of the population, as 
well as the most immediately accessible opportunities for raising 
productivity by intensification of existing development efforts. 
Within the agricultural sector there there will be a slow but 
steady relative shift toward domestic markets and away from 
export markets. Nonetheless the key to the necessary growth 
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performance of agriculture up to 1981 will still be an accelerated 
rate of growth of the volume of agricultural exports. Agricultural 
exports will also continue to be the main source of foreign exchange 
earnings, which provide the means of acquiring the machinery and 
equipment for the sharply higher investment rate. The projection 
model assumes that it will be feasible to raise the long-term trend 
in agricultural export volume about a quarter, from about 4 per cent 
per year over the whole period 1949-50 to 1962-63 to about 5 per cent 
per year from the 1963 peak*5. Since the International Coffee 
Agreement is likely to limit the rate of growth of the quantity of 
coffee exports to much less than that (perhaps 1-2 per cent per 
year), this implies that other agricultural exports would have to be 
expanded still more rapidly (perhaps 8-9 per cent per year). The 
essential constraint on achieving this export target is the pace at 
which government efforts can induce productivity improvements 
and changed output patterns in peasant agriculture. 
The other factor affecting Uganda's returns from agricultural 
exports, and hence the attainable rise in gross product in the agri-
cultural sector, is of course world prices. Any prediction of 
prospects for agricultural export earnings is inevitably subject to 
uncertainty. In the past Uganda has suffered greatly from declining 
prices in her export markets. Part of this experience was due to 
the reaction from the unusually high price levels of the Korean 
War commodities boom, and future price declines are unlikely to 
be of the magnitude experienced from 1954 to 1962. However, 
it would be foolhardy to expect the high prices of 1963 and 1964 
to continue, and not to make a substantial allowance for future 
price declines. The adjustment made here is for a 1 per cent 
decline in agricultural export prices per annum, after 1963, which 
is less than from 1954 to 1962, but implies 1981 prices about 10 
per cent below the 1960-62 low. 
Future returns from agricultural exports are dependent not 
only on the behaviour of world prices but also on Uganda's success 
in adjusting individual commodity outputs to fit changing price 
conditions. If agricultural output expansion can be biased toward 
products with firmer price prospects, and toward higher qualities, 
the resulting revenue performance may be expected to be more 
favourable than in the past, in which Uganda has been notably 
unsuccessful in making such shifts. Agricultural planning should 
therefore be concerned with influencing the composition of output 
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as well as with expanding the total physical volume. 
An important element of possible future structural change 
which ought to be investigated further is the character of agricultural 
inputs. Uganda has in the past made only meagre use of fertilizers, 
insecticides, and agricultural machinery. If sharp changes in these 
patterns prove economically attractive, they would have an effect 
on the future import bill, and might increase the range for local 
manufacturing, particularly of chemicals. 
The shift toward domestic markets in the agricultural sector 
will come partly as a result of increased demand for agricultural 
inputs in the manufacturing sector (e.g. cotton for local manufac-
ture) and partly as a result of increased production of food products 
for sale, as a result of substitution for existing food imports and 
of the increasing urban population. Thus this shift depends on 
achievement of the other structural changes involved in attaining 
the high-growth path. 
(iv) Role of the government and the budget.—In addition to the 
leading role for government in raising the overall investment rate, 
it must be expected that government current expenditure will 
increase at a faster rate than in the years of economic retardation. 
The suggestion in the projection is that government current expen-
diture will grow at a slightly lower rate than overall monetary 
domestic product, but that this will still be half again the rate of 
expansion in the 1958-62 period. 
Many of the services provided by government are essential 
aids to economic growth. Accelerated expansion of secondary 
and higher education, for example, will be necessary to provide 
the additional educated manpower needed to sustain the desired 
growth rates in capital and output. Expending government ser-
vices also contributes to spreading the benefits of growth among a 
far wider group than the direct beneficiaries of development pro-
jects, and therefore provides an incentive among the population 
at large to support the plan. 
The government is therefore faced with a necessity to raise 
finance both to cover the costs of expanding current services and to 
provide a substantial budgetary contribution to development 
investment. The projection indicates that during the next five-
year plan (1966-71) effective tax rates will have to be raised by about 
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30 per cent. This early increase in tax rates, as a key condition for 
success of the plan, will be its most unpopular feature. It will 
demand widespread understanding of the ultimate objectives of 
the plan to gain public support. 
How this increase is allocated among different tax sources is 
partly a matter of political choice, but a reasonable pattern may be 
as follows: Part of the increase can take the form of increases in 
customs duties, which will have as its objective protection of new 
industries as well as revenue increases from continuing imports. 
The changed composition of imports will almost surely require 
that duties be extended to goods now lightly taxed (intermediate 
goods and perhaps capital goods) if adequate revenue is to be found. 
In addition local industries ought to carry an increasing burden 
of indirect tax to compensate for the loss of customs revenue as 
import substitution proceeds. Direct taxes will also have to be 
increased, though this adjustment will be eased because the types 
of income subject to direct tax will probably be rising faster than 
total incomes. Finally, export taxes should be raised or extended 
to new products to offset the effect of declines in export prices. 
In fact, if the plan is to succeed it is unlikely that rates for any 
category of tax can be left at present levels. 
The underlying objective is to keep planned government bor-
rowing, both foreign and domestic, within limits which are likely to 
be financially feasible. It would be quite unrealistic to plan on 
expanding such borrowing in the same proportion as the necessary 
rise of government investment—over four times by 1971 and over 
ten times by 1981. The projection still implies a tripling of govern-
ment borrowing during the course of the three plans. It should be 
remembered that other public agencies in the industrial development 
field will also be heavy borrowers, particularly from foreign sources, 
if the plan is to succeed. A significant contribution may come from 
monetary creation to support more rapid growth, and gradually 
over time from additional borrowing in domestic financial markets. 
But at the present stage of development the main emphasis must be 
on raising additional tax revenues to keep the financial problem 
within bounds. Adjusting to the financial constraint in this way 
will of course at the same time help to restrain too-early improve-
ment of consumption standards (and thus meet the overall saving 
constraint) and to encourage import substitution (and thus meet the 
foreign exchange constraint). 
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Use of the Projection Model to Analyse Conditions for Doubling Pet-
Capita Income. 
Let us n o w t u r n t o a m o r e t echn ica l e x a m i n a t i o n of h o w these 
m a j o r impl i ca t ions f o r a s t ra tegy of d o u b l i n g per c a p i t a i n c o m e in 
U g a n d a a r e der ived f r o m the p ro j ec t i on m o d e l . A list of e s t i m a t e d 
cond i t i ons as specif ied in t he m o d e l is g iven in T a b l e V - l . T h e p a r a -
meters e m p l o y e d a r e given in T a b l e IV-1 in the p rev ious C h a p t e r , 
in the c o l u m n f o r t he ' a m b i t i o u s ' p ro j ec t i on . T h e e s t ima ted effects 
t h r o u g h o u t the e c o n o m y by 1981 a re p re sen ted in T a b l e V-2. 
T h e specific detai ls of t he ' a m b i t o u s ' p ro j ec t ion c a n be t r aced in 
these t h r ee tables , bu t here let m e ske tch t he logical s e q u e n c e o f 
analysis . 
Table V-l. Estimated Conditions for Doubling per capita Income in Uganda 
1966-1981 
Condition. 
1. Monetary GDP increases 8.4% p.a. 
after 1966, i.e. 4.6 times 1962-81. 
2. Agricultural export volume increases 
5.0% p.a. after 1963, i.e. 3 .2 times 
1962-81. 
3. Agricultural export prices decrease 
1 % p.a. after 1963, i.e. to an index 
of 88.5 in 1981 (1960-62 = 100). 
4. Manufactured exports increase 7% 
p.a. less £3 mil. decrease in copper, 
i.e. 3.1 times 1962-81. 
5. Government current expenditure in-
creases 7% p.a., i.e. 3.6 times 1962-
81. 
6. Import substitution replaces half of 
imports of food, manufactured con-
sumer goods, and intermediate 
goods, three-fourths of construction 
materials, none of vehicles, fuel, 
equipment. 
7. Capital formation increases to 32% of 
GDP volume within period of next 
5-Year Plan. 
Implications. 
Population increases at 2.6% p.a. 
Non-monetary product increases at 
4.7% p.a. 
Monetary product increases 19% in 
1963,4% p.a. 1963-66, both adjusted 
for export prices. 
Rate of increase is a fourth higher than 
actual average rate (at 1960-62 
prices) from 1949/50 to 1962/63, 
despite likely effect of Coffee Agree-
ment on quantity. 
Rate of decrease compares with 3 % 
p.a. 1954-63, 0% p.a. 1949/50-
1962/63; assumes Coffee Agreement 
stabilizes prices on quota sales. 
Rate of increase approximately equi-
valent to £3 mil. every 4 years, as 
1954-58 and 1958-62. 
Rate of increase approximately half 
again that in 1958-62, somewhat less 
than 1954-58. 
Substitution compares with almost 
none 1954-62. 
Imports replaced are about £12 mil. 
at 1962 level of GDP, £37 mil. at 
1981 level. 
Share of capital formation compares 
with 15% in 1962, 28% in 1955. 
Required capital formation is derived 
from capital-output ratios and re-
retirement rates in model similar to 
1954-58, with tentative 9% p.a. 
growth of urban product; parameters 
approximate an overall capital-
output ratio of 3.0 and a retirement 
rate of 7% of GDP. 
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8. Tax rates increase about 30% on Increase for taxes other than export 
average within period of next 5- taxes is about double recent trends in 
Year Plan. effective yields, and is highest for 
customs duties, next for indirect, 
next for direct. 
Increase for export taxes offsets effect 
of falling prices. 
Table V-2. Estimated effects of Doubling per capita Income in Uganda 1966-81 
1962^ 
(mil. £) 
1981 Ratio 
(mil. £) of 1981 
to 1962 
Annual Share of 
Rate of Total 
growth 1962-81 
1962-81 (%) 
(%) 
GDP, monetary . 106.4 484.7 4 .6 8 .2 
G D P volume® . 105.6 498.4 4 7 8.5 
Agricultural product 49.9 170.5 3 4 6.7 47-35d 
Urban product 52.6 263.2 5 0 8.9 49-54d 
Construction product!) 3 .9 51.0 13 2 15.7 4-1 Id 
Manufacturing product 8 .6 57.7 6 7 10.6 8-12d 
Services product^ . . 22.8 114.7 5 0 8.9 21-24d 
Government p roduc t^ 13.4 58.9 4 .4 8.1 12-12d 
Transport product 7 .8 31.9 4 1 7.7 7-6d 
Gross investment 15.4 157.9 10.2 (17.8)® 
Construction 8.3 93.4 11 2 
Equipment 7.1 64.5 9 1 
(18.8)= Government investment 4 .9 54.3 11 1 
Gross invest./GDP volume (14.6%) (31.7%) 
Ag. export volume^ 37.7 119.2 3 2 6.2 
Agricultural exports 38.5 105.5 2 7 5.4 
Manufactured exports 6 .2 19.4 3 1 6 .2 
Mfd. import substitution . — 37.2 
Food imports 5.2 11.3 2 2 15-9s 
Mfd. consumer imports 13.3 28.8 2 2 39-238 
Vehicle imports 2 .8 12.1 4 3 8-10e 
Intermediate imports 3.8 11.4 3 0 11-98 
Fuel imports 2 .3 10.8 4 7 7 - 9s 
Constr. mat. imports 1.6 4.7 2 8 5 - 4s 
Equipment imports 4 .9 44.4 9 1 14-368 
Total exports'1 44.7 125.0 2 8 5.6 
Total imports 33.9 123.6 3 6 7.0 
Balance of tradek + 10.7 + 1.4 
Imports/GDP (31.9%) (25.5%) 
Direct tax revenue 4 .0 19.7 5.0 18-17h 
Export tax revenue . . 3 .0 16.9 5 5 14—14h 
Customs revenue 7.7 43.7 5 7 35-37'' 
Indirect tax revenue . . 7.1 38.0 5 4 33—32h 
Govt, current expend. 22.0 79.6 3 6 7 .0 
Govt, tax revenue 21.8 118.4 5 4 9 .3 
Govt. econ. bal. (R-G) .2 + 38.8 
Govt, borrowing (Ig-(R-G)) 5.1 15.5 
Revenue/GDP (20.5%) (24.4%) 
Consumption and other uses' 58.2 245.8 4. 2 7.9(5.9)' 
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Notes. 
(а) Agricultural exports at 1960-62 prices. 
(б) Projects continuing rise in share of value-added in value of output. 
(c) Includes public educational and medical services. 
(d) Share of GDP. 
(e) Approximate rate of growth to 1971, assuming 'steady-growth* rate of 
investment attained then. Implies 1971 gross investment about £67 mil., 
govt, investment £23 mil. 
( / ) Defined only for changes from 1962. 
(g) Share of total imports. 
(//) Share of total tax revenue. 
.(/) GDP+M—E—I—G. 
( j ) Approximate rate of growth to 1971. Implies 1971 consumption about 
£8 mil. Note includes large increase in 1963. 
(k) Excluding re-exports. 
(m) 1962 base for projection used a number of preliminary figures. Revisions 
are shown in Table II-A, but have not been corrected here. 
First, the central growth objective of doubling per capita 
income from 1966 to 1981, in conjunction with independent esti-
mates of population increase, of the growth of non-monetary 
subsistence product, of the large actual G D P increase in 1963, 
and of likely increases 1963-1966, establish the growth target. 
It is to raise monetary G D P 4.6 times from the 1962 base year to 
1981—from £106 to £485 million. 
Next, three of the autonomous variables can be projected 
independently—agricultural export volume, agricultural export 
prices, and manufactured exports. Specifics are given in Tables 
V-l and V-2, and the general rationale of these projections as the 
most that can reasonably be hoped for has been discussed above.7 
Similarly, many of the parameters of the model can be projected 
independently, either as unchanged or as following a simple time-
trend. These are the parameters which are presumed to be un-
affected by government policy measures or the desired shift to a 
high-growth path—the gross product parameters, the import para-
meters for commodity categories in which foreign supplies are 
likely to retain a strong comparative advantage, and (by assump-
tion) the parameters specifying public and private shares in construc-
tion and equipment investment. 
This leaves the other two autonomous variables—government 
current expenditure and the manufactured import substitution 
variable—and the other parameters of the model, which reflect 
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government policies and the desired shift to a high-growth path, 
to be adjusted to fit the 1981 G D P target. More than one combina-
tion of adjustments is possible to reach the specified GDP, and a 
combination must be suggested which appears reasonable in each 
individual adjustment as well as in the final outcome for the balance 
of trade and the government budget. The construction and 
equipment parameters are adjusted upwards as specified by the net 
capital-output ratios and a tentative initial estimate of the rate 
of growth of urban product. The import parameters for food 
products, manufactured consumer goods, intermediate goods, 
and construction materials are adjusted downward to represent a 
degree of import substitution which appears reasonably attainable 
by energetic government policies, which implies a large enough 
value of manufactured import substitution to attain the G D P 
target, and which is tentatively estimated to limit sufficiently the 
adverse shift in the balance of trade. Government current expen-
diture is projected at a rate which is consistent with the G D P 
target and the other autonomous variables, and which is assumed 
to be politically reasonable. The several tax parameters are ad-
justed upward, with a pattern of tax sources reflecting previous 
trends, by an amount which is tentatively estimated to contain 
government borrowing for the development budget to a reasonable 
level, and which restrains the rise of private income and hence 
domestic demands within the GDP target. Details about all the 
parameters are given in Table I V-l. 
Computationally, once the parameters are set the reduced-
form multipliers can be calculated,8 and the projected autonomous 
variables determine the implied 1981 values of all the other variables, 
as set forth in Table V-2. 
Finally, since at several points in adjusting the parameters 
tentative estimates of the outcome of the calculations were referred 
to, these tentative estimates must be checked for consistency with 
the calculated results. If a significant inconsistency appears, the 
affected parameters and the projection would have to be read-
justed in a second approximation. It is also highly relevant to 
check that the adverse shift in the balance of trade is consistent 
with the rise in government borrowing for the development budget, 
implying that the more rapidly growing economy is pressing simi-
larly against both the foreign exchange and the public finance 
constraints. 
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The Uganda Economy in 1981 
The economy which will emerge by 1981 if this ambitious 
development effort is successful may be pictured in terms of the 
results of the projection. The estimated effects on most of the 
variables of the model are presented in Table V-2. 
The main consequences for the structure of production are as 
follows: 
(a) Gross domestic product in the monetary economy would 
be 4.6 times as large as in 1962; 
(b) Urban product plus construction product would rise from 
53 per cent to 65 per cent of monetary GDP; 
(c) Construction is the most rapidly growing industry, ex-
panding thirteen-fold by 1981. It is followed by manu-
facturing, with a seven-fold expansion; 
(d) Agriculture expands more rapidly than in the past, with 
a three-fold increase in product, but declines in relative 
importance. The domestic market rises from about a 
fifth to about two-fifths of agricultural sales. Non-
monetary subsistence product in agriculture still rises, 
but falls relatively from 29 per cent to 14 per cent of total 
GDP; 
(e) Services, government, and transport expand between 
five and four times—more rapidly than agriculture but 
less rapidly than manufacturing. 
This changing internal structure would be combined with a 
changing relationship between Uganda and the world economy: 
(a) Import substitution would reduce imports from 32 per cent 
to 25 per cent of gross domestic product. Despite this 
extensive import substitution, the value of imports in all 
the major classes would at least double; 
(b) Changes in the composition of imports by major classes 
would be marked. The largest changes would occur in 
the case of equipment (rising from 14 per cent to 36 per cent 
of total imports) and food and manufactured consumption 
goods (falling from 54 per cent to 32 per cent of total 
imports). In addition, the product-mix within classes 
would be altered. The composition of consumer goods 
imports would shift sharply away from non-durables; 
(c) Agricultural exports would rise more slowly than manu-
factured exports,7 allowing for declining export prices, 
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but would still be the main source of foreign exchange 
earnings; 
(d) With exports increasing in value a little less than three-fold 
and imports expanding more than three-fold, the balance 
of trade would change adversely by about £10 million. 
This would require an increase in the annual inflow of 
foreign capital of about this amount, net of increased 
payments on past borrowing and any other increases in 
payments for invisibles. 
The changing pattern of government revenue and expen-
diture may be summarised as follows:— 
(a) Government tax revenue increases about five-fold, and the 
share of government revenue in domestic product rises 
from 20 per cent to 24 per cent; 
(b) The projection assumes little change in composition of tax 
revenues. This depends on tax rate adjustments which 
more than compensate for the effects on present tax bases 
of manufactured import substitution, the shift toward 
capital equipment imports, and some decline in agricultural 
export prices; 
(c) Government current expenditure nearly quadruples. It 
would not rise as fast as tax revenue, however, allowing 
for much increased government saving, as reflected in 
the government economic balance; 
(d) In addition to higher government saving, however, it would 
be necessary to increase government borrowing from 
£5 million to about £15 million annually, net of carrying 
charges on the past debt. This increased need for finance 
in the budget is consistent with the increased need for 
capital inflow in the balance of trade. 
Differences Between a 'Moderate' and an 'Ambitious' Plan 
An illuminating comparison can be made with the situation 
which would exist if the conditions for doubling per capita income, 
as examined here, were not fully carried out. The alternative 
'moderate' projection might consist of 4 per cent (the long-run 
trend) instead of 5 per cent annual growth in the volume of agricul-
tural exports, 10 per cent instead of 50 per cent import substitution, a 
rise in the share of investment in gross domestic product to 26 per 
cent rather than 32 per cent, and tax rates increasing by 15 per cent 
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instead of 30 per cent. Such a programme could be viewed as a 
less demanding alternative, although it would still be a greater 
expansion effort than Uganda has achieved in recent years. 
What would be the characteristics of such an alternative 
programme ? Detailed tables comparable to those of the 'ambitious' 
projection are not reproduced here, but the main points of contrast 
are these: 
(a) Per capita income would not be doubled, although growth 
would accelerate compared with the 1958-1962 experience. 
Monetary G D P would grow at 6.4 per cent per annum, 
resulting in a 50 per cent rise in per capita income by 1981 
rather than the desired doubling; 
(b) The change in structure of production by sector and the 
composition of imports would be far less striking; 
(c) The small degree of import substitution would not only 
limit the shift toward manufacturing, but because of rising 
requirements for equipment could not avoid an increase 
in the share of imports in gross domestic product, from 32 
per cent to 34 per cent; 
(d) As a result of the rise in imports and the poorer agricul-
tural export performance, the balance of trade changes 
adversely by about £25 million, requiring what seems to 
be an impossibly large increase in annual inflow of foreign 
capital. A greater degree of import substitution, or more 
rapid growth of agricultural export volume despite the 
effect of the International Coffee Agreement, seem to be 
essential conditions for sustaining even 'moderate' growth 
within a bearable balance of payments; 
(e) Tax revenues would still rise a little faster than current 
expenditures, permitting some government saving. But 
with the expansion of government investment to £16 
million in 1971 and £33 million in 1981, as required in the 
'moderate' projection, government borrowing would have 
to rise to about £25 million annually, which again seems 
impossibly large. Higher taxes and more government 
saving also seem to be essential conditions for even the 
'moderate' growth path. 
A conclusion suggested by this comparison is that although the 
'ambitious' growth objective is more demanding, it is also in some 
ways more self-sustaining. The various parts of a high-growth 
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programme based on structural change reinforce each other, while 
the achievements which can be expected are considerable enough 
to make the effort worthwhile. 
Manpower and Employment 
The analysis to this point has focused on expansion of output, 
mobilization of capital resources, and structural changes in the 
economy. Even in this initial broad view, however, it is important 
to consider the place of the labour force in the 1981 perspective. 
The labour force comes into the plan in two quite different 
ways. On the one hand, the question must be raised whether there 
will be enough educated manpower available to operate the addi-
tional capital and produce the desired outputs. In Uganda there 
is likely to be a serious continuing problem, at least till 1981, of 
ensuring an adequate supply, with the right quantities and types of 
skill, of people with secondary and higher education. This question 
is largely the province of detailed manpower and educational 
planning, starting from a finer analysis of the industrial composition 
of future development, and only some broad indications of the 
problem can be given here. 
On the other hand, the question can be reversed and posed in 
the form, "Is the planned growth likely to provide enough job 
opportunities to satisfy popular aspirations?" This employment 
question is likely to be particularly pressing for people with primary 
education or less. Here some meaningful points can be made even 
in aggregative terms. 
Some guidelines on prospective needs for'Category I 'manpower, 
normally requiring people with university degrees or similar higher 
education, if the ambitious growth objective considered here is 
attained, have been prepared by Rado and Jolly.9 The discussion 
which follows simply summarises and comments on their work. 
Their central calculation is that if G D P volume is to grow at 8.5 
per cent per year from 1962 to 1981, as indicated in the projection, 
and if a further goal of 100 per cent Ugandanisation of 'Category I' 
positions is to be achieved by 1981, then the rate of increase of 
entrants into university-level education from 1965 to 1978 must be 
about 27 per cent per year. This would be a tremendously rapid 
pace of expansion for higher education, and naturally poses sharply 
the question whether the educated manpower constraint would 
simply prevent attaining the high-growth objective. 
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Nonetheless there are reasonable grounds for believing that, 
provided policy-makers give a suitably high priority to easing the 
educated manpower constraint one way or another, the economic 
growth objective can be achieved with a somewhat less phenomenal 
pace of expansion of university education in Uganda. To begin 
with, one striking result of the Rado-Jolly analysis is that there is a 
pronounced trade-off between the desired rate of increase of, 
university entrants and the target percentage of Ugandanisation. 
The 1962 position starts with half Europeans in 'Category I ' posts, 
and it is assumed that foreigners are entirely replaced and fill 
none of the increased demands. Thus keeping everything else un-
changed, lowering the target to about 60 per cent Ugandanisation 
would reduce the calculated annual rise in entrants to about 20 
per cent. Next, the manpower demand projection posits an elasti-
city of 1.1 between the rate of growth of monetary G D P and the 
rate of growth of 'Category I ' manpower. This is a reasonable 
norm derived from a serious cross-section study of national statis-
tical data by Professor Tinbergen.10 But educated manpower 
requirements are almost surely more flexible than other factor 
inputs, so that in face of a shortage it should be possible to operate 
under pressure with less than the norm despite some loss of general 
efficiency. Thus if between 1962 and 1981 Uganda could get by 
with an elasticity of about .75, this would offer another possibility 
of reducing the annual rise in university entrants to around 20 per 
cent. Finally, it would doubtless be possible to supply some part 
of the demand through other channels than the present one 
university in Uganda—both through other specialised institutions 
of higher education at home and through continuing to send a 
proportion of Uganda students abroad. 
Despite these grounds for believing that the educated manpower 
constraint is not insurmountable, the urgency of a truly ambitious 
programme for expanding Uganda's educated manpower at what 
may appear to be a phenomenal pace, as an integral part of a plan 
to double per capita incomes by 1981, is clear. Expansion of higher 
education in the order of 20 per cent per year is conservative, 
not fantastic. Manpower planning is above all the field where it 
is essential to have a long-term perspective in setting the activities 
of the next plan.11 
Turning now to the employment problem, for people with 
primary education or less, the situation is quite different. As 
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noted in Chapter II, urban employment has declined since 1958, 
and construction employment since 1954. The reason for this 
discouraging performance was partly the retardation in growth of 
output and partly the continuing rise in productivity per worker. 
The data available are not good enough at present to be very precise 
as in analysing changes in productivity. It seems that output per 
worker in the urban sectors has risen at between 5 per cent and 
6 per cent per year during both 1954-58 and 1958-1962. If this 
trend in productivity continues in the future, then it would take a 
5-6 per cent annual increase in urban product just to maintain em-
ployment at the existing level. With greater investment and perhaps 
more rapidly rising wages in the future, the trend of productivity 
per worker might of course rise. 
The employment problem is compounded by population 
growth. For the past decade the proportion of the total population 
employed in wage-paying jobs in Uganda has been declining. 
In the future it may be expected that the number of people aspiring 
to paid employment will grow faster than the total population, partly 
as a result of the expansion of primary education. Moreover, 
the economy currently provides many fewer jobs than would 
be desirable, in view of the number of unemployed and under-
employed. Therefore for the future political leaders may well 
consider expansion of employment opportunities as urgent a goal 
as expanding output per capita. They may also examine policy 
measures to alter past employment-output relationships. 
The desire to increase employment opportunities faster than 
population is another justification of the high-growth objective. 
Achievement of the 1981 goals would imply an annual increase of 
urban product of about 9 per cent per year, which should enable 
employment in the urban sectors to grow faster than population. 
Moreover, the overall employment effect depends not only on the 
overall growth of output and the rise of productivity within each 
sector, but also on the shift in composition of output between sectors. 
If there is a shift in output toward industries which use relatively 
more labour, employment will rise more rapidly. The major shift 
of that character which occurs in the projected pattern of output 
expansion is the marked growth in construction. In 1962 construc-
tion accounted for only 7 per cent of total non-agricultural output 
but provided 17 per cent of total non-agricultural employment. 
Allowing for the shift toward the construction industry, and 
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assuming (perhaps on the low side) that the rise in productivity 
in both the urban sectors and construction will average 5 per cent 
per year, the projected non-agricultural labour force in 1981 would 
be 2.9 times that of 1962. This represents a rate of growth of 
5.7 per cent per year, which is over twice the projected rate of 
growth of population. Thus achievement of the high-growth 
objective for 1981, provided the trend in productivity per worker 
remains unchanged, might bring about a significant improvement 
in the employment situation, something which has not been achieved 
in recent years. 
'Shifting Gears' in the next Five-Year Plan 
If the objective of doubling per capita income is to be achieved 
over three plan periods, it is essential that the economy be shifted 
into the high-growth path during the next five-year plan. In 
particular, the rate of investment must be raised from the recent 
15 per cent of GDP to the high-growth rate of around 32 per cent 
of GDP by 1971, so that the economy can continue at this pace for 
the remaining decade until 1981. At the same time, all of the 
necessary structural changes must be energetically initiated. 
To accomplish this transition during the next five-year plan, 
as noted in Table V-2, gross investment should be expanded at 
about 18 per cent per year up to 1971, and then continue to rise at 
about 9 per cent thereafter. This rate of rise implies that cumulative 
gross investment during the five fiscal years of the plan should be 
about £230 million, and government investment about £87 million. 
It is an obvious question whether this amount of gross investment, 
with the rate rising over the period rather than doubling immediately, 
will suffice to support the desired rate of growth of 8.4 per cent per 
year during the next plan itself. The implied overall capital-output 
ratio during just these five years would be roughly 2.3, which is 
distinctly below the 'normal' 3.0 implied in the longer-term pro-
jection.12 There are, however, reasonable grounds for hoping 
that this unusual performance would be possible during the 'shifting 
of gears' phase. The economy has been operating with reserves 
of productive capacity built up during the retardation period and 
not yet fully utilised, which can be exploited during the transition. 
The export boom of 1963 and 1964 has provided a cushion from 
which it ought to be easier to expand taxes and saving than from 
the depressed base of 1962. Not least, political and administrative 
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energies focused during the last few years on the pressing problems 
of the first years of independence may increasingly be allocated to 
the tasks of economic expansion and innovation. 
The 'shifting gears' phase will involve a complex of adjustments 
affecting all parts of the economy. Five key points of government 
strategy deserve particular emphasis here: 
(a) To expand the development budget by four or five times 
by 1971, and to reinforce the momentum generated by 
government investment by stimulating corresponding 
expansion of other public and of private investment; 
(b) To make adjustments in the tariff structure, initiate a wide 
range of manufacturing projects by the U.D.C. and other 
public agencies, and adopt tax and other policies stimulating 
to private manufacturing, which together will be adequate 
to establish import substitution in food products, manu-
factured consumer goods, intermediate goods, and con-
struction materials approaching 25 per cent by 1971; 
(c) To adopt agricultural programmes capable of raising the 
rate of growth of all agricultural exports at least a fourth 
above the past long-term average, which given the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement implies at least doubling exports 
of products other than coffee in the eight years 1963-1971; 
(d) To adopt an educational programme expanding enrol-
ments at higher and secondary levels at rates which, as an 
order of magnitude, imply doubling every three to five 
years; 
(e) To initiate at the start of the plan period a schedule for 
raising effective tax rates about 30 per cent on the average 
within the first few years, while adapting the tax structure 
to obtain this additional revenue despite the impact on 
present tax bases of manufactured import substitution, a 
rising share of capital equipment imports, and some 
continuing decline in agricultural export prices. 
Above all, the next five-year plan will demand a dynamic 
effort of imagination and leadership to dramatise to everyone 
involved in making economic decisions in Uganda the extensive 
adjustments required to make the next plan a successful advance 
toward 1981 goals. 
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Footnotes: 
1 The paper on which this chapter is based was originally written jointly 
by Brian Van Arkadie and myself. I have rewritten it to fit into the out-
line of this monograph, but of course its ideas still reflect contributions 
from both of us. I am grateful to him for permitting me to use it here. 
2 Uganda planning officials with whom we worked most closely at the 
time the analysis was originally prepared were John Kakonge, Director 
of Planning, J. Ilett, J. Waddimba, and G. Nkojo of the planning bureau, 
and Miss A. Martens of the statistics department. We appreciate their 
interest and help, but remain responsible for the judgments expressed. 
3 See Chapter IV, pp. 6-7. 
4 See B. Van Arkadie and P. Ndegwa, "Future Trade, Balance of Payments, 
and Aid Requirements of East Africa", Proceedings, Univ. of East 
Africa Conference on Foreign Aid, Dar es Salaam, Sept. 1964, for discus-
sion of overall capital-output ratios in East Africa. See also Kenya 
Government, The Growth of the Economy, 1954-62. 
5 See B. Van Arkadie, "Import Substitution and Export Promotion as 
Aids to Industrialisation in East Africa", East African Economic Review, 
Dec. 1964. 
6 See Y. Kyesimira, "Agricultural Export Development in East Africa", 
E.A.I.S.R. Conference Papers, Jan. 1965. 
7 Since the projection for manufactured exports was made, new ore reserves 
have been proved and copper exports are not now expected to decline. 
8 The reduced form equation for GDP in the 'ambitious' projection is 
G D P = 2.11 Ea* + 1.82 T + 2.19 (Em + Sm) + 1.69 G. These 
GDP multipliers can be compared with those in Table IV-3. 
9 E. Rado & R. Jolly, "The Demand for Manpower: An East African 
Case Study", Journal of Development Studies, March, 1965. 
10 J. Tinbergen, "Financial Aspects of Educational Expansion in Developing 
Regions", Conference of the OECD Study Group on the Economics of 
Education, Sept. 1964; cited in Rado & Jolly, loc. cit. 
11 See A. R. Jolly, Planning Education in Developing Countries, East African 
Publishing House, 1966. 
12 Calculated from gross investment of £230 million, retirement of £56 
million (projected at 5 per cent per year from the assumed £10 million 
in 1966), GDP volume rising from £142 million in 1966 to £216 million 
in 1971. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE NEW PLANS 
The new development plans of the three East African countries 
all constitute major advances in comprehensive planning. The 
focus of attention has clearly been shifted from a programme of 
public projects to the desired growth objectives and the development 
activities and policies needed to attain them in the economy as a 
whole. The design of the new plans has also been much improved 
technically. Particularly with respect to the first function of a 
comprehensive plan discussed in Chapter I—that of making the 
strategic decisions about the magnitude and directions of develop-
ment, using aggregative analyses and projections—the new plans 
are far superior to the old ones. On the other hand it is true that 
with respect to the third function—that of systematically selecting 
development activities which contribute most to attaining aggre-
gative and sector targets, using various forms of project analysis 
—there has been very little advance as yet. Above all, the crucial 
test of plan implementation is just beginning. As of June 1965 
(after one year of experience with the new plans in Tanzania and 
Kenya, and after the year in which the old plan was markedly 
expanded in Uganda), centralised organisation and procedures for 
supervising planned development activities throughout the govern-
ments were not yet firmly established, and use of economic policy 
instruments to guide decentralised private development activities 
was still only loosely related to plan goals. I shall examine certain 
aspects of plan implementation more fully in the next chapter. 
Of course these generalisations about the new plans apply in 
somewhat varying degrees to the three countries, and are judgments 
expressed as of June 1965. The Tanzania five-year plan for 1964/65-
1968/69 has formally been in operation for one year, but content 
adjustments and implementation arrangements are still being 
made. The Kenya six-year plan for 1964/65-1969/70 has also had 
one year of operation, but it was intended to be adjusted and filled 
out in a new plan for the last five years, and this revision will pro-
bably appear towards the end of 1965. The Uganda five-year 
plan for 1966/67-1970/71 will not appear until 1966, so comments 
at this time can be based only on a few public statements about 
the initial draft framework for the new plan and on implementation 
arrangements during the final two years of the much-expanded old 
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plan. Let us now turn to examining the new Tanzania and Kenya 
plans in some detail. 
The New Tanzania Plan 
The Tanzania five-year plan for 1964/65-1968/69 is dramatically 
more comprehensive and more ambitious than the previous plan 
discussed in Chapter III. A sense of the change in character of 
the plan may be obtained from statements by the Minister of State 
for Development Planning in introducing it: 
The Five-Year Plan 1964/69 differs from previous plans 
in so far as it is the first comprehensive and long-term plan. 
It can be termed a comprehensive plan because all the sectors 
of activity, Public and Private, Economic and Social, National 
and Regional are involved in the development effort and have 
been assigned objectives, the technical and economic feasibility 
of which has been checked in advance . . . The planning 
method can be said to be long-term because it has framed the 
Five-Year Plan as a first stage within the longer perspective 
which embraces by 1980 a vision of Tanganyika as a nation of 
14 million inhabitants enjoying twice the present average 
individual income, an expectancy of life at birth of 50 instead 
of the present 35 to 40 years, and a level of education qualifying 
all those needed to fill the main positions in the country . . . It 
is firstly a guide which enables all those involved in the develop-
ment of the country to play their part to the full in harmony 
with their fellow citizens to their own benefit as well as that of 
the community as a whole. Secondly, it is a touchstone for 
gauging progress in the various sectors of the economy and 
thus a means of discovering in time any corrective steps that 
may be necessary to restore balanced development. Finally, 
it constitutes for the Government a means of assessing the 
probable consequences of a political or administrative decision 
on the pace of development.1 
Some of these statements may be rather sweeping, but they aptly 
characterise the transition in the approach to development planning 
which has been undertaken. 
Preparation of the plan involved four main stages, extending 
over something more than a year. First, a tentative structure of 
the economy in 1980 was estimated, if certain socio-economic 
goals were to be attained, notably doubling of per capita product. 
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From this long-term projection intermediate objectives for the 
successive five-year plans were derived. Second, 'maximum feasible' 
sector production targets for 1970 were estimated. In the case of 
agriculture, these were estimated product by product in consultation 
with Regional Development Committees, and the outcome was to 
raise initial estimates. In the case of manufacturing, alternative 
targets depending on the degree of import substitution (within the 
East African Common Market as well as in external trade) were 
estimated. Investment requirements were estimated from adjusted 
past capital-output ratios, and discussions were held with the 
Chambers of Commerce about private investment intentions and 
goals. Third, ministry development expenditure proposals, initially 
drafted without financial ceilings, were adjusted in the light of three 
estimated constraints: sustainable tax-financed current expenditures 
in the government budget, assuming steady improvement in effi-
ciency of the civil service in implementing development activities; 
attainable foreign and domestic borrowing, allowing for debt 
service; and overall high-level manpower requirements, implying 
the residual needs for expatriate personnel. The projected structure 
of the economy in 1970 was then estimated so as to accommodate all 
of these elements in what was judged to be an attainable pattern. 
The resulting outline plan was approved by the government. Fourth, 
government ministries, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Regional 
Development Committees were informed of the targets and expendi-
tures indicated in the outline plan, and asked to prepare and submit 
specific development activities consistent with the outline. The 
ministries' projects were then embodied in the final plan as approved 
by the Government.2 
Consistency of all these interdependent estimates was checked, 
as is commonly done in practice, by a process of successive approxi-
mations, working simultaneously from the supply and the demand 
sides. Two main statistical tables were used: a uses-resources 
table for a lengthy list of major products and sector outputs, and 
an aggregative financial income-expenditure table including external 
transactions.3 The interconnections among the sector output 
projections to 1970, the estimated 1970 balance of payments, the 
investment needs over the five fiscal years, and government recurrent 
revenues and expenditures in the final year are not fully presented 
in the published plan, however. An explicit statistical projection 
model of the sort discussed in Chapter IV was not used, but in the 
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next section I shall apply the model to the official plan in an attempt 
to bring out some of these interconnections. 
The main features of the new Tanzania plan, in quantitative 
plans, are summarised in Table VI-1. Similar tables will be 
examined in later sections for Kenya and Uganda. Tanzania 
hopes to accelerate the annual rate of growth of monetary gross 
domestic product, in constant prices, from about 5 per cent during 
the recent period of retardation to something in the order of 
8 to 9 per cent. Since agricultural export prices are assumed, perhaps 
optimistically, to remain higher than in the 1960-62 base period, 
the rate of growth in current prices is a little higher. This is clearly 
an ambitious objective, but is actually not far above the performance 
of the economy during the previous period of rapid growth in the 
mid-fifties, and during the export boom of 1963 and 1964. There 
is a good deal of emphasis in the plan on structural changes asso-
ciated with industrialisation, but if we examine monetised activities, 
as in the table, agricultural product is projected to accelerate nearly 
as much as urban product. In an economy in which agriculture 
has the weight it has in Tanzania, an ambitious overall growth objec-
tive must involve acceleration of agricultural expansion even if 
industrialisation is particularly emphasised. The plan does not 
specify the rise in urban employment which is expected to result, 
but unless the disappointing experience during the 1963-64 export 
boom can be altered, insufficient job creation may well be a problem. 
Table VI-1. Tanzania: Features of the New Plan. 
Recent Past Future Est. or 
or Old Plat^ New Planb 
G D P volume (growth rate, %) . . + 5.2 + 8.5 
G D P monetary (growth rate, %) + 5.9 + 8.8 
Ag. product (growth rate, %) . . + 5.5 + 7 . 3 
Urban product (growth rate, %) 
Urban employment (growth rate, %) . . 
+ 6 . 2 + 8.8 
—0.8C U.S. 
Gross investment (£ mil.) £24.4 £85.0 
Invest./GDP volume ( % ) 20% 33% 
Capital—output ratio . . 2.6—2.8 2.3' 
Govt, investment (£ mil.) £ 9 . 5 £32.0 
Other public invest. (£ mil.) £23.6f 
Private investment (£ mil.) £14.9 £29.4' 
Govt, devel. expend, (ann. ave., £ mil.) 
Development/GDP volume ( % ) 
Foreign finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) 
Domes, finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) 
£6.8 
5 .8% d 
£5.0= 
£1. 8e 
£14.56 
7 .4%e 
£11.3h 
£3.2' ' 
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Notes: 
n.s. Not specified. 
(o) Growth rates are for 1958-62, investment figures for 1962, capital-output 
ratio for 1954-58 and 1958-62, development budget figures actual for 
three years of old plan, development ratio for annual average relative to 
1962 GDP volume. 
(b) Growth rates are for 1960-62 average to 1970, investment estimates for 
1970, capital-output ratio for 1964/65'—1968/69 while investment rate 
is rising, development budget estimates for 1964/65—1968/69, develop-
ment ratio for annual average relative to estimated GDP volume in 1966/ 
67 (middle year). 
(c) Non-ag. employment, including construction. 
(d) Adjusted to common scope for all three countries; see Chapter III, 
p. 15. 
(e) Shares of foreign and domestic in Table III-9 applied to actual 
expenditures. 
( / ) Other public and private investment in 1970 divided in proportion of 
totals over five fiscal years of plan. 
(g) If central government contributions to public enterprises included, annual 
average becomes £20.4 mil. and percentage 10.4%. 
(h) Shares of foreign and domestic in Table VI-3 applied to annual average; 
see also note g. 
(/) Capital-output ratio is calculated assuming retirement is 7% of esti-
mated 1964 G D P as implied in plan, then increases at 5% per year as 
gross investment rate rises. 
The plan anticipates that gross investment will have to increase 
about three and a half times by 1970 in order to support the accele-
rated expansion of the economy, and that the rate of investment 
will have to go up from around 20 per cent of GDP in the recent 
past to over 30 per cent. Again this is an ambitious objective, 
though still not far above the peak investment rates in the mid-
fifties. The composition of planned investment is notably different 
from the past, however, with central government investment, and 
particularly other public investment by such agencies as the National 
Development Corporation and the National Housing Corporation, 
projected to expand much more rapidly than private investment 
(even though the latter doubles). The strains within government 
of this changed pattern will doubtless be significant. The implied 
overall capital-output ratio over the five years is still moderately 
below that in the past. 
Looking at the central government's own development expen-
ditures, they are projected approximately to double as an annual 
rate during the new plan compared to the old plan, and to rise as a 
share of G D P from under 6 per cent to about 1 \ per cent. But in 
addition about two-fifths of the burgeoning investment by other 
public agencies is expected to be provided by the central government, 
and if this is included the share of G D P for the development budget 
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rises to over 10 per cent. The new plan assumes that nearly four-
fifths of the finance for the development budget can be obtained 
as foreign grants and loans, which is similar to the proportion in the 
past but implies an absolute rise from about £5 million a year to 
about £16 million, including government participation in other 
public agencies. 
The projected sector composition of total gross investment 
during the plan period is summarised in Table VI-2. Considering 
the five broad groups of sectors outlined in the table, the largest 
share—over 35 per cent—is projected for directly productive non-
agricultural sectors such as manufacturing and commerce. This is 
in line with the emphasis in the plan upon industrialisation, and 
it may be noted that even with the substantial role anticipated for 
public agencies the principal form of this investment is expected 
Table VI-2: Tanzania Development Plan, 1964/65-1968/69: Composition by 
Economic Sector and Type of Organisation. (£ th.) 
Total 
Other 
Central Public 
Government Agencies 
Private 
Enter-
prises 
Agriculture 
Livestock and Fishing 
Land and Water Settlement 
Forests 
| 25,509 
11,906 
1,023 
14,055a 
11,006 
923 
3,054a 
900 
100 
8,400 
Game and Tourism 
Mining and Mapping 
Manufacturing 
Commerce and Coops. 
Credit 
1,681 
5,300 
51,370 
31,811 
b 
417 
400 
200 
372 
273 
1,800 
6,570 
2,930 
b 
991 
3,100 
34,600 
28,509 
Electric Power 
Roads 
Railway 
Airports . . 
Posts and Telecommunications 
7,064 
13,350 
15,540 
2,721 
1,000 
64 
12,050 
40 
1,221 
7,000 
1,300 
15,500 
1,500 
1,000 
Education 
Health 
Social Services 
Information 
Housing . . 
18,133 
6,205 
3,829 
400 
41,748 
14,333 
1,805 
2,429 
400 
5,448 
3,400 
1,400 
1,100 
19,300 
400 
3,000 
300 
17,000 
Defence and Police 
Administration 
Local Government 
5,210 
2,000 
200 
5,210 
2,000 
200 
TOTAL . . 246,000 72,373° 77,327d 96,300 
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Notes: 
(a) Total of £17.1 mil. for central government and public agencies is allo-
cated £10.2 million for transformation activities associated with irrigation 
and resettlement, £6.9 million for improvement activities in existing 
agriculture. 
(b) Co-operative Bank lending of £7.5 million is distributed among producing 
sectors. 
(c) Total for central government excludes £29,627 th. contribution to public 
enterprises. 
Cd) Total for other public agencies includes £29,627 th. for Co-operative 
Bank, TANESCO, N.H.C. and T.D.C./T.A.C. provided by central 
government, £19,700 th. provided from own resources, £10,000 th. for 
local government, £18,000 th. for E.A.C.S.O. agencies. 
Source: Tanzania Government, Tanganyika Five-year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development, 1st July, 1964—30tli June, 1968. 
to be by private enterprises. The next largest share—a little under 
30 per cent—is allotted to education and welfare services, but 
notably to housing, the bulk of which is expected to be organised 
under public auspices. Economic infrastructures and directly 
productive investment in agriculture are projected to have shares 
of something over 15 per cent each, while general government 
services are allotted less than 5 per cent. 
The percentages just noted are of course shares of total gross 
investment, including that by other public agencies, which is 
financed to some degree autonomously, and by private enterprises, 
which despite consultations while the plan was being drafted 
remain largely hopes of future investment decisions. A comparison 
with the old plan can only be made for the central government's 
own development expenditures, by comparing Table III-4 in Chapter 
III with Table VI-9 later in this chapter.4 There are two notable 
increases in emphasis in the central government's new programme. 
Agriculture is given a share of about 36 per cent, compared to 
21 per cent in the old plan; while education and welfare activities 
receive a share of about 34 per cent, compared to the earlier 20 
per cent. Thus even though only a modest part of total gross 
investment is expected to flow into agriculture, the central govern-
ment's own development activities in agriculture are to be expanded 
dramatically—from about £1.8 to about £5.2 million per year. 
The shares of other groups of sectors are correspondingly reduced. 
Among the economic infrastructures, even a smaller share for roads 
still constitutes an absolute rise of about a third in planned annual 
expenditures, but the allocation to general government services 
is reduced both relatively and absolutely. 
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The anticipated pattern of financing of the new Tanzania 
plan is indicated in Table VI-3. As noted above, the proportions 
of foreign and domestic finance which are hoped for—78 per cent 
and 22 per cent—are similar to those in the old plan, but including 
central government contributions to other public investment, the 
absolute values are about three times as high on an annual basis. 
Since the plan estimates that about half the central government's 
expenditures will be for local costs rather than foreign exchange 
costs, if the plan is to be carried out it will clearly be necessary 
either for foreign grants and loans to cover a substantial portion 
of local costs of projects, or for the share of domestic finance 
to be raised. 
Table VI-3. Tanzania Development Plan, 1964/65-1968/69: Planned Financing 
(£ mil.) 
Central Public Private 
Government Agencies Enterprises 
Taxation 8 .6 3.4 . 
Other domestic revenue — . 5.0 a 72.0 
Domestic borrowing 13.9 10.6b 4 .0 
Percentage domestic 22% 40 %d 79% 
Foreign grants 8.0 3.4 
Foreign loans 71.5 28.7c 16.9 
Foreign assistance in negotiation e 
Balance not covered e 
Percentage foreign 78% 60 %d 21% 
Sub-total 102.0 47.0 
Central government contribution . . . . —29.6 + 29.6 
TOTAL . 72.4 77.3 96.3 
Notes: 
(a) Includes £4.0 mil. self-help by local government, £1.0 mil. operating 
surpluses of public enterprises. 
(b) Includes £2.6 mil. by local government, £8.0 mil. by public enterprises. 
(c) Includes £18.0 mil. byEACSO agencies, £10.7 mil. by public enterprises. 
(d) Excluding local government, percentage domestic is 24%, percentage 
foreign 76%. 
(e) Not specified in published Plan. 
Source: See Table VI-2. 
The manpower analysis in the published plan implies that the 
problem of obtaining sufficient numbers of high-level personnel, 
normally requiring secondary, post-secondary, or university educa-
tion, should be manageable. A vigorous programme of government 
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action is outlined along four lines: systematic job analyses to improve 
utilisation of present personnel; expanded in-service training 
schemes; expanded formal education, including doubling Form 4 
leavers and quadrupling Form 6 leavers over the five years; and 
energetic recruitment of additional expatriates for residual shortages. 
But with these actions the projection is that the gap between supply 
and demand of secondary leavers will be substantially narrowed, 
if not closed, and that the shortage of Tanzanian university gra-
duates—about half the demand—can be filled by a practicable 
rise in hiring of expatriates. Thus for staff, professional and 
administrative posts in the government, a position of roughly 
250 Tanzanians, 600 expatriates, and 300 vacancies is projected 
to become one of roughly 800 Tanzanians and 700 expatriates. 
Given the somewhat flexible nature of the educated manpower 
constraint, whether this analysis is on the optimistic side or not is 
difficult to judge prior to the test of experience. 
Analysis of the New Tanzania Plan using the Projection Model.5 
An intriguing exercise is to use the statistical projection 
model developed in Chapter IV to make a 1970 projection of the 
Tanzania economy, trying to make the same assumptions about 
autonomous demand and parameter changes as in the official 
plan, and then to compare the model projection with the 1970 
estimates in the published plan. In principle, a statistical projection 
model of the sort presented here should permit a more comprehensive 
and explicit test of internal consistency. In practice, given the 
imperfections of the model, I can only hope that comparing the 
model with the plan will be informative and suggestive. It may 
bring out some of the implicit interconnections within the economy 
not spelled out in the published plan, and perhaps suggest some 
likely problems of implementation. 
The assumed conditions for the model projection are sum-
marised in Table VI-4, along with certain implications for their 
orders of magnitude, in comparison with the past. These assumed 
conditions are extracted in so far as possible from the published 
plan, though to get them in the form needed for the model involved 
a variety of inferences, some of which may be doubtful. The 
projections for agricultural export volume, agricultural export 
prices, government expenditures, and mineral exports are reasonably 
straightforward. The plan implies that the volume of agricultural 
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e x p o r t s will g r o w m o r e r ap id ly t h a n in t he pe r iod of r e t a r d a t i o n 
a n d t h a n in 1963-64, b u t in l ine wi th t h e longer r u n t r e n d . I t 
a s s u m e s t h a t e x p o r t pr ices will be c o m p a r a t i v e l y f a v o u r a b l e — a b o u t 
6 per cent a b o v e 1962 levels in 1970. I t p ro jec t s t h a t t he r a t e of 
rise of g o v e r n m e n t expend i tu r e s will be m a r k e d l y r e s t r a i n e d , 
c o m p a r e d to t he f ree-whee l ing pe r iod of e x p o r t b o o m , a n d as n o t e d 
a b o v e , t h a t the re will b e a s t eady rise in efficiency of t he civil service 
in i m p l e m e n t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t act ivi t ies . F ina l ly , mine ra l e x p o r t s 
a r e expec ted t o g r o w m o r e slowly t h a n in t he pas t . 
Table. VI-4. Assumed Conditions for Tanzania 1970 Projection Using Model. 
Condition 
1. Agricultural export volume increases 
as stated in Plan for production of 
8 major crops, less estimated 
domestic use of sisal and cotton; 
other ag. exports projected in same 
proportion. 
2. Agricultural export prices remain 
above 1962 for 8 major crops, as 
stated in Plan. Fall of 1 % p.a. as-
sumed for other ag. exports. 
3. Government current expenditure in-
creases 4 . 6 % p.a. from 1964/65, 
as stated in Plan. 
4. Manufactured exports increase as 
stated in Plan for production of 
minerals; other exports, largely 
inter-territorial, assumed from 
Plan figures for major industrial 
projects. 
5. Import substitution replaces 33% of 
imports of food, manufactured 
consumer goods, vehicles; 40% of 
construction materials, inter-
mediate goods; 20% of fuels; none 
of equipment. Based on output 
values of manufactured products 
stated in Plan, reduced for inter-
mediate goods to assumed maxi-
mum 40 % substitution, reduced for 
fuels to reflect large crude oil con-
tent of local refining. 
6. Capital formation increases to 32% 
of real GDP by 1970. Based on 
relationships in model which ap-
proximate a capital-output ratio of 
2.7 around 1970 and a retirement 
rate o f 7 % o f G D P . 
Implications 
Rate of increase 5.7% p.a., compared 
to 2 . 5 % 1958-62, 5 . 7 % p.a. from 
1954/55 ave. to 1962/63 ave. 
Price index for 8 major crops is 106, 
above 1962 for all but cotton. 
Compares with no significant price 
trend 54/55 ave. to 62/63 ave. 
Rate of increase over entire period is 
6 .7% p.a., because of marked 
increases in last two years. 
Rate of increase 6.8 % p.a., lower than 
1958-62 because of limited known 
mineral resources, despite assumed 
inter-territorial exports of manu-
factured products. 
Substitution compares with roughly 
12% for all imports combined over 
8 years 54-62. Imports replaced are 
about £13 mil. at 1962 level of 
GDP, about £27 mil. at 1970 level; 
note includes inter-territorial as well 
as foreign imports. 
Share of capital formation compares 
with 21% in 1962, 29% in 1954, 
33 % for 1970 stated in Plan. Capital-
output ratio around 1970 is similar 
to 2.6 1954-58 and 2.8 1958-62. 
Because snare of capital formation 
rises gradually, implicit capital-
output ratio during five years of 
Plan 1964/65 to 1968/69 is about 
2.3. 
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7. Tax rates rise in line with trend for Share of revenue in GDP rises slightly, 
customs duties (about 30% rise compared to Plan assumption that 
despite changed import mix), are revenue rises about 2/3 of rate of 
raised by 1963 sisal and coffee GDP. 
export taxes, are unchanged for 
direct and indirect taxes. 
The assumed conditions for import substitution were more 
difficult to establish from the published plan. The plan provides 
a detailed list of expected manufactured products in 1970, specifying 
both value of output and value added, but after allowing for present 
output and guessed interterritorial exports from some major pro-
jects like the Land-Rover plant, the remaining output still implied 
what seemed an implausibly high degree of import substitution. 
In particular, the expected output of intermediate goods appeared 
to involve more than 100 per cent substitution for this category 
of imports. Therefore in the model projection, import substitution 
in intermediate goods has been assumed to be (only) 40 per cent. 
For other categories of substitutable imports, the corresponding 
proportions are 40 per cent, 33 per cent, or 20 per cent, which are 
roughly consistent with the expected outputs of those products 
listed in the plan. 
The investment parameters adopted for the model projection 
imply that capital formation must rise to about 32 per cent of G D P 
volume by 1970—half again as high a proportion as in the recent 
past. This is in line with the plan, as discussed above. It may be 
noted that the 2.7 capital-output ratio in 1970 is in line with 
Tanzania's past experience, but because the plan projects a gradual 
rather than an abrupt rise in the share of investment, the implicit 
capital-output ratio over the five fiscal years 1964/65 to 1968/69 
is lower—about 2.3.6 
On the other hand, the tax parameters used in the model 
projection are consciously set higher than those indicated in the 
plan. The published document does not give any revenue estimates, 
but suggests in the text that revenue is likely to rise at only about 
two-thirds the rate of growth of GDP. If this assumption were 
adopted, the model would surely project an excessively large ex-
pansion of private income and demand. For the projection, 
therefore, it is assumed that effective rates of customs duties continue 
to go up in line with the recent trend, while the other tax parameters 
are unchanged. 
Turning now to the results of the 1970 projection, the projected 
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va lues f o r m o s t of t he var iab les of t he m o d e l a r e set f o r t h in T a b l e 
VI-5 , w i t h c o m p a r i s o n s whe reve r ava i lab le to t he official p l a n . 
Gene ra l i s ing very b r o a d l y , t he m o d e l gives a s imi lar p i c t u r e of 
expec ted d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e T a n z a n i a e c o n o m y by 1970, if t he 
a s s u m e d c o n d i t i o n s s t a ted in t he p l a n a r e real ised. T h i s is h a r d l y 
su rpr i s ing , unless e i ther the m o d e l o r t he p l a n were very inep t ly p u t 
t oge the r . Let u s e x a m i n e the c o m p a r i s o n in m o r e deta i l , h o w e v e r , 
t o see if any suggest ive po in t s emerge . 
Table VI-5. Comparison of 1970 Projection Using Model and Official Tanzania 
Plan. 
Rates of growth^ or 
Model Plan shares of appropriate 
Projection Projection totals (%) 
1962i 1970 1970 Mode! Plan 
(mil. £ (mil. £) (mil £) Projec. Projec. 
GDP, monetary , 123.3 286.9 264.6b + 9 . 9 + 8 .8 
G DP volume^ , 124.7 282.1 259.8 + 9 . 5 + 8.5 
Agricultural product® 48.5 94.6 86.5 + 7 . 7 + 7 . 3 
Urban product 68.2 155.2 154.8 + 9 . 6 + 8.8 
Construction product 8.0 32.3<l e + 16.7 + 12.7 
Manufacturing product . 15.4 46.6 e + 13.1 + 11.1 
Services product . 18.4 42.0 c + 9 . 6 + 8.4 
Government product . 17.3 32.6d e + 7 . 3 + 8.0 
Transport product . . 15.7 31.0 e + 7 . 9 + 8.5 
Gross investment . . . 26.8 91.6 85.0 + 14.6 + 14.6 
Construction . 14.1 49.7 f + 15.0 f 
Equipment 12.7 41.9 f + 14.2 f 
Government investment . . 10.4 36.3 32.0 + 14.9 + 18.4 
Investment/GDP volume . • 21% 32% 33% 
Agric. export volume® 46.8 77.4 f + 5 . 7 r 
Agricultural exports . 45.4 82.2 f + 6.8 f 
Manufactured exports 8.2 14.8 f + 6 . 8 f 
Manufactured import 
substitutions 27.1 f 
Food imports . . 10.2 15.6 f 20-15% r 
Mfd. consumer imports . . 18.9 28.9 f 37-28% f 
Vehicle imports 3 .5 5 .3 f 7 -5% f 
Intermediate imports. . 3 .7 11.2 f 7-11% r 
Fuel imports 3.9 7.1 f 8 .7% f 
Constr. mat. imports 3 .7 8.9 f 7 .9 % f 
Equipment imports 7 .6 25.3 f 15.25% f 
Total exports . 53.6 97.0 95.0 + 6.8 + 6 . 8 
Total imports . 51.5 102.3 100.0 + 8.0 + 7 . 5 
Balance of trade . + 2 . 1 —5.3 —5.0 
Imports/GDP • (42%) (36%) (38%) 
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Direct tax revenue 5.8 13.3 f 25-23% f 
Export tax revenue 0.1 1.7 f 0 - 3 % f 
Customs revenue 9 .2 23.5 f 39-41% f 
Indirect tax revenue 8.3 19.0 f 35-33% f 
Govt, current expenditure 19.6 35.4 35.0 + 6.7 +5.1 
Govt, tax revenue 23.4 57.6 37.9 + 10.5 + 5 . : 
Govt. econ. bal. (R-G) 3.8 22.2 2.9 
Govt, borrowing (I-(R-G)) 6.7 14.1 29.1 
Revenue/GDP 19% 20% 14% 
Consumption and other uses'1 74.7 165.2 145.1 + 9 . 2 + 7 . 4 
Notes: 
(a) Agricultural exports at 1960-62 prices. 
(b) Calculated from G D P volume by adding additional value of agricultural 
exports due to higher prices, as estimated in Model. 
(c) Rates of growth for Model are calculated as if over 9 years, for closer 
comparability with Plan. Because of new base-year estimates, Plan 
figures for 60-62 average are close to previous official figures for 1962 
used in Model. Model projection largely uses absolute figures from 
Plan in projecting autonomous variables, so its projection 62 to 70 is 
comparable to Plan projection 60-62 to 70. 
(d) Projects continuing rise in share of value-added in value of output. 
(e) Absolute figures within non-agriculture aren't comparable because of 
differences in base-year estimates and definitions. Rates of growth are 
presumably less affected by these base-year differences. 
( / ) Not specified in published Plan. 
(g) Defined only for changes from 1962. 
(/() G D P + M - E - I —G. 
(0 1962 base-year figures include some preliminary estimates; they are 
corrected in Tables II-B and II-2, but not in projection. 
First, the model projection indicates a somewhat higher G D P 
and consumption than does the plan, even though the plan already 
specifies an 8.5 per cent of growth. Since G D P in the model is 
fundamentally a measure of demand, this suggests that the antici-
pated 1970 investment rate and import substitution (even after 
the latter has been pruned as indicated above) may be so high as to 
threaten some excess demand pressure. This prospect is made 
more likely on the supply side by the implicit low capital-output 
ratio over the entire interval between 1962 and 1970, though present 
under-utilisation of capacity might permit the low ratio. If this 
implication should prove correct, i.e. if the economy actually presses 
against the constraint of domestic saving plus capital inflow, what 
would be needed to bring demand and supply into closer balance 
would be either less import substitution and greater foreign capital 
inflow, or more severe tax restraint on private consumption demand. 
Second, the model projection suggests somewhat greater 
divergence among sector rates of growth outside agriculture than 
117 
Development Planning in East Africa 
does the plan. In particular, I think it is a valid inference that 
the construction sector will have to grow more rapidly than the 
plan projects, if the share of investment in GDP is raised as much 
as assumed, and particularly if government investment expands 
more rapidly than private investment.7 In many respects this 
leading role for construction can be helpful in the development 
process. Expanding construction doesn't demand great technolo-
gical innovation, does open up opportunities for domestic produc-
tion of construction materials, and is likely to have a comparatively 
favourable effect on employment opportuntities. 
Third, the composition of imports (which is specified in the 
model projection but not in the published plan) is likely to change 
dramatically under the combined influence of differential import 
substitution and differential growth of domestic demand for the 
various categories of goods. Thus the share of the three categories 
of consumer goods imports may be expected to drop from two-
thirds to half of the total, the share of intermediate goods (despite 
extensive import substitution) to rise, and the share of capital 
equipment imports to jump from 15 per cent to 25 per cent. In 
addition to our intrinsic interest in the composition of imports, 
we may note that this shift from presently high-duty imports to 
presently low-duty imports will raise a need for adjusting the customs 
structure substantially, if tax revenue from this source is to be 
maintained and indeed increased relative to total value of imports. 
Fourth, 1970 total exports, total imports, and balance of 
trade in the model projection are remarkably similar to those in 
the published plan. They imply an increased need for inflow of 
foreign capital, net of changes in invisibles and carrying charges 
on past inflows, of less than £10 million. If these non-merchandise 
transactions are as projected in the plan, and if the foreign capital 
inflows both public and private follow the hoped-for pattern indi-
cated in Table VI-3, the foreign exchange constraint would be 
readily satisfied. If excess demand pressure rises, however, and 
import substitution is less than hoped, the needed capital inflow 
would be larger. 
Fifth, because of the altered assumptions about tax parameters 
(noted above), the model projection indicates much larger 1970 
tax revenue than is suggested by the text of the plan. Whereas the 
plan text mentions an elasticity of tax revenue relative to GDP of 
about two-thirds, which would imply a marked fall in the share of 
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taxes in GDP, the model projects a rise from about 19 per cent to 
about 20 per cent. Correspondingly, the model projects a sub-
stantial rise in government saving out of tax revenues, and a residual 
rise in government net borrowing of something less than £10 
million, roughly in line with the negative shift in the balance of 
trade. On the other hand, the implication of a revenue elasticity of 
only two-thirds is that government net borrowing would have to 
rise to the range of £20-25 million, and the government's financial 
deficit would be much larger than the economy's trade deficit. 
In that case the government finance constraint would be much 
tighter than the foreign exchange constraint, and in actuality 
would almost surely prevent attainment of the growth objective. 
It seems clear that if the plan is to succeed, the government will have 
to take action to raise the elasticity of the tax structure substantially. 
To sum up, the new Tanzania development plan is an 'ambitious' 
plan compared with the past, which appears on the basis of the 
analysis here to project a broadly feasible pattern of accelerated 
growth and structural change. Actual achievement of its ambitious 
objectives will depend on realising in practice a wide range of 
conditions, assumptions, and policies, as noted in this section 
and the last. Whether performance will come up to the plan in all 
these respects remains to be seen. But the plan itself lays out a 
reasonable approach to attaining its objectives. 
Looking at the four potential constraints distinguished in 
previous chapters, government finance and educated manpower 
seem to me distinctly the most worrisome. The model projection 
brings out that revisions in the tax structure to raise the share of 
taxes in GDP, combined with realisation of the plan's assumption 
that the rise of government current expenditure will be held down, 
are essential to provide a sufficient domestic contribution to the 
development budget. However, a 1964/65 contribution of £2 
million from general recurrent revenue could not be continued 
for 1965/66, though a hastily drafted special development levy of 
5 per cent on personal incomes above £120 and on most agricultural 
cash crops was to be instituted in its stead.8 Moreover, the 
divergence noted earlier between the roughly fifty per cent share 
of local costs in planned development expenditures and the roughly 
twenty per cent share of anticipated domestic financing was a 
major issue in foreign aid negotiations during 1964/65; the arrange-
ments made during the year with the United Kingdom and with 
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China fortunately did extend to some local costs (provided suitable 
Chinese goods can be imported). It seems inevitable that problems 
of raising sufficient government finance from domestic or foreign 
sources will continue to be extremely pressing throughout the 
plan period. 
With respect to high-level manpower, though the plan outlines 
a set of actions expected to adjust supply to demand over the 
plan period, the experience during 1964/65 indicates that the man-
power constraint is currently very tight. The constraint seems to 
be taking the narrower form discussed in Chapter II—a shortage 
of experienced government officials first to prepare detailed develop-
ment projects and then, when finance is obtained, to implement 
them at the expected pace. Whereas the budgeted development 
expenditure during 1964/65 was £22.1 million, including £7.8 
million of projects carried over from the previous plan, the revised 
estimate of expenditure is £10 million, and the final figure may well 
turn out to be less. The budgeted figure of £31.2 million for 
1965/66 seems even farther beyond what the government can carry 
out, though a rise even to the range of £14-15 million would still 
constitute an increase of about 2\ times over the last year of the 
old plan. It seems almost certain that high-level manpower will 
be paired with government finance as the second critical constraint 
on implementation of the new Tanzania plan. 
The New Kenya Plan 
The Kenya six-year plan for 1964/65-1969/70 similarly consti-
tutes a significant advance over the previous plans examined in 
Chapter III, though it is in essence transitional. A sense of 
its broader approach to development planning may be obtained 
from the following statements in the opening chapter: 
The Government of Kenya is dedicated to the creation 
of a democratic African socialist Kenya: democratic because 
it will be a free society in which there will be no place for 
discrimination by race, tribe, belief, or otherwise; African 
because the nation must grow from indigenous roots, adapting 
the best from other cultural systems; socialist because all 
people have the right to be free from economic exploitation 
and social inequality. . . . A fundamental characteristic of 
African socialism is its strong commitment to central economic 
planning as the organisation and technique for marshalling 
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the nation's resources in efficient pursuit of Government's 
economic and social objectives. Planning is intended to co-
ordinate activities in the private and public sectors, to ensure 
that actions in each sector complement those in the other, 
and to influence development in both sectors for the common 
good. To fulfil its purpose the planning organisation must 
perform a series of inter-related functions: (1) Develop factual 
and functional knowledge of the economy. . . . (2) Specify 
and analyse targets. . . . (3) Formulate plans and policies. . . . 
(4) Co-ordinate and communicate plans. . . . (5) Implement 
the plan and evaluate its operation. . . . (6) Promote revision 
and flexibility. . . . In the light of the above criteria for compre-
hensive economic Planning, the present Development Plan 
is not a final product. . . . Nevertheless, . . . this Plan is the 
result of a decision that some general guide lines must be laid 
down during the Government's first year in office.9 
The interim nature of the published plan must be kept in 
mind in our analysis in this section and the next. A revised plan 
for the last five years of the period is being prepared, and will 
probably be issued towards the end of 1965. On the one hand, 
the published plan is less fully worked out than the revision may be 
expected to be. While its scope is the evolution of the economy 
as a whole, public development activities are specified in less detail 
for the last three years than for the first three, private investment 
is treated aggregatively, and the economic analysis is formulated 
in terms of implications of the plan rather than in terms of objectives 
from which the plan is derived. On the other hand, the growth 
targets in the published plan are to be raised somewhat (a 6.2 per cent 
rate of growth has been announced) and the content of the plan 
adjusted in various directions during the revision. The analysis 
below perforce refers to targets and expenditures as initially 
published. 
The main features of the new Kenya plan, in quantitative 
terms, are summarised in Table VI-6. Kenya hopes to accelerate 
the annual rate of growth of GDP volume from about per cent 
during the years of retardation 1958-62 to about 6 per cent in the 
future. Recalling the adjectives used in Chapter V to characterise 
the two alternative projections for Uganda, this growth objective 
may reasonably be described as 'moderate' rather than 'ambitious'. 
Though its achievement would constitute a significant acceleration 
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over the 1958-62 period, it is distinctly lower than Kenya's per-
formance during the mid-fifties, and a little lower than Kenya 
achieved during 1963 and 1964 (as well as lower than Tanzania 
and probably Uganda hope for). Since the plan assumes that 
agricultural export prices in 1970 will have fallen again to 1962 levels, 
the projected rate of growth of monetary G D P at current prices10 
is also about 6 per cent. Surprisingly, the plan projects a slower 
rate of growth of urban product than of agricultural product, and 
correspondingly, a slight decline in the share of urban product in 
GDP as a whole. This pattern derives, on the one hand, from the 
judgment that agriculture must continue to be the foundation of 
the economy in the immediate future, and deserves highest priority 
in allocation of resources for development, and on the other hand, 
from the judgment that changing trade patterns within the East 
African Common Market will sharply reduce future expansion of 
manufactured exports. I shall comment further on this point in 
examining the results of the model projection in the next section. 
Nonetheless the plan projects rising urban employment at about 
2 | per cent per year, which in turn implies that urban product per 
man employed will go up at only 3 per cent per year in the future, 
about half the 5-7 per cent experienced in the past. This estimate 
unfortunately seems over-optimistic, and a much more rapid 
growth of urban product is likely to be necessary to have the desired 
effect on urban employment. 
Table Vl-6. Kenya: Features of the New Plan. 
Recent Past Future Est. 
or Old Plana or New Planb 
GDP volume (growth rate, %) . . + 3 . 5 + 5.7 k 
G DP monetary (growth rate, %) + 3.9 + 5.7 k 
Ag. product (growth rate, %) + 3.6 + 6.8 
Urban product (growth rate, %) 
Urban employment (growth rate, %) 
. . + 4 . 5 + 5.5 
+ 0 . 0 + 2 . 5 
Gross investment (£ mil.) . . £33.3 £66.0 
Invest/GDP volume (%) 19%° 23% 
Capital-output ratio 2 .9 -4 .6 3.2' 
Govt, investment (£ mil.) £11.1 £16.2f 
Other public invest. (£ mil.) . . £1.7 £10.8f 
Private investment (£ mil.) . . £20.5 £39.9f 
Govt, devel. expend, (ann. ave., £ mil.) £8.8d £10.3s 
Devel./GDP volume (%) . . 5.3 %e 4.5%g 
Foreign finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) £8.4 £9. Oh 
Domes, finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) . . £0.4 £1. 3h 
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Notes. 
(a) Growth rates are for 1958-62, investment figures for 1962, capital-output 
ratio for 1954-58 and 1958-62, development expenditure figures actual 
for four years of old plan, development ratio for annual average relative 
to 1962 GDP volume. 
(b) Growth rates are for 1962 to 1970, investment estimates for 1970, capital-
output ratio for 1964/65 to 1969/70 while investment rate is rising, 
development budget estimates for 1964/65 to 1969/70, development ratio 
for annual average relative to estimated GDP volume in 1966/67 (third 
year). 
(c) 15% in 1963. 
(d) Excluding Settlement, which rose from zero to £7.5 million over four 
years; also excluding contractor-financed roads. 
(e) Adjusted to common scope for all three countries; see Chapter III, p. 15. 
( / ) 1970 gross investment divided in proportion to totals over six years of 
plan. 
(g) Excluding Settlement and other land purchases, which with existing 
program falls from £8.0 mil. to £1.6 mil. over first four years of plan. 
If included, figures become £14.5 mil. and 6 .3%. 
(/;) Shares of foreign and domestic in first three years of plan, from Table 
VI-8, applied to average annual expenditures. 
(0 Capital-output ratio is calculated assuming retirement is 7 % of estimated 
GDP in 1964 as implied in plan, then increases at 5% per year as gross 
investment rate rises. 
(k) To be + 6 . 2 % in the revised plan. 
The plan anticipates that gross investment in 1970 will have to 
be about twice as large as in 1962 in order to support this rate of 
growth of GDP, with the rate of investment rising from 19 per cent 
(but only 15 per cent in 1963) to about 23 per cent. Unlike the 
intention in Tanzania, public investment and private investment 
are projected to expand in approximately their recent proportions, 
but as in Tanzania, investment by other public agencies, such as 
the Tana River Development Corporation and the Development 
Finance Company of Kenya, is to be expanded more than central 
government investment. The implied overall capital-output ratio 
over the six years of the plan is about 3.2 (using the same retirement 
calculations as for Tanzania and Uganda); this is slightly above 
1954-58 but of course much below 1958-62 when existing excess 
capacity was built up. 
Turning now to the central government's own development 
expenditures (excluding Settlement), they are projected to rise 
only moderately, from an annual average of £8.8 million under 
the previous plan (or higher including contractor-financed roads) 
to an annual average of £10.3 million under the new plan (though 
the latter average consists of lower expenditures at the beginning 
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and higher expenditures at the end). As a share of GDP they 
fall from about per cent to about 4 \ per cent. Thus the new 
Kenya plan does not rely on increased central government develop-
ment activities to take the lead in raising overall investment and, 
accelerating expansion of the economy as a whole. However 
investment by other public agencies is expected to play a leading 
role, particularly electric power investment on the Tana River, 
and private investment is expected to recover and maintain its 
recent share of the total. The plan assumes that nearly 90 per cent 
of the central government's development budget can be financed 
from foreign sources, which is little different from the past. 
There is a special problem in interpreting central government 
development expenditures for Kenya because of the extraordinary 
Settlement programme. The figures in the tables here exclude all 
Settlement expenditures, both for purchase of land and for invest-
ment needed to shift from large-scale to small-scale farming, and 
also Land Bank lending for other land purchases. This adjustment 
seems clearly appropriate for comparability with the previous plan 
and with the other two East African countries. The Settlement pro-
gramme has highly valuable social and political effects, but econo-
mically it consists essentially in financial transfers for land purchase 
and in replacement investment which hopefully will at least maintain 
previous levels of output. Fortunately the foreign finance for Settle-
ment is presumed to be entirely supplementary to finance for the 
regular development budget. Nonetheless the Settlement programme 
surely is a major focus of attention of Kenya political leaders and 
government officials, and the fact that it is proceeding concurrently 
with the basic development programme analysed here must be kept 
in mind. 
The projected sector composition of central government and 
other public investment during the plan period is summarised in 
Table VI-7. Since the published plan, as an interim document, does 
not estimate the expected sector composition of private investment, 
it is not possible to draw overall comparisons with the old plan or 
with the new Tanzania plan. Comparisons can be made on a 
reasonably standard basis for the central government's own develop-
ment expenditures, however, by referring to Table III-4 in Chapter 
III and Table VI-9 below. This shows that, comparing the new 
Kenya plan with the old one, the share of agriculture broadly 
defined is raised from 35 per cent to about 47 per cent, and the share 
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of education and other welfare services from 13 per cent to about 
22 per cent. The rise for agriculture of course reflects Kenya's 
general emphasis upon agricultural expansion as the basis for more 
rapid economic growth, and the rise for education reflects the plan's 
recognition of the urgency of increasing supplies of high-level 
manpower. Correspondingly, the shares of planned expenditure 
on economic infrastructures and on general government services 
are reduced in the new plan, and the absolute amounts as well. 
The planned average annual expenditure on roads, as a notable 
instance, is less than half that in the old plan (including contractor-
financed roads). It may be recalled that this shift in sector pattern 
of development expenditures between the old and the new plans is 
broadly in the same directions as in Tanzania; after the shifts 
Kenya is still spending relatively more on agriculture and less on 
education and welfare services, as in the past. 
Table VI-7. Kenya Development Plan, 1964/65-1969/70: Composition by 
Economic Sector and Type of Organisation. (£ th.) 
Central Other Public Private 
Total Govt. Agencies Enterprises 
Agriculture 10,206a 6,740a 3,466 
Livestock and Fishing 2,256 1,251 1,005 
Land and Water 17,652 17,652 
Settlement 19,084a 19,084a 
Forests 3,200 3,200 
Game and Tourism 966 966 
Mining and Mapping 263 263 
Manufacturing 4,500 — 4,500 
Commerce and Co-ops. 623 277 346 
Credit — — 
Electric Power 20,500 20,500 
Roads 6,820 5,120 1,700 
Railway 14,200 14,200 
Airports 1,214 1,214 
Posts and Tel 2,310 2,310 
Education 9,783 6,300 3,483 
Health 3,945 3,845 100 
Social Services 345 345 
Information 683 683 
Housing 2,460 2,460 
Defence and Police 2,770 2,770 
Administration 2,453 2,453 
Local Govt. 6,000 6,000 
TOTAL (excluding Settlement) 301,149c 61,539ac 51,610 188,000b 
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Notes. 
(a) Land Bank lending for land purchase, £6,000 th., included with Settlement 
Programme. Neither Settlement nor these land purchases are included in 
Total. Settlement comprises £4,301 th. for land purchase and £8,783 th. 
for associated investment. 
(b) Private capital formation not broken down by sectors. 
(c) Total development expend, by central govt, as stated here differs from 
estimated capital formation by central government as stated elsewhere in 
Plan mainly because Settlement and other lending for land purchases 
are not included, but also because adjustments have not been made to 
exclude some other transfers and include capital expenditures in recurrent 
budget. 
Source: Kenya Government, Development Plan, 1964-1970. 
T h e an t i c ipa t ed sources of financing f o r t he first th ree years 
of t h e new K e n y a p l a n a r e set f o r t h in T a b l e VI-8. I t is h o p e d t h a t 
fo re ign finance will cover 87 pe r cen t of t he cen t ra l g o v e r n m e n t 
d e v e l o p m e n t b u d g e t , a n d the b u l k (f igures n o t specif ied) of inves t -
m e n t by o t h e r pub l ic agencies . Since t he p r o p o r t i o n of local 
cos ts in K e n y a ' s d e v e l o p m e n t b u d g e t is p r e s u m a b l y of t he s a m e 
o r d e r of m a g n i t u d e as in T a n z a n i a , t he K e n y a p lan raises t he s a m e 
Table VI-8. Kenya Development Plan, 1964/65-1966/67 (Three Years): Planned 
Financing (£ mil.) 
Central Public Private 
Government Agencies Enterprises 
Taxation r 3.8 
Other domestic revenue . . < 
Domestic borrowing I 
Percentage domestic 13 %b 
Foreign grants r 6 . i 
Foreign loans 1 L 
Foreign assistance in negotiation 15.9 
Balance not covered 4.5 
Settlement 12.4a 
Percentage foreign 87%b 
TOTAL 30.3» 26.9= 
Notes. 
(a) Settlement not included in total; expenditures during three fiscal years are 
covered entirely by extraordinary foreign finance. 
(b) If Settlement were included, percentage foreign would be 91%, per-
centage domestic 9 %. 
(c) Breakdown between domestic and foreign not specified, but predominantly 
foreign. Plan states that at least half is available or in prospect. 
(d) Not specified in plan. 
Source: See Table VI-7. 
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ques t ion as t o h o w la rge a f o r e i g n c o n t r i b u t i o n t o cove r ing local 
costs of d e v e l o p m e n t p ro j ec t s can be o b t a i n e d . 
T h e high-level m a n p o w e r analys is in t he p u b l i s h e d p l a n is 
qu i t e t en ta t ive . I t p ro j ec t s near ly fifty pe r cen t s h o r t a g e s of b o t h 
univers i ty g r a d u a t e s a n d s e c o n d a r y school leavers , p r i o r t o pol icy 
measu re s o t h e r t h a n e x p a n d i n g f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n , b u t r e fe r s to 
supp ly of such m a n p o w e r as on ly a 'poss ib ly l imi t ing f a c t o r ' . 
A m u c h m o r e comple t e , a n d r e p o r t e d l y also m o r e r eassu r ing , 
m a n p o w e r analys is h a s been a p r inc ipa l e l ement in t h e w o r k a l r eady 
d o n e to revise t he p l an . 
Table VI-9. Comparison of Sector Composition of Kenya and Tanzania 'New 
Plans': Average Annual Expenditures by Central Governments (£ th. and %) 
Average Annual Expend. Percentages 
Kenya Tanzania Kenya Tanzania 
Agriculture . . 1,123a \ 2,811 10.9a \ 19.4 
Livestock and Fishing 209 J 2.0 f 
Land and Water . . 2,942 2,201 28.7 15.2 
Settlement . . 3,181a a 
Forests 533 185 5 .2 1.3 
Game and Tourism 161 83 1.6 0.6 
Mining and Mapping 44 80 0 .4 0 .6 
Manufacturing — 40 — 0.3 
Commerce and Co-ops. . . 46 74 0 .4 0 .5 
Credit • — — • — — 
Electric Power 13 0 .1 
Roads 853 2,410 8.3 16.6 
Railway • — 8 — 0.1 
Airports 202 244 2 .0 1.7 
Posts and Tel. — — — — 
Education . . 1,050 2,867 10.2 19.8 
Health 641 361 6.3 2.5 
Social Services 58 486 0 .6 3.4 
Information 114 80 1.1 0 .6 
Housing 410 1,090 4 .0 7.5 
Defence and Police 462 1,042 4 .5 7 .2 
Administration 409 400 4 .0 2 .8 
Local Government . . 1,000 — 9.7 — 
TOTAL . . 10,257® 14,475b 100.0 100 0 
Notes. 
(a) Total for Kenya excludes Settlement Programme and Land Bank lending 
for land purchases. Note also that average expenditures for these two 
activities of £3,181 th. per year are not representative, as expenditures 
under the existing program fall from £8.0 mil. in 1964/65 to £1.6 mil. in 
1967/68, and no allowance is made for likely extensions of the programmes. 
(b) Total for Tanzania excludes government contributions to public enter-
prises, which average £5,925 th. 
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Analysis of the New Kenya Plan using the Projection Model 
Let us now repeat the same kind of exercise for analysing 
the economic implications of the new Kenya plan as was undertaken 
earlier in the case of Tanzania. The approach is to try to adopt 
the same assumptions about autonomous demands and parameter 
changes as in the official plan, to introduce them into the statistical 
model developed in Chapter IV, to make a 1970 projection, and then 
to compare the results of the projection with the 1970 estimates 
in the published plan. Again, given the imperfections of the model, 
I can only hope that the comparison will be informative and 
suggestive. 
The assumed conditions for the model projection are listed 
in Table VI-10, along with some indications of how these assump-
tions compare with the past. The projections of agricultural 
export volume and agricultural export prices are taken directly 
from the published plan. They imply that volume will expand at 
around 5^ per cent per year—distinctly more than in the years of 
retardation 1958-62, about the same as in 1963 and 1964, but still 
somewhat below Kenya's long-term trend—while prices will slide 
off again to the 1962 level. A projection of government current 
expenditure is not given in the published plan; the assumption here 
that they will rise at only 4 per cent per year is designed to reflect 
effective economy measures as mentioned in the plan document, 
but may well be distinctly too low in actuality. 
Table VI-10. Assumed Conditions for Kenya 1970 Projection Using Model. 
Conditions 
1. Agricultural export volume increases 
as stated in Plan. 
2. Agricultural export prices remain un-
changed on average from 1962 to 
1970. 
3. Government current expenditure in-
creases 4 . 0 % p.a. from 1962/63 to 
1970/71. Plan specifies only addi-
tional recurrent costs of plan 
activities. 
4. Manufactured exports increase as 
stated in Plan. 
Implications 
Rate of increase 5 .3% p.a., compared 
to 3 .2% 1958-62, 6 .7% from 
1949/50 ave. to 1962/63 ave. 
Compares with no significant price 
trend 1950 to 1962/63 ave.; implies 
1970 prices about 10% below 1964. 
Rate of increase a little below 1958-
62, implies effective economy mea-
sures as suggested in Plan. Govern-
ment product increases more rapidly 
because of rising share in expendi-
tures. 
Rate of increase 3 .4% p.a., much 
lower than 15.6% 1958-62 because 
of assumed effect of measures to 
move closer to balance in inter-
territorial trade. 
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5. Import substitution replaces 25% of Substitution compares with roughly 
imports of food and manufactured 5% for all imports combined over 
consumer goods; 5% of intermediate 1958-62. Imports replaced are about 
goods, fuels, construction materials; £10 mil. at 1962 level of GDP, about 
none of vehicles and equipment. £15 mil. at 1970 level; note includes 
Based on estimates of consumer, inter-territorial as well as foreign 
producer, and capital goods imports imports, 
as stated in Plan. 
6. Capital formation increases to 25 % of Share of capital formation compares 
GDP volume by 1970. Based on with 19% in 1962, 15% in 1963, 
relationships in model approximat- 32% in 1954, 23% for 1970 stated in 
ing a capital-output ratio of 2 .8 Plan. Capital-output ratio compares 
around 1970, and a retirement rate with 2.9 1954-58. Implicit capital-
of 7 % of GDP. output ratio during six years of 
Plan 1964/65 to 1969/70 is also about 
2.9. 
7. Tax rates rise in line with trend for Share of revenue in GDP rises from 
customs duties (about 20% rise de- 25% to 27%, permitting substantial 
spite change in import mix) and rise in government saving with 
indirect taxes (about 15 % rise), are assumed slow growth of current 
raised slightly by 1963 sisal and expenditure. 
coffee export taxes, are unchanged 
for direct taxes. Plan doesn't 
specify tax adjustments. 
The projection of manufactured exports in the published plan 
implies that changing trade policies within the East African 
Common Market will limit their future overall growth to around 
31 per cent per year. This is a very important change from the 
past, when rising interterritorial exports have been a principal 
stimulus to the growth of the Kenya economy, and is one of the 
main explanations of the plan's 'moderate' growth objective. At 
the same time, though the text of the plan does not stress import 
substitution as a major point of development strategy, the balance 
of payments projection actually indicates substantially more rapid 
import substitution than in the 1958-62 or 1963-64 periods. 
Correspondingly, the assumption in the model is that import 
substitution replaces about a quarter of current imports of food 
products and manufactured consumer goods by 1970, plus a small 
amount of intermediate goods, fuels (the new Mombasa refinery), 
and construction materials. The net effect upon the manufacturing 
sector is that more extensive import substitution than in the past 
compensates substantially for the unfavourable change in manu-
factured export prospects. 
The investment parameters adopted in the model projection 
(which it may be remembered are defined in somewhat different 
terms) approximate a conventional capital-output ratio of about 
2.8 in 1970, which is about the same as in the mid-fifties, and a little 
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below that implied in the plan. However, since the model pro-
jection results in a higher rate of growth of aggregate demand in 
the economy, as discussed further below, these investment para-
meters imply that the share of investment in GDP volume would 
need to be raised to about 25 per cent by 1970, a little above the 
23 per cent suggested in the published plan. 
Finally, the tax parameters for the model projection are raised 
to follow recent trends towards higher customs duties and higher 
indirect taxes; future tax adjustments are not specified in the 
published plan. These assumed but reasonable tax rate increases, 
combined with the already comparatively high income elasticity 
of the Kenya tax structure, imply rather buoyant revenue prospects. 
The results of the model projection compared to the 1970 
estimates in the published plan are presented systematically in 
Table VI-11. Again I should stress that the purpose of the compa-
rison is simply to bring out the kinds of questions about future 
prospects which this kind of statistical projection model is designed 
to raise. The most suggestive points appear to be the following. 
Table VI-11. Comparison of 1970 Projection Using Model and Official Kenya Plan. 
Rates of growth or 
Model Plan shares of appropriate 
Projection Projec.i totals (%) 
1962 1970 1970 Model Plan 
{mil. £) (mil. £) (mil. £) Projec. Projec.i 
GDP, monetary . . 180.9 301.0 280.7 + 6 . 6 + 5.711 
GDP, volumea . . 179.3 299.4 279.1° + 6 . 6 + 5 . 7 n 
Agric. product . . 39.9 64.2 66.8 + 6 . 1 + 6.8 
Urban product . . 134.2 221.1 204.0 + 6.5 + 5.5 
Construction product . . 6.8 15.7k 10.0 + 11.0 + 5.0 
Manufacturing product . . 23.9 44.4 35.9 + 8.1 + 5.2 
Services product . . 56.7 90.1 85.2 + 6 . 0 + 5.2 
Government product . . 28.1 43.6k 39.8 + 5.6 + 4 . 5 
Transport product . . . . 25.6 42.9 43.1 + 6 . 6 + 6 . 9 
Gross investment . . 33.3 IS.6 66.0 + 10.8 + 8 . 9 
Construction . . 18.5 40.7 f + 10.4 f 
Equipment . . 14.8 34.9 f + 11.3 f 
Govt, investment . . 11.1 24.6 16.2 + 10.5 + 4 . 9 
Invest./GDP volume • • 19% 25% 23% 
Ag. export volumea . . 40.0 60.4 57. 5e + 5.3 + 5 . 3 
Agricultural exports . . 41.6 62.0 59.1 + 5.1 + 5.3 
Manufactured exports . . 13.7 18.0 21.0 + 3 . 4 + 3 . 4 
Manufactured import 
substitutionb 15.2 
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Food imports 12.0d 13.4 g 14-11 
Mfd. consumer imports 27.0d 29.9 g 33-24% -47-38 % 
Vehicle imports 6.4d 9 .5 g 8 -8% I 
Intermediate imports 11.2d 19.3 g 14-15 %1 
Fuel imports 8.7d 12.9 g 11-10% I > J4—j J / 0 
Constr. mat. imports 3.7d 10.7 g 4-9 %1 . 1 Q 07 0/ 
Equipment imports 13.8d 29.9 g 17-24% J • 19-27/0 
Total exports 62.5 90. Oh 90. lh + 4 . 7 + 4 . 8 
Total imports 76.8 125.7h 112.7h + 5.4 + 4 . 8 
Balance of trade - 1 4 . 4 - 3 5 . 7 - 2 2 . 6 
Imports/GDP (42%) (42%) (40%) 
Direct tax revenue . . 1 2 . 4 \ 20.2 f \ 28-24% f Export tax revenue . . -J f J r 
Customs revenue 13.8 27.6 f 31-34% f 
Indirect tax revenue 18.8 34.9 f 42-42% f 
Govt, current expenditure . 39.8 54.5 i + 4 . 0 f 
Govt, tax revenue 45.0 82.7 r + 7.9 f 
Govt. ecou. bal. (R-G) 5.1 28.2 f 
Govt, borrowing (I-(R-G) ) 4 .3 - 3 . 6 m f 
Revenue/GDP 25% 27% f 
Consumption & other uses0 122.1 206.6 f + 6 . 8 r 
Notes. 
(a) Agricultural exports at 1960-62 prices. 
(/)) Defined only for changes from 1962. 
(c) GDP + M - E - I - G. 
(d) 1963. 
(e) Calculated from GDP by subtracting difference in value of agric. exports 
at 1960-62 prices, as estimated in Model. 
( / ) Not specified in published Plan. 
(g) Breakdown given in Plan for three broad classes of retained imports 
(excluding re-exports)—consumer goods, producer goods, capital goods. 
(It) Includes assumed £10.0 mil. of re-exports. 
(/) Plan specifies only increase in recurrent expenditures due to Plan activities. 
(J) There are slight differences in base-year figures because of later statistical 
revisions and hence absolute figures are not precisely comparable. Rates 
of growth are less affected by these minor base year differences. 
(k) Projects continuing rise in share of value-added in value of output. 
(m) Excluding repayments, and also borrowing by other public agencies. 
In) To be + 6.2% in the revised plan. 
F i r s t , t h e m o d e l p r o j e c t i o n ind ica tes a r a t e of g r o w t h of G D P 
vo lume of a b o u t 6.6 pe r cen t pe r yea r c o m p a r e d t o t he or ig ina l 
5.7 pe r cen t a n d revised 6.2 pe r cent . G D P in t h e m o d e l is f u n d a -
menta l ly a m e a s u r e of agg rega te d e m a n d ; th is resul t t h e r e f o r e 
suggests t h a t t h e p ro j ec t ed a u t o n o m o u s d e m a n d s ( p e r h a p s m o s t 
n o t a b l y t h e ex ten t of m a n u f a c t u r e d i m p o r t subs t i tu t ion ) , i n t e rac t ing 
wi th t he in t e rna l s t r u c t u r e of t he e c o n o m y as expressed in t he m o d e l ' s 
p a r a m e t e r s (which a s n o t e d in C h a p t e r IV imply h ighe r i n d u c e d 
domes t i c d e m a n d s f o r K e n y a t h a n fo r t he o t h e r t w o coun t r i e s ) , 
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may generate directly and indirectly more aggregate demand than 
has been anticipated. If the aggregate supply of goods and services 
were being pressed to the maximum, this might indicate some excess 
demand pressure—a possibility noted above for the new Tanzania 
plan. But in the circumstances of the Kenya economy it may well 
be feasible for the supply simply to expand a little more rapidly to 
satisfy the demand. This would presumably require the calculated 
further rise in the 1970 investment rate from 23 per cent to 25 per cent 
of GDP volume, which would in turn depend on calling forth 
additional domestic saving plus capital inflow as GDP expands. 
Conceivably, however, the present excess capacity in the Kenya 
economy might permit more rapid growth with a lower capital-
output ratio than is assumed here. 
Second, the model projection suggests a somewhat more normal 
pattern of sector growth than in the initial plan. Because of the 
extent of assumed import substitution, combined with the effect 
of rising domestic incomes, manufacturing is projected to continue 
to be a leading sector despite its unfavourable export prospects. 
Services and government also grow a little more than in the plan 
(government being partly affected by a projected rising trend in 
the ratio of government product to government expenditure), so 
urban product as a whole is projected to continue to outpace 
agricultural product. In addition, construction product seems 
almost sure to have to expand more rapidly than the plan projects, 
to sustain the indicated rise in the investment rate. According to 
the model, construction would be the leading sector in the economy, 
and its projected rate of growth of about 11 per cent per year could, 
fortunately, provide a main source of employment opportunities. 
Third, in the model projection total imports rise somewhat 
more than in the published plan, with a similar shift in composition 
towards construction materials and equipment, and away from 
consumer goods other than vehicles. The shift in composition 
poses the same problem of adjusting the structure of customs 
duties to maintain tax revenues as was noted earlier for Tanzania. 
The higher total imports in the model of course imply a tighter 
foreign exchange constraint, with the projected 1970 deficit in the 
balance of trade in the order of £35 million, rather than £20-25 
million as in the published plan. If net invisibles become more 
positive as anticipated in the plan, if the recent recorded and 
unrecorded private capital outflow ceases, and if the public capital 
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inflow comes up to the estimated financing of the plan, the overall 
balance of payments could still be just manageable. The difference 
is that whereas the estimated balance of payments position in the 
published plan is quite easy, the higher growth rate and especially 
higher investment rate in the model projection fully absorb this 
ease. Indeed, any bad luck could make foreign exchange a critical 
constraint in Kenya. 
Fourth, in the model projection government tax revenue 
expands at just under 8 per cent per year—that is, more rapidly 
than GDP. Given the spartan assumption that government 
current expenditure rises at only 4 per cent per year, the calculated 
result is a dramatic increase in the surplus of revenue over expen-
diture. Indeed, the size of the increase is surely politically un-
realistic; in these circumstances either the assumed restraint on 
government expenditure would be relaxed or the assumed tax rate 
increases would not be imposed. The only inference I would be 
willing to draw from this part of the model projection11 is that quite 
reasonable tax rate adjustments in the already comparatively 
elastic Kenya tax structure would suffice to raise revenue more 
rapidly than GDP, and that the resulting revenue could accom-
modate both a higher trend in current expenditure and a significant 
budgetary contribution to development. 
To sum up, the new Kenya plan is a 'moderate' plan for accele-
rating future development, which appears on the basis of the 
analysis here to be clearly attainable. Indeed, some rise in the 
growth objective and some modifications in the pattern may well 
be feasible with only limited adjustments in government develop-
ment activities and policies. The revised plan for the last five 
years of the plan period may possibly make some such changes. 
Looking at the four potential constraints distinguished in 
previous chapters, it seems to me unlikely that any of them will 
prove to be a critical barrier to implementation of the new plan. 
All four pose problems, but these problems seem likely to be 
manageable. With respect to the constraint of domestic saving plus 
foreign capital inflow, the main uncertainty is the projected recovery 
and expansion of private investment to maintain its recent role 
in the economy. As existing excess capacity is more fully utilised, 
however, and assuming reasonable administration of the system 
of exchange control introduced in 1965 to curtail residents' un-
approved capital outflow, the necessary rise in private saving and 
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capital inflow is a good prospect. Kenya's foreign exchange 
problem is likely to be more serious than Tanzania's and Uganda's, 
as brought out in our analysis, but it should be just manageable 
unless there is bad luck in some major element of the projected 
balance of payments. Turning to the government finance constraint, 
unfortunately about £1.2 million of recurrent tax sources previously 
allocated directly to the development budget had to be withdrawn 
for fiscal year 1965/66, and the problem of covering local costs 
continued to be a key issue in foreign aid negotiations.12 However, 
the model projection suggests that tax revenue can reasonably be 
expected to rise more rapidly than GDP, which should permit an 
enlarged domestic contribution to the development budget, and 
in quite a number of cases in 1964/65 foreign governments agreed 
to finance a portion of local costs. Finally, the high-level manpower 
problem was apparent in 1964/65—as in Tanzania taking the 
narrower form of difficulties within the government in designing 
and implementing development projects. But given the limited 
rise in central government development expenditure which is planned 
and considering the Kenya government's past record of nearly full 
plan implementation, it seems reasonable to expect that workable 
solutions to the manpower problem will be found. 
Possible Lines of the New Uganda Plan 
The second Uganda five-year plan for 1966/67-1970/71 is in 
the midst of being prepared at the time of writing (June 1965), 
so nothing definite can be said about its ultimate form. The 
Minister of Planning and Community Development and the 
Director of Planning have in various speeches indicated some of the 
dimensions of the initial draft framework, however, such as the 
growth target and the size of the investment programme, and this 
initial framework, used to guide the sector working parties, broadly 
resembled the 1966-71 phase of the analysis in Chapter V. Though 
comments at this time can only be speculative, it may be helpful 
simply to sketch a few possible features of a new Uganda plan, on a 
basis comparable to our analysis of the Tanzania and Kenya plans. 
This is what is attempted in Table VI-12; all the specific figures are 
taken from the analysis in Chapter V. 
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Table VI-12. Uganda: Possible Features of the New Plan. 
Recent Past Future Est. 
or Old Plana or New Plan» 
GDP volume (growth rate, %) 
GDP, monetary (growth rate, %) 
Ag. product (growth rate %) 
Urban product (growth rate, %) 
Urban employment (growth rate, %) 
+ 3.0= 
+ 0 . 4 
- 3 . 3 
. . + 4 . 7 
- 0 . 7 
+ 8.5 
+ 8.2 
+ 6.7 
+ 8.9 
+ 3.5 
Gross investment (£ mil.) . . £16.4 £67.4 
Invest./GDP volume (%) 15% 32% 
Capital-output ratio . . 3 .6-3 .8 2 .3 
Govt, investment (£ mil.) £4.4 ? 
Other public invest. (£ mil.) £4.7 ? 
Private investment (£ mil.) £7.3 ? 
Govt, devel. expend, (ann. ave., £ mil.) 
Devel./GDP volume (%) 
Foreign finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) 
Domestic finance (ann. ave., £ mil.) . . 
5 .5 
5.0%d 
3.3 
2.2 
17.5= 
10.0% ? 
? 
Notes. 
(a) Growth rates are for 1958-62, investment figures for 1962, capital-output 
ratio for 1954-58 and 1958-62, development expenditure figures actual 
for first three years of old plan, development ratio for annual average 
relative to 1962 GDP volume. 
(b) All future estimates taken from unofficial projection in Chapter V. 
Growth rates are for 1962-1971, investment estimates for 1971, capital-
output ratio for 1966/67-1970/71 while investment rate is rising, deve-
lopment budget estimates for 1966/67—1970/71, development ratio for 
annual average relative to estimated GDP volume in 1968/69 (middle 
year). 
(c) If 1962 is adjusted upward £5 million for normal cotton crop, growth 
rate becomes + 4.2%. 
(d) Adjusted to common scope for all three countries; see Chapter III, p. 15. 
(e) Estimated from rate of growth of government investment in projection; 
implies central government total of £87.5 in overall total of £230 during 
five fiscal years. 
( / ) Capital-output ratio is calculated assuming retirement is 7% of estimated 
1966 GDP as implied in projection, then increases at 5% per year as 
eross investment rate rises. 
T o beg in wi th , if t h e f ina l p l a n is s imilar t o t h e ini t ia l d r a f t 
f r a m e w o r k , t he n e w U g a n d a p l a n will be a n ' a m b i t i o u s ' r a t h e r 
t h a n a ' m o d e r a t e ' p l a n ( r e fe r r ing aga in t o t h e ad jec t ives e m p l o y e d 
earl ier) . T h e a i m m a y well be t o acce le ra te t he a n n u a l r a t e of 
g r o w t h of m o n e t a r y G D P , a t c o n s t a n t pr ices , f r o m a b o u t 3 pe r cent 
d u r i n g 1958-62 to s o m e t h i n g over 8 per cen t in t he f u t u r e . A b s o l u t e l y 
this g r o w t h ob jec t ive is qu i t e s imi lar t o t h a t of t h e n e w T a n z a n i a 
p lan , b u t s ince over t h e las t d e c a d e (except d u r i n g t h e 1963-64 
expor t b o o m ) U g a n d a ' s e c o n o m y has g r o w n dis t inct ly less r ap id ly 
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than Tanzania's, relatively it requires an even more dramatic change 
in performance. To make such an overall growth objective at all 
feasible, the new plan will presumably have to undertake both to 
accelerate the past rate of growth of agricultural product and to 
expand urban product still more rapidly, particularly through 
import substitution in manufacturing. If the rate of growth of 
urban product can be raised into the 9 per cent range, however, 
and if the wage trend of 1963 and 1964 is moderated, a significant 
up-trend in urban employment may be hoped for, as suggested in 
the table. 
A condition for this marked acceleration in Uganda's economic 
growth is likely to be that gross investment expand about four times 
between 1962 and 1970, with the rate of investment rising from 15 
per cent (18 per cent by 1964) to over 30 per cent. This 1970 
investment rate is close to the target in the Tanzania plan, but since 
Uganda started lower the increase would be somewhat larger. 
The figures projected in the table imply a capital-output ratio over 
the five fiscal years of the plan of about 2.3, which is also similar 
to the Tanzania plan but lower than in Kenya. It may be recalled 
that in the past Uganda has generally had a higher capital-output 
ratio than the other two countries. A crucial question is therefore 
whether, given the existing excess capacity and given the mix 
of development activities proposed by the working parties and 
included in the final plan, the overall capital-output ratio can be 
held down to this level. The composition of gross investment 
among the central government, other public agencies, and private 
enterprises will also depend on the final mix of development 
activities. 
The implication for the central government's own development 
budget may well be average annual expenditures in the order of 
£17-18 million, or about triple the average actually achieved in the 
old plan. Relative to GDP this would be about the same as in 
Tanzania, including there the central government's contribution 
to other public agencies, and about twice as high as in Kenya. 
Whether Uganda will undertake to raise domestically a larger share 
of the necessary finance than in Tanzania and Kenya, as she has in 
the past, is another crucial question affecting the viability of the 
new plan. 
At this time, before the final plan is worked out, it is not possible 
to make any firm judgments about which of the four potential 
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constraints distinguished in previous chapters are likely to be 
tightest in the future. There is some evidence, drawn from the 
experience of 1964/65 and 1965/66, when the government markedly 
expanded the old plan, that the crucial constraints may prove to be 
government finance and high-level manpower in the civil service. 
If so, the pattern of constraints would be broadly similar to that 
forecast earlier for Tanzania, rather than the easier situation 
anticipated for Kenya. 
With respect to government finance, during 1964/65 a sub-
stantial windfall from export taxes—£4.7 million according to the 
revised estimate—was successfully allocated to the development 
budget, in addition to normal revenue sources and domestic 
borrowing.13 For 1965/66, however, export taxes on coffee are 
expected to fall from £7.7 million to £2.1 million, as a result of 
the lower world price, rising investment in coffee stocks by the 
Coffee Marketing Board, and a decision to write off part of these 
costs by reducing the Board's tax obligations. There will thus be 
no contribution from the recurrent to the development budget in 
1965/66 (though some additional domestic borrowing is antici-
pated). Indeed, the recurrent budget itself, even after an across-
the-board 7 per cent slash in those expenditure votes susceptible of 
such reduction, and a number of proposed tax adjustments, is 
projected to be in deficit in the order of £1.5 million. At the same 
time, the question of using foreign aid to cover a portion of local 
costs of development projects continues to be an active issue in 
negotiations—not because of the circumstances of 1963/64 and 
1964/65, when Uganda's domestic contributions to the development 
budget were impressive, but in view of the prospect of a tight 
government finance constraint in the future. 
The evidence about the high-level manpower constraint, 
particularly in the form of a shortage of experienced government 
officials to design and implement development projects at the desired 
pace, is not yet clear. As noted in Chapter III, during the first 
three years of the old plan there were quite large shortfalls from 
budgeted expenditures, though these were to a considerable extent 
due to delays in arranging finance. Then in 1964/65 the approved 
estimates jumped to £20.2 million, and the Ministry of Finance 
released funds for £17.0 million, but the revised estimate of develop-
ment expenditure is £12.4 million, and the final figure in the audited 
accounts may well turn out to be less. On the other hand, if the 
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revised estimate is confirmed, it would constitute a doubling over 
the previous year, and would actually support an optimistic view 
about the adequacy of high-level manpower within the civil service 
to carry out a much expanded development programme. Further 
experience, and the manpower analysis in the final plan, will be 
necessary to reach a reasoned judgment as to whether high-level 
manpower will be a second critical constraint on the new Uganda 
plan. 
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One of the main implementation problems which was not fully anticipated, 
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the statistical projection model in Chapter IV, and it has been applied 
uniformly to all three countries. The Kenya plan makes rough price 
corrections for the years 1954-62 using the Nairobi cost of living index, 
which implies a much larger divergence between constant-price and 
current-price trends, but the future projections are entirely in constant 
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11. If the model were being used in practice, it would be desirable to re-
calculate the projection after changing the government expenditure 
assumption, and any others which appear doubtful on second thought. 
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12. Kenya Government, Budget Speech, 1965166. On this and other 
points about the June, 1965 status of the new plan, see also Economic 
Survey 1965 and Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1965/66 (three 
parts). 
13. Uganda Government, Budget Speech, 1965/66. On this and other points 
about the June 1965 status of the old plan, see also Background to the 
Budget 1965-66 and Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, 1965/66 
(three parts). 
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CHAPTER VH. I M P L E M E N T A T I O N AND COORDINATION 
O F PLANS 
Implementation is the crucial test of development planning. 
Particularly in the years immediately ahead, as the East African 
governments attempt to carry through the transition to compre-
hensive planning which is now under way, implementation will be 
a major challenge. All three governments, though in somewhat 
different styles and degrees, are initiating new plans which are 
designed with more advanced planning techniques, aim at substan-
tially accelerated overall economic growth, and imply mobilization 
of development efforts throughout the economy. Implementation 
arrangements must similarly be adapted and extended if the plans 
are to succeed. 
The two most important arrangements for effective implementa-
tion, as suggested in the first chapter, are (a) centralised organisation 
and procedures for supervising planned development activities 
throughout the government, and (b) energetic and coherent use of 
economic policy instruments to guide decentralised private deve-
lopment activities. I shall discuss these two aspects of plan im-
plementation at the national level in the next section. In the 
circumstances of East Africa, in which the three governments are 
participating in a common market, there is also a special problem—-
and opportunity—of accommodating national implementation 
arrangements with East African co-operation in those policy areas 
essential for realising the advantages of the common market. This 
is the subject of the second section of the chapter. 
National Implementation Procedures and Policies 
My comments on national implementation arrangements 
will be brief and based essentially on the logic of comprehensive 
planning. The issues clearly spread out f rom the economic 
problems of accelerating development to the public administration 
problems of maintaining standard government practices for making 
decisions and carrying them out, and to the political problems of 
giving increased weight to economic development among the society's 
many goals. 
The key requirement for effective implementation of the 
government's own development activities is centralised surveillance 
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of all development projects, even though they are carried out by 
many different operating agencies. This surveillance has two 
successive stages in time. Initially, every proposal for a develop-
ment project should be screened centrally against reasonably 
uniform criteria, to reach a decision whether or not it ought to be 
included in the government's programme. In order for this screening 
process to promote constructive action rather than inhibit it, it is 
important that operating agencies present more proposals (or 
variants of single proposals) than can be approved, and that the 
criteria aim at promptly selecting acceptable projects (despite the 
risk of making mistakes) rather than at ensuring that all approved 
projects are optimal. Subsequently, there should be regular and 
reasonably standardised progress reports on every approved project, 
so that snags in implementation can be promptly spotted and 
some remedy introduced. The whole emphasis should thus be 
on expediting implementation of a much larger volume of develop-
ment activities than has been practicable in the past. 
At the time of writing (June, 1965), Tanzania has established 
the most explicit formal structure for centralised plan supervision. 
The Directorate for Development Planning in the President's 
Office in principle has some authority over regular ministries in 
plan implementation, a system of progress reports on individual 
projects has been set up, and positions for eight 'trouble-shooters' 
in the field have been established (though only two are filled). 
However, it is fair to say that there is still considerable uncertainty 
as to how the formal structure will operate in practice, along with 
the traditional controls of the Ministry of Finance and the esta-
blished responsibilities of the regular ministries. In Kenya and 
Uganda, definite proposals about the future implementation func-
tions of the respective development planning ministries are just 
coming to the fore. Providing for centralised supervision of all 
plan implementation obviously poses delicate issues of public 
administration and of political power, but surely both administration 
and politics need to be adapted in significant degree to the new 
exigencies of planned economic development. 
In countries which maintain mixed economies of private and 
public enterprises, as in East Africa, effective plan implementation 
must also include coherent use of fiscal, monetary, and regulatory 
policies to energise and guide private development activities. Let 
me cite two illustrative examples of cases in which several policy 
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instruments are best employed together to induce a desired result. 
An important objective of the new plans is to expand the amount of 
domestic saving plus capital inflow going into private investment. 
Here it is reasonable to consider simultaneously (a) modifying 
company and personal income taxes so as to shift the burden from 
retained profits toward distributed profits, (b) employing the central 
bank's control and guidance of commercial banks to broaden 
lending practices in the direction of longer-term and fixed-capital 
financing, (c) establishing legal guarantees of security of capital for 
approved foreign investors combined with agreed arrangements 
for attracting additional participation by domestic investors, 
(id) administering exchange controls so as to reduce capital outflows 
by domestic residents while keeping release of exchange for current 
transactions as automatic as is possible with a control system.1 
Another objective which seems likely to become increasingly pressing 
is to expand the number of non-agricultural jobs more rapidly 
than the rate of growth of population. Here it is reasonable to 
consider simultaneously (a) adjusting the mix of public projects 
approved for inclusion in the plan to favour those with higher over 
those with lower employment content, (b) instituting modifications 
of company income taxes to give tax advantages for private firms 
which expand their labour forces and to reduce tax stimuli for 
labour-saving capital investments, (c) establishing an incomes 
policy which relates wage and salary rises to productivity increases, 
(d) providing government support for in-service training schemes 
within industrial and commercial firms and for job-oriented part-
time courses supplementing the formal education system.2 
As illustrated by these two examples, attainment of a number 
of the plan's objectives requires inducing suitable private actions 
throughout the economy. Various agencies of the government 
have a wide range of policy instruments at their disposal, and it is 
obviously sensible in many cases to employ several instruments 
in a coherent way. Doing so must depend fundamentally on ra-
tional and firm cabinet-level decisions, as the diverse concerns of 
many parts of the government are involved. It should be helpful 
in reaching such decisions, however, if a principal function assigned 
to the development planning organisation is to prepare recommenda-
tions on coherent sets of policy instruments for supporting the plan. 
If it is objected that this implies development planning taking pre-
cedence over all other goals influencing economic policies, I would 
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suggest that there is no serious risk of this happening in the actual 
political processes of government. The practical problem is one 
of focusing greater cabinet-level attention on coherent use of policy 
instruments, as an integral part of comprehensive development 
planning. 
East African Coordination of Industrialisation Policies 
A distinctive aspect of plan implementation in East Africa 
is the need to coordinate some of the three governments' policies 
in areas essential for effective operation of the common market. 
In this section I shall attempt to consider the problems of policy 
coordination in just one area, though a very important one— 
industrialisation policies. 
As recently as two years ago, it was widely expected that such 
coordination problems would be absorbed (not necessarily easily 
solved) among many other aspects of economic integration within 
a political federation. It is now clear that full federation cannot 
be agreed upon, and the drift of affairs is strongly toward concen-
trating policy instruments in the hands of three separate national 
governments. Separate decision-making without coordination is 
simpler, more satisfying to the officials directly concerned, and in 
areas where it releases more vigorous measures of national plan 
implementation, constructive. As of June, 1965, however, there 
seems to be a serious risk that failure to establish suitable coordina-
tion arrangements for some economic policies will make national 
plan implementation weaker in all three countries. This risk 
seems to me especially great in the field of industrialisation policies. 
The problem is to accommodate East African coordination of some 
policies with national initiative in other policies.3 
Industrialisation policies are simultaneously the greatest 
potential source of gain from the common market, and the greatest 
present source of tension among the three governments. The new 
development plans for Tanzania and Uganda examined in Chapter 
VI are based in significant degree upon major advances in industria-
lisation, and the new Kenya plan still depends on continued progress 
of her established industrial sectors, even though in a less leading 
role than in the past. The common market has clearly provided a 
major stimulus to industrial progress in East Africa as a whole, 
even though a more than proportionate share of industrial invest-
ment has been located in Kenya.4 Continuation of substantially 
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free trade within a common external tariff, supplemented by co-
ordination of selected policy instruments to promote industrialisation 
in all three countries, seems to me vital for the success of all three 
plans. 
Given viable arrangements for coordination of industrialisation 
policies, each of the three countries, in a protected common market 
of £500 million monetary GDP, can be much more attractive for 
industrial investment, domestic or foreign, than an equally protected 
separate market of £210, £160, or £130 million. The point is not 
only that there are a good many industries in which technical eco-
nomies of scale demand the larger market to support the industry 
at all, though this is an important consideration for carrying 
industrialisation beyond the easier smallscale industries.5 The 
point is also that firms in almost any industry are attracted by the 
possible financial returns from penetrating into the larger market, 
and that cumulative industrial progress is promoted by inter-firm 
competition within the larger market. However, without explicit 
coordination of some policy instruments, a combination of certain 
intrinsic locational advantages plus external economies of previous 
industrial progress is likely to continue to attract a more than 
proportionate share of industrial investment to Kenya. This 
situation is not politically acceptable in Tanzania, and less overtly 
in Uganda. The objective of viable coordination arrangements 
must therefore be to retain the mutual advantages of the common 
market while adjusting the distribution of new investments among 
the three partners. 
At present, uncoordinated industrialisation policies are a 
dangerous source of tension among the three governments. The 
Kampala Agreement of April, 1964 appeared to provide an agreed 
approach, with four main provisions: (a) Major firms operating in 
all three countries were to be persuaded to match local production 
with local demand. (b) Countries with trade deficits and active 
projects for new industries to supply local markets were authorized 
to introduce, after consultation, temporary quotas on inter-territorial 
imports, (c) Certain new industries needing East African markets, 
for which projects were nearly firm, were allocated to particular 
countries, with the largest number to Tanzania and the next largest 
to Uganda. (d) A longer-term plan for development and location of 
large-scale industries was to be prepared, with the initial assistance 
of a committee of international experts. However, except for the 
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last point, on which no action has yet been taken, the Agreement 
focused on allocation of investment rather than on raising the 
overall rate of industrialisation. Above all, the Agreement did not 
establish definite organisational arrangements and terms of reference 
for continuous coordination of industrialisation policies. As the 
separate national governments pursue their activities autonomously 
with only perfunctory consultation, irritations naturally build 
up and periodically break out in mutual recriminations. 
A viable system for coordination of industrialisation policies 
in East Africa should be aimed not at one, but at two, objectives. 
These joint objectives are (a) to raise substantially the total rate 
of industrial investment in East Africa and (b) to ensure that future 
industrial investment is geographically distributed approximately 
equally among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It is essential to 
set the first objective because present industrialisation is still quite 
limited (about 100,000 employees in manufacturing), because the 
new plans depend on stepping up the rate of growth of manufac-
turing, and because only raising total investment substantially 
can significantly ease the strain of adjusting its distribution among 
the three countries. It is essential to set the second objective because 
Kenya has moved well ahead of her two partners in the common 
market (45 per cent of manufacturing employment in 1962, 61 per 
cent of gross product in manufacturing, and 77 per cent of inter-
territorial exports of non-food manufactures), and because modifying 
the location of future industrial investment is a condition for accept-
ing the common market in Tanzania and Uganda. If both objectives 
can be attained, however, all three countries will benefit. 
In devising a viable coordination system, six possible policy 
instruments can be usefully distinguished. 
(1) Promotion and persuasion. Each national government is 
already engaged in investigating possible industrial projects, 
publicising promising possibilities to both foreign and domestic 
firms, and exerting whatever powers of persuasion or pressure it 
possesses to encourage industrial investment. The effectiveness of this 
instrument should not be underestimated, and it will surely continue 
to be used. It is especially suited for separate use by the national 
governments, and the strains of rivalry in its use should be manageable. 
(2) Facilities and services. Each government also undertakes 
various activities designed to provide inputs, to lower costs, or 
to diminish uncertainties for new industrial projects, and thus to 
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raise their expected profitability to private firms. Among such 
activities are preparation of industrial sites, lending institutions 
providing finance at below-market rates, and for foreign firms, 
defined policies about repatriation of profits and capital. Again 
this instrument is important, and is bound to be continued. Again it 
would be reasonable to leave it to the national governments. 
(3) Public enterprises. The Uganda Development Corpora-
tion has played a leading entrepreneurial role in Uganda industry. 
The National Development Corporation in Tanzania is now likely 
to play a similar role both in management and in finance, and the 
Development Finance Company of Kenya will be active in provision 
of finance for industrial enterprises. Public enterprises can accelerate 
industrialisation either by accepting greater risks in pioneering new 
branches of industry, or by accepting lower rates of financial profit in 
branches of industry which are especially stimulating to the rest 
of the economy. It seems likely and desirable that public enterprises, 
if managed energetically and non-politically, will be an important 
policy instrument in the future. Public enterprises appear particularly 
useful for the exercise of initiative by the three national governments. 
(4) Business tax credits. As of 1965 the key features of company 
income taxation are a corporation tax rate of Shs. 8 in the pound 
(40 per cent), none of which is deductible by shareholders from 
individual income tax, and investment allowances for industrial 
buildings and equipment permitting 120 per cent of cost to be 
written off over their useful lives.6 Tax provisions are traditionally 
kept uniform by consultation among the three finance ministers, 
through E.A.C.S.O., but there is nothing to prevent one country 
setting its rates independently, or competition in tax policies break-
ing out. Tax holidays for new enterprises have been discussed in 
the past, and the IBRD mission to Uganda recommended 
a particular formula. The official positions up till now, however, 
have been that all tax benefits should apply to existing as well as 
new enterprises, that a generally favourable tax climate is the most 
important inducement, and that the present tax system provides 
adequate stimulus for industrial investment. I shall discuss below 
why I believe that much more should be done with business tax 
credits, and that this policy instrument should be used in a 
coordinated way. 
(5) Protection. Customs duties are already used rather ener-
getically to protect domestic industries. There is a fairly general 
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rate of nearly 40 per cent ad valorem for products considered 
desirable to protect, and higher ad valorem or specific rates apply 
in particular cases. Again duties are traditionally kept uniform 
by consultation among the three finance ministers, through 
E.A.C.S.O. Customs duties must be substantially uniform to prevent 
duty-avoiding transhipment between the members of the common 
market, and it is anomalous that there is no formal agreement 
among the three governments committing themselves to set common 
tariffs and defining procedures which must be followed in changing 
customs duties. Individual governments can and do raise the 
effective protection indirectly, however, by granting customs 
drawbacks to domestic producers for duties on imported materials 
or other inputs. Moreover, since the Kampala Agreement Tanzania 
has introduced quotas rather extensively on inter-territorial imports. 
It seems to me essential that arrangements for coordinated use of 
these three protective instruments be agreed upon. 
(6) Licensing. Domestic producers of certain scheduled manu-
factured products can be granted licences, through E.A.C.S.O., 
giving some protection against domestic competition during the 
term of the licences. However, the list of scheduled products is 
short, competition has subsequently been permitted in some 
scheduled products, the administrative process has often ended in 
deadlock, and the industries allocated in the Kampala agreement 
have not gone through the licensing procedure. The three IBRD 
missions to Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya successively recom-
mended that licensing be abandoned as ineffective and negative. 
Certainly under present conditions it is almost impossible to employ 
licensing to influence industrial location. An applicant who believes 
that investment will be more profitable in one of the three countries, 
but who is offered a licence only if he locates in another, may either 
drop his application for a licence or not invest at all; in the meantime 
rivalry is intensified among the three governments, and uncertainty 
delays the investment. Some change in present arrangements to 
use this policy instrument seems clearly needed; if it is retained 
for large-scale industries its use must surely be coordinated. 
It seems to me that a viable middle way between entirely 
national plan implementation and unplanned operation of the 
common market would be an agreement to employ the last three 
policy instruments—business tax credits, protection, and licensing—• 
only through a coordinating mechanism, and to reserve the first 
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three instruments—promotion, facilities, and public enterprises— 
for the exercise of national initiative. In the light of recent experience, 
there would have to be a formal agreement by which the national 
governments committed themselves to coordinated use of these 
particular instruments for at least one plan period, and in which 
the governments established a definite mechanism for continuous 
coordination. The mechanism would presumably include a tri-
partite committee, but it should provide for continuous represent-
ation of the three governments, some executive staff, and agreed 
terms of reference. The terms of reference should set forth the two 
objectives of raising the total rate of industrial investment in 
East Africa and of ensuring approximately equal distribution of 
future investment among the three countries. To approach the 
first objective, the governments should undertake to make much 
more vigorous use of business tax credits, as well as rationalised 
use of protection and licensing. To approach the second objective, 
the governments should commit themselves to authorise supple-
mentary inducements to investment in a lagging country, if its 
share of future industrial investment fell below a certain minimum. 
These are rather sweeping suggestions, but if the three governments 
wish to agree, a pattern of cooperation along these lines would 
permit mutually beneficial use of the range of policy instruments 
available to promote industrialisation. 
The chief new instrument suggested here is business tax credits. 
There are many technical considerations involved, but let me 
indicate a few points which seem attractive. First, there should 
be a combination of higher tax rates and larger tax credits. Higher 
rates are needed in recognition of pressing government revenue 
needs for development, and to permit a significant tax differential 
between comparatively static and comparatively dynamic firms. 
Larger tax credits are needed to grant lower effective taxes to new 
and expanding firms, both to permit greater reinvestment of current 
profits and to raise the expected profitability of investment of new 
capital. Whereas comparatively static firms can reasonably be 
expected to provide additional general government revenue, com-
paratively dynamic firms will already be contributing appropriately 
to development if their profits are used for continuing expansion. 
Second, one form of tax credit should be a tax holiday for new 
domestic or foreign firms, and for separable new establishments 
of existing firms, which initiate production of new manufactured 
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products. Tax holidays in various forms are now commonly 
offered by underdeveloped countries, and such benefits would 
bring East Africa into line with practices elsewhere. A principal 
advantage of a tax holiday over an investment allowance is that 
it would not give special tax encouragement to introducing capital-
using rather than labour-using processes. Third, another form of 
tax credit should be provided for existing establishments which 
expand production of their existing product lines at above-average 
rates. A large share of total industrial investment is bound to be 
undertaken by establishments already operating in East Africa, 
and it seems clearly desirable to stimulate expansion by these 
establishments as well as new ones. The formula should limit 
benefits to those existing establishments which expand at above-
average rates, however. The formula itself might be tied to the 
rate of growth of value added or of a physical output measure, but 
it would be particularly interesting if it were tied to the rate of 
growth of employment, which might in some cases encourage 
more labour-using processes. 
Protection is already being used as an instrument of industriali-
sation policy, and it may at first sight appear that the only change 
is to establish a clear legal basis for setting a common external 
tariff. Two other significant changes should be provided for, however. 
First, as import substitution proceeds, and the share of manufac-
tured consumer goods in total imports falls while the shares of 
intermediate goods and capital goods rise, it would be desirable 
to alter the customs structure to maintain customs revenue. Duties 
on intermediate goods should be set at a substantial revenue rate, 
while duties on finished goods are adjusted to maintain present 
effective protection where necessary, and export rebates are in-
troduced to prevent East African goods from becoming less competi-
tive internationally. With such a revised customs structure, the 
leverage of customs drawbacks on imported materials in affecting 
investment decisions would be notably increased. Second, the 
use of quotas for temporary protection against inter-territorial 
imports should be subject to joint approval, in the same way as 
the other policy instruments being operated through the coordinat-
ing committee. 
Licensing should also be available as a policy instrument, 
for industries in which the minimum plant size is largely relative to 
the East African market. To make it more readily available, the 
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range of products potentially eligible for licences should be greatly 
extended, to cover a considerable list of products not now produced 
in East Africa which might be introduced in the next decade or so. 
In practice, it might not be necessary to use licensing, in addition 
to tax credits and protection, in more than a limited number of 
cases. Licensing is generally an inferior instrument, because of its 
restrictive effect on subsequent investment, and should be used 
only as a third choice for particular large-scale industries. 
These three policy instruments operating through the coordi-
nating committee would be employed both to raise the total rate of 
industrial investment, and if it proved necessary, to affect the 
distribution of new investment among the three countries. An 
important technical problem is how to measure the share of industrial 
investment being received by each of the three countries, so as 
to determine whether supplementary inducements for investment 
should be authorised for a lagging country. It seems to me that 
the final decision that a country's share has fallen below the accept-
able minimum must involve the exercise of discretion by the govern-
ments, but using agreed criteria. The coordinating committee might 
keep track of three main measures—each country's share of addi-
tional manufacturing employment, its share of additional gross 
product in manufacturing, and its share of gross capital formation 
excluding residential construction and agricultural investment. 
It seems to me preferable not to attempt to measure such effects 
as induced demand for inter-territorial exports or revenue transfers 
through the fiscal system, since the commonly accepted objective 
is rough equality of the direct benefits of industrial activity. The 
measures would have to be examined over several years (say, an 
average of the past two years compared to an average of the previous 
two). Decisions should of course be reached as promptly as the 
evidence permits, but it should be recognized that the aim is a 
long-term adjustment of the pattern of industrial location. It would 
not be meaningful to specify an exact minimum share of future 
industrial investment, but it would be reasonable for the govern-
ments to state the principle that remedial action should be authorised 
whenever one country's share fell as low as a quarter. 
When it was decided that a country's share had fallen below 
an acceptable minimum, it would be authorised to offer supple-
mentary inducements to projects within its boundaries. The two 
most effective instruments for influencing the location of industrial 
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investment are likely to be additional tax credits and larger customs 
drawbacks on imported materials. These devices would directly 
raise the profitability of investment in the lagging country, offsetting 
the other locational considerations which have caused the lag. 
They also have the advantage that they would affect most those 
projects for which the other locational considerations were least 
decisive. Quotas could assist in getting new industrial projects 
established, and since they would be temporary, they would also 
affect most those projects close to being profitable already. In 
particular cases the governments through the coordinating commit-
tee might also grant exceptional duties or licences, on condition 
that the project was located in a lagging country. 
The ideas sketched in this section are of course no panacea 
for problems of economic cooperation within the East African 
common market. On the other hand, if the governments wish to 
agree, it seems to me that a viable pattern of coordination of some 
instruments of industrialisation policy, while other instruments 
are left to the separate initiative of the national governments, can 
be established. I have discussed industrialisation policies at this 
length partly because of their crucial importance for the success 
of the new plans. In addition, industrialisation policies illustrate 
nicely both the process of using several policy instruments coherent-
ly to attain a plan objective, and the distinctive problems of 
coordinating national policies within a common market. 
Will the Plans Succeed? 
An obvious question which arises from the analysis in this 
monograph of development planning in East Africa is whether 
the new plans can reasonably be expected to succeed. The question 
needs to be more sharply defined, however. If the question is whether 
the new plans will be so decisive that, say, nine-tenths of the 1970 
variables considered in the published plans will actually turn out 
within 5 per cent of the projections, I would suggest that the proba-
bility of success is quite low. There are simply too many uncertainties 
both in the autonomous influences on the East African economies 
and in present understanding of the operating relationships within 
them. If the question is whether the new plan in Tanzania or in 
Uganda will suceed in raising monetary GDP at constant prices to 
the 1970 target (or presumed 1971 target in the case of Uganda), 
I would still not wager a large sum of money at even odds. For 
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these 'ambitious' plans, it would be a truly spectacular achievement 
to raise the overall rate of growth so sharply so soon. Kenya's 
plan has of course a better chance to achieve its 'moderate' target. 
If, however, the question posed is whether the new plans will 
succeed in initiating a much wider range of development activities 
and policies than in the past, and in raising the sustainable rate 
of growth of monetary G D P at constant prices substantially, say 
above 6 per cent, then I would suggest that there is a quite high 
probability of success in all three countries. It seems to me that this 
is the right criterion for judging the ultimate success of a develop-
ment plan: does it mobilise additional development efforts through-
out the economy so as to accelerate measurably the overall rate 
of growth? 
Success even in these terms will still depend on many conditions. 
The plans count on substantial assistance from foreign governments. 
In view of the likely critical constraints on achievement of much 
higher growth objectives, foreign aid will be more effective if it 
emphasises provision of government finance, including in parti-
cular a significant portion of local costs of development projects, 
and provision of technical assistance personnel, in ways which are 
most readily absorbed into the government's personnel system.7 
The most fundamental condition, however, is effective implement-
ation of the new plans by the East African governments. Key 
questions affecting success of the plans are whether the govern-
ments will be able to establish centralised surveillance of develop-
ment projects, to make coherent use of economic policy instruments 
for guiding private development activities, and to agree upon a 
viable accommodation of national plan implementation and specific 
policy coordination within the common market. 
Footnotes: 
1. The income tax changes announced in the budget speeches of June 1965 
did shift the burden from retained profits toward distributed profits by 
levying corporation tax on total profits, eliminating any tax credit in 
calculating personal income tax on dividend income, and dropping the 
penalty tax on undistributed profits of closely-held companies. At the 
same time, the administrative procedures announced for the new systems 
of exchange control were clearly designed to interfere as little as possible 
with regular non-capital transactions. 
2. Adjusting the mix of public projects according to employment content 
could be most consistently done by applying a standardised project 
analysis procedure with a low scarcity value for the labour employed, 
as discussed in the first chapter. As of June, 1965, however, none of 
the governments was stressing these policy instruments, though Kenya 
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had obtained a once-for-all employment rise by agreement among 
employers, unions, and the government, now expiring. 
3. For discussion of many other aspects of East African economic co-
operation see C. Leys and P. Robson, editors, Federation in East Africa, 
Oxford University Press, 1965; and Aaron Segal, East Africa: Strategy 
for Economic Cooperation, E.A. Inst, of Social and Cultural Affairs, 1965. 
4. The most thorough analysis available of the development effects of the 
common market is Philip Ndegwa, The Common Market and 
Development in East Africa, E.A. Publishing House, 1965. See also 
sources in footnote 3. 
5. Prospects for a number of large-scale industries are examined in U. N., 
Economic Commission for Africa, Report of the ECA Industrial Co-
ordination Mission to East and Central Africa, mimeographed, Dec. 1963. 
See also A. F. Ewing, "Industrialisation and U.N.E.C.A.", Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3. 
6. The corporation tax rate is, according to the budget speeches, to be 
reduced to Shs. 7/50 in the pound for 1966. 
7. For discussion of many aspects of foreign aid in East Africa see the 
papers presented in Proceedings, University of East Africa Conference 
on Foreign Aid, Dar es Salaam, forthcoming. 
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